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ABSTRACT 
Research in workplace safety has focused on either the physical approach that emphasizes 
ergonomic design of the environment and work-related equipment, an environmental 
approach that emphasizes potential hazards such as noise, toxins, and temperature, or a 
behavioural approach that emphasizes changing employee behaviours that are deemed to 
be responsible for workplace incidents such as accidents, injuries, fatalities, and safety-
related events. I built on this research (i) to develop and validate an HPWS for safety scale, 
and (ii) to propose and test a model of processes through which unit level HPWS for safety 
influence individual level safety outcomes. This thesis reports the findings of four studies. 
Three of these studies focused on the development and validation of an HPWS for safety 
scale while the fourth study used the validated scale to examine the processes through 
which HR practices influence workplace safety. Data were analyzed using multilevel 
structural equation modelling (MSEM) with Mplus version 7.3. The findings revealed that (i) 
experienced HPWS for safety directly relates to safety behaviours and also indirectly through 
safety knowledge and safety motivation, (ii) experienced HPWS for safety relates to both 
safety-specific events and workplace injuries through a mediational chain of safety 
knowledge and safety compliance, (iii) experienced HPWS for safety relates to workplace 
injuries through a mediational chain of safety knowledge and safety initiative, (iv) 
experienced HPWS for safety relates to both safety-related events and workplace injuries via 
safety motivation and safety compliance, (v) the use of HPWS for safety significantly related 
to unit safety climate, (vi) the use of HPWS for safety significantly related to experienced 
HPWS for safety while unit-level safety climate moderated the safety knowledge-safety 
compliance relationship. Lastly, the findings provide support for the psychometric properties 
of the scale. I also discussed the theoretical and practical implications of the findings, 
highlighted the study’s strengths and limitations, and then mapped out some directions for 
future research. 
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1.0. CHAPTER 1:   INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background of the Study 
Workplace accidents claim millions of lives and cause even more disabilities each year 
worldwide, including about 5600 work-related fatal injuries each year between 2002 and 
2008 (U.S. Bureau of Labour Statistics, 2011), and approximately 3 million work-related 
injuries and illnesses in 2013 (U.S. Bureau of Labour Statistics, 2014). The International 
Labour Organization (2011) corroborates the preceding reports by suggesting that at least 
2.34 million employees died because of work-related incidents or diseases in 2008 
(amounting to 6300 work-related deaths per day) and 317 million work-related injuries. Thus, 
globally, it has been estimated that the number of work-related fatalities exceeds the number 
of road fatalities or violent deaths (Howard, 2014). Although official statistics on workplace 
incidents such as accidents, injuries, safety-related events and, of course, fatalities are 
unreliable in Nigeria, estimates suggest that on average, 200 industrial accidents occur per 
day in Nigeria, with between 100 and 200 occupational fatalities per year (Fajana, 2010).  
Given that a considerable number of work-related injuries and illnesses are not reported for a 
variety of reasons (U. S. Government Accountability Office, 2009), it is possible that actual 
workplace injuries and illnesses will be greater than the existing figures suggest. Research 
into workplace safety has been motivated by not only the high financial costs of accidents 
and damage to corporate reputation, but also the human costs of pain, sufferings and grief 
that employees and their families experience (Nahrgang, Morgeson & Hofmann, 2007). 
 
Studies on workplace safety have consistently employed three distinct but conceptually 
related approaches: (i) the physical approach that emphasizes ergonomic design of the 
environment and work-related equipment; (ii) an environmental approach that emphasizes 
potential hazards such as noise, toxins, and temperatures; and (iii) a behavioural approach 
that emphasizes changing employee behaviour that are deemed to be responsible for 
injuries, accidents, and fatalities in the workplace (Smith, Karsh, Carayon, & Conway, 2003). 
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The focus of the current study is on behavioural safety in the workplace because safety 
problems stem not only from the poor attitudes of management towards workplace safety 
(Coyle, Sleeman, & Adams, 1995) but also from employees’ unsafe behaviours including 
recklessness, violation of safety rules and regulations and from nonchalant attitudes to 
hazards (Laurence, 2005; Zohar & Luria, 2003; Hobbs & Williamson, 2002). Margolis (1973) 
notes that employee attitudes toward safety are directly related to management attitudes 
toward safety. In support of Margolis (1973), Beck and Feldman (1983) opine that the 
execution of safe work practices is contingent upon what employees expect. The foregoing 
arguments suggest that management’s and employees’ safety-related attitudes and 
behaviours are equally important in the consideration of employees’ workplace safety. Thus, 
there is need to shift the research spotlight from the other two approaches (i. e. ergonomic 
and environmental) to a behavioural approach to workplace safety.  
 
Previous behavioural approach to workplace safety has tended to focus on either an 
individual or organizational level of analysis. At the individual-level of analysis, studies have 
reported relationships between employees’ perceptions of their work environment or other 
individual factors (e.g. job insecurity, experienced high performance work systems [HPWS], 
safety attitudes) and safety outcomes such as accidents, injuries (e.g. Neal & Griffin, 2006; 
Huang, Ho, Smith, & Chen, 2006; Clarke, 2006; DeJoy, Schaffer, Wilson, Vanenberg, & 
Butts, 2004; Mearns, Whitaker, & Flin, 2003; Barling, Loughlin, & Kelloway, 2002; Probst & 
Brubaker, 2001), and near misses (e.g. Zacharatos, Barling, & Iverson, 2005). At the 
organizational or unit-level of analysis, organizational factors or aggregated climate 
perceptions have been examined as predictors of safety outcomes such as accidents and 
injuries (e.g. Wallace, Popp, & Mondore, 2006; Zacharatos & colleagues, 2005; Zohar & 
Luria, 2004; Zohar, 2002). While research from each stream has made significant 
contributions, Deitz, Carlson, Donavan, Babakus, and Hansen (2011) note that neither a 
micro- nor macro- approach alone can meaningfully account for differences in, for example, 
safety outcomes. Although research (e.g. Gerhart, 2005, Bowen & Ostroff, 2004) suggests 
16 
 
that Strategic Human Resource Management (SHRM) should move closer to the individual 
level by emphasizing the impact of human resource practices on employee attitudes, very 
limited research has to date examined both individual (e.g. employee perceptions of HR 
practices, behaviours) and organization or unit-level (e.g. use of HR practices; climate) 
predictors of workplace safety (Wallace & Chen, 2006) in the same study. The dearth of 
research that has adopted a multilevel approach to examining the influence of high 
performance work systems (HPWS) on individual safety outcomes limits our understanding 
of the nested nature of antecedents to employee safety knowledge/safety motivation and 
behaviours, and ultimately safety outcomes. 
 
A paucity of research has examined the influence of individual human resource practices 
such as selecting for safety, safety compensation or rewards (Lauver, 2007) and training 
(Lauver, 2007; Harvey, Bolam, Gregory, & Erdos, 2001) on workplace injuries. However, 
extant research has shown that HRM practices are more likely to yield positive effects for the 
organization when they are introduced as part of a coherent system, rather than as single 
“best practices” (Kling, 1995).  In support of Kling (1995), Dyer and Reeves (1995) assert 
that these systems “seem to be superior to any of the individual HR activities of which they 
are composed” (p. 668). This resonates with SHRM research that focuses on bundles of 
HRM practices and their impact on organizational outcomes (Jiang, Lepak, Hu, & Baer, 
2012; Buller & McEvoy, 2012; Becker & Huselid, 1998). Unfortunately, our understanding of 
the role of HPWS in workplace safety is limited. Although some research (e.g. Evans & 
Davis, 2015; Zacharatos & colleagues, 2005) has begun to link HPWS practices to safety, 
the extant literature demonstrates only limited insights into the influence of HPWS on 
employee safety outcomes. Thus, the lack of adequate research attention to HPWS as 
potential predictors of workplace safety has left us with several unanswered questions. First, 
do HPWS influence employees’ safety outcomes? If so, what are the processes or 
mechanisms through which HPWS influence workplace safety?   
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Whereas there is considerable evidence that HPWS are associated with organizational 
performance (e.g. Aryee, Walumbwa, Seidu, Otaye, 2012; Combs, Liu, Hall, & Ketchen, 
2006; Wright, Gardner, Moynihan, & Allen, 2005; Boselie, Dietz, & Boon, 2005; Bartel, 2004; 
Batt, 2002; Arthur, 1994), research has identified a number of theoretical and methodological 
limitations (Ferris, Arthur, Berkson, Harrel-Cook, & Fink, 1998). For example, it has been 
observed that there is a little consensus among researchers concerning the specific practices 
to be included in the configuration of the HPWS (Collins & Smith, 2006; Datta, Guthrie, & 
Wright, 2005; Delaney & Huselid, 1996). Thus, there is a call for SHRM researchers to “see 
the development of reliable and valid measures of HRM systems to be one of the primary 
challenges for……...advancing…………research” (Delaney & Huselid, 1996, p. 967). 
Although research seems to have addressed this concern, most of the scales developed in 
response to this call do not have strategic focus (Lepak, Liao, Chung, & Harden, 2006; 
Bowen & Ostroff, 2004). Fundamental to SHRM is the construct of HPWS that is defined as a 
“system of HR practices designed to enhance employees’ skills, commitment, and 
productivity in such a way that employees become a source of sustainable competitive 
advantage” (Datta & colleagues, 2005, p. 136). Predicated on the assumption that adoption 
of a specific organizational strategy (e.g. safety) aligned with a system of internally coherent 
human resource practices rather than individual isolated practices influence organizational 
performance (Lepak & colleagues, 2006), a few studies have examined the influence of a set 
of HRM practices on workplace safety (e. g. Evans & Davis, 2015; Zacharatos & colleagues, 
2005). However, none of these studies focused on the development and validation of a 
safety-specific HPWS measure.  While Liao, Toya, Lepak, and Hong (2009), for example, 
reported an HPWS for service quality, to the best of my knowledge and in spite of the relative 
importance (compared to production) of workplace safety, research has yet to develop and 
validate an HPWS for safety measure. 
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Two perspectives have often been assumed on the HRM-performance relationship by SHRM 
researchers. The first perspective is based on a system approach where current research in 
this area has now shifted emphasis away from separate or individual HRM practices and 
employee performance to a more macro focus on the overall set of HRM practices and 
organizational performance (e.g. Huselid, Jackson, & Schuler, 1997; Huselid & Becker, 1996; 
Huselid, 1995). In other words, rather than examining the effects of individual HRM practices 
on organizational (e.g. Delery & Doty, 1996; Delaney & Huselid, 1996) or on individual 
performance, the present trend in SHRM research focusing on HRM-performance 
relationship is to consider a system of HRM or a configuration of HRM practices (Ferris & 
colleagues, 1998). 
 
The second perspective has been the strategic approach (Ferris, Hochwarter, Buckley, 
Harrell-Cook, & Frink, 1999). In this strategic-based approach, the particular “fit” between 
various HRM practices and the organization’s competitive strategy have been examined (e.g. 
Miles & Snow, 1994; Wright & Snell, 1991). Embedded in this perspective is the argument or 
notion that, to be effective, HRM systems should achieve “horizontal fit” in such a way that 
these practices complement and are aligned with one another and achieve “vertical fit” in 
such a manner that the HRM system is aligned with the organizational strategy (Becker & 
Gerhart, 1996; Huselid, 1995; Wright & McMahan, 1992). Consistent with this “fit” notion, 
Bowen and Ostroff (2004, p. 206) suggest that the content of HRM system “should be largely 
driven by the strategic goals and values of the organization” and that “the foci of the HRM 
practices must be designed around a particular strategic focus” such as workplace safety. 
The importance of this statement is that, for HRM systems to be effective, they must reflect 
how employees add values, and this can be realized only when the HRM practices are linked 
within a system toward some strategic focus or anchor. This implies that the HRM systems 
must be objective-specific in order to achieve maximum effects on organizational 
performance. In support of this argument, Liao and colleagues (2009) opine that without 
being objective-specific, HRM systems lack a clear direction for employees. As a result, all 
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dimensions of the HPWS should be selected and designed to achieve specific organizational 
objectives. 
 
In response to this orientation, SHRM researchers have not only adopted a configurational 
perspective to conceptualize HPWS, but have also developed HPWS with an objective-
specific focus. For example, Liao and colleagues (2009) derived some dimensions of their 
measures primarily from Zacharatos and colleagues’ (2005) general measure of HPWS 
practices and Delery and Doty’s (1996) general measure of HPWS for banking industry and 
adapted them in their study to have a service-quality focus. Building on this scenario of 
HPWS differentiation views and prior research on objective-specific HPWS (e.g. Liao & 
colleagues, 2009), I argue that HPWS should strategically anchor around a specific 
organizational objective-workplace safety, and that practices within the system (i.e. HPWS 
for safety practices) should supplement one another in order to create synergistic effects. 
 
Another issue in the safety literature is a lack of clear and consistent construct definitions and 
conceptualizations (cf. Clarke & Robertson, 2005). Although workplace safety research has 
safety as its ultimate outcome, it is unclear what constitutes safety outcomes or performance. 
Thus, it has been noted that research has not always distinguished between safety 
behaviours and safety outcomes (Christian, Bradley, Wallace, & Burke, 2009). A number of 
studies have either focused on accident and injury rates while others have focused on 
employee behaviours. It is here argued that this lack of distinction in the definition and 
conceptualization of safety constructs retards our understanding of the outcomes of efforts to 
promote workplace safety. Fishbein (1979) and Fishbein and Azjen (1975) have called for 
the need to distinguish between outcomes (e.g. safety-related events, workplace injuries) 
and behaviours (e.g. safety compliance, safety initiative). Consequently, this study considers 
safety behaviours as distinct from safety outcomes. Safety behaviours are here defined as 
actions or behaviours individuals demonstrate that promote health and safety in the 
workplace. In contrast to safety behaviours, safety outcomes are tangible events or results 
20 
 
such as workplace injuries, accidents, fatalities (Christian & colleagues, 2009; Barling & 
colleagues, 2002), and safety-related events. 
 
While research on workplace safety has predominantly focused on safety compliance model 
(Gomez-Mejia, Backin, Cardy, & Dimick, 1997; Montgomery, 1996; Cooper, Philips, 
Sutherland, & Makin, 1994), it has been argued that safety compliance alone cannot foster 
workplace safety. Although enforcement of safety compliance may help address unsafe 
work-related behaviours, these behaviours cannot be predicted in a growing number of work 
situations and therefore safety outcomes (e.g. accidents, injuries, etc.) cannot be avoided by 
ensuring safety compliance. Thus, in addition to relying on management practices that 
ensure rule enforcement (i.e. safety compliance), it has been acknowledged that workplace 
safety may involve discretionary behaviours (Hofmann, Morgeson, & Gerras, 2003; Griffin & 
Neal, 2000). In other words, organizational practices (e.g. HR practices) could also enhance 
safety through rule development (e.g. safety initiative) as a way of fostering workplace safety. 
 
Research in SHRM has shown that a management strategy emphasizing high-commitment 
(Wood & de Menezes, 1998; Walton, 1985) and high-involvement (Lawler, 1996, 1986) work 
practices offers a constructive alternative to a rule enforcement (or safety compliance) 
approach. Walton (1985) argues that high commitment work practices (HCWP) provide an 
environment that enhances workers’ commitment leading to mutually beneficial outcomes for 
both employees and organizations. In the same vein, high involvement management 
practices (HIWP) focuses on the empowerment of the employees through increased 
dissemination of information and participation in decision making (Zacharatos & colleagues, 
2005). Thus, work practices that generate high levels of commitment and involvement (e.g. 
HPWS) promote employee discretionary behaviours.  
 
Zacharatos and colleagues (2005) argue that HPWS could be applied to improve workplace 
safety “just as well as firm economic performance” (p. 78). This resonates with the argument 
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that safety should be regarded as a performance variable just like production, profits, sales, 
customer services and quality control (Kivimaki, Kalimo, & Salminen, 1995; Griffiths, 1985). It 
is also consistent with Kaminski (2001) who suggests that many of the HR management 
practices that are frequently utilized to enhance organizational performance might have 
similar effects on workplace injuries. Building on the preceding arguments, Zacharatos and 
colleagues (2005) conducted two separate studies that investigated (i) the influence of 
human resource management practices on safety performance (measured in terms of lost 
time injuries) at the organizational level and (ii) at the individual level, the mechanisms 
through which employee perceived HPWS influence safety performance. While Zacharatos 
and colleagues’ (2005) studies extended prior research on HPWS-performance relationships 
by establishing a link between HPWS and workplace safety, there are some methodological 
limitations in their study. For example, in their first study, a single organizational 
representative provided data with regard to the existence or use of high commitment 
management practices in their respective companies. It has been observed that a single-
rater design has questionable reliability status (Bowen & Ostroff, 2004; Gerhart, Wright, 
McMahan, & Snell, 2000). 
 
In view of the foregoing limitations, and grounded in social exchange theory (SET: Blau, 
1964) and social information processing (SIP: Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978) perspective, data 
obtained from oil and gas industry in Nigeria were used to test a model of the mechanisms 
(mediation and moderation) through which the use of HPWS for safety influences individual 
employee safety outcomes. Specifically, the objectives of this study were: 
To build on existing research to develop and validate a theoretically informed measure of 
HPWS for safety; and 
To propose and test a multilevel model of the mechanisms through which unit-level HPWS 
for safety influence safety outcomes. 
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These objectives are schematically depicted in a multilevel conceptual model shown in 
Figure 2.1. This study proposes a multilevel model of the relationship between unit-level 
HPWS for safety and employee safety outcomes. I proposed that the unit level HPWS for 
safety is directly related to unit level safety climate and employee experienced HPWS for 
safety. I also proposed that experienced HPWS for safety is indirectly related to safety 
behaviours of safety compliance and safety initiative through safety knowledge and safety 
motivation. Furthermore, I proposed that experienced HPWS for safety is related to safety 
outcomes of safety-related events and workplace injuries through the mediating effects of 
both safety knowledge and safety motivation, and safety behaviours of safety compliance 
and safety initiative. Again, I proposed that unit level safety climate moderates the effects of 
safety knowledge and safety motivation on safety behaviours of safety compliance and 
safety initiative. Lastly, I proposed that safety knowledge/safety motivation and unit safety 
climate interact to foster employee safety outcomes of safety-related events and workplace 
injuries through the mediating effects of safety behaviours of safety compliance and safety 
initiative.  
1.2. Theoretical Contributions of the Study 
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. 
Whereas research has shown that HPWS can be applied to workplace safety (Evans & 
Davis, 2015; Zacharatos & colleagues, 2005) as well as firm economic performance (Wright 
& colleagues, 2005; Bartel, 2004; Batt, 2002), research has yet to develop a safety-specific 
measure of HPWS. Thus, informed by Bowen and Ostroff’s (2004) recommendation that 
HRM practices should be driven by an organization’s strategy focus, the current study 
developed and validated an HPWS for safety measure. Although the constituent domains of 
HPWS for safety scale initially built on extant HPWS research, they are driven by a focus on 
enhancing workplace safety. I utilize a rigorous empirical procedure to establish the construct 
validity of the new HPWS for safety measure that should extend the psychometric properties 
and predictive validity of similar scales in this area. It is therefore, expected that this measure 
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of HPWS for safety should address two issues in SHRM literature: (i) Delaney and Huselid’s 
(1996) concerns that the SHRM literature “is distinguished by the fact that virtually no two 
studies measure HRM practices in the same way” (p. 967), Delery’s (1998) concerns with 
regards to the absence of theoretically informed measure of HPWS practices (Delery, 1998), 
and (ii) the need for a strategically-focused HPWS (Bowen & Ostroff, 2004) which is related 
to but goes beyond the motivation for Delaney and Huselid’s call. Thus, the development and 
validation of an HPWS for safety measure centres on the foundation human resource issues 
(Schneider, White, & Paul, 1998) that must be addressed if the strategic objective of safety 
performance is to be accomplished (Bowen & Ostroff, 2004). 
 
Second, research (e.g. Wallace & Chen, 2006) has acknowledged that productivity and 
safety are both important dimensions of overall performance on many jobs. Although prior 
research in SHRM has linked HPWS to performance outcomes, extant literature indicates 
that the focus has been on productivity to the neglect of workplace safety. Zacharatos and 
colleagues (2005) noted this gap and consequently extended prior research on HPWS-
performance relationships to include occupational safety. Extending their research, this study 
examines the intermediate mechanisms through which HPWS for safety influence workplace 
safety outcomes. In doing so, it demonstrates that performance can be measured in a 
number of different ways and that HPWS can have positive effects on a variety of outcomes, 
including safety outcomes, depending on the priorities of the organization (Zacharatos, 
2001). It also bridges the research domains of strategic HRM and safety in order to enhance 
our understanding of the role of safety in SHRM research and to make a subtle distinction in 
the theoretical refinement of SHRM and safety literatures. 
 
Third, in spite of the recognition of multilevel studies (Wright & Nishii, 2007; Wallace & Chen, 
2006; Ostroff & Bowen, 2000), most prior safety research has focused on relationships 
between variables at either the organizational or individual level of analysis without due 
cognizance of the interplay between individual behaviours and organizational variables. For 
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example, Zacharatos and colleagues, (2000) conducted two separate studies linking HPWS 
to workplace safety. Their first study linked the use of HPWS to occupational safety at the 
organizational level while the second study focused on the influence of employee 
perceptions of the use of HPWS on occupational safety at the individual level of analysis. 
Thus, there is a relative dearth of empirical work examining a multilevel approach to explicate 
HPWS-safety outcomes relationships. By adopting a multilevel approach, this study explicitly 
recognizes the integrated nature of organizations in such a way that individual and 
organizational characteristics combine to influence individual outcomes (Kozlowski & Klein, 
2000). In other words, it enhances our understanding of how and why organizational and 
individual factors combine to shape the attitudinal and behavioural effects of the use of 
HPWS for safety and thereby provide organizations and managers with actionable 
knowledge about how to use safety-related HR practices effectively to promote workplace 
safety. 
 
Lastly, Christian and colleagues (2009) note the lack of clear and consistent construct 
definitions and conceptualizations as a shortcoming in the safety literature. This lack of 
conceptual distinction constrains our understanding of the impact of workplace safety 
promotion. Consequently, this study extends the extant safety literature by responding to the 
recent call (See Christian & colleagues, 2009) to distinguish between safety behaviours and 
safety outcomes. Clear delineation of the two constructs is a critical step to facilitate not only 
the organization of accumulated knowledge, but also the development of theory in the safety 
domain (Christian & colleagues, 2009). Another issue which is often overlooked in safety 
literature is the final linkage between safety performance as behaviour and safety outcomes 
(e.g. Neal, Griffin, & Hart, 2000; Griffin & Neal, 2000; Sigmard & Marchand, 1995). Rarely 
have the two been examined in the same study. 
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1.3. A Brief Literature Review and Definition of Key Constructs 
1.3.1. High-Performance Work Systems (HPWS) 
Over the past two decades or so, organizations have become interested in the concept of 
strategic management and its corollary, strategic HRM. Researchers in business-related 
disciplines have attempted to tie the methods and tools of their disciplines to the strategy of 
the firm (Wright & McMahan, 1992). But because of the apparent lack of integration across 
the various HRM functions, the attempts made to tie each functional area to the firm’s 
strategy independent of the other functions resulted in such phenomenon as “strategic 
selection,” “strategic appraisal,” “strategic development,” and “strategic rewards” (Fombrum, 
Trichy, & Devanna, 1984). While the perspective of HRM has been extended by these efforts 
by admitting the necessity for each individual sub-function to be aligned with organizational 
goals, the interplay between all of the functions was neglected (Wright & Snell, 1991; 
Lengnick-Hall & Lengnick-Hall, 1988). However, following the pressure to become a strategic 
partner in the emergence of SHRM (e. g. Bowen & Ostroff, 2004; Ulrich, 1998; Wright & 
McMahan, 1992; Fombrum & colleagues, 1984), researchers have begun to approach the 
field from a more macro perspective, that is, a perspective that could precisely be referred to 
as strategic human resource management (SHRM) (Butler, Ferris, & Napier, 1991).  
 
According to Wright and McMahan (1992), SHRM is the pattern of planned human resource 
deployments and activities that are intended to enable an organization to achieve its goals. 
Wright and McMahan’s (1992) definition of SHRM emphasized two fundamental elements 
that differentiate it from traditional HRM. First, vertically, it involves the linking of HRM 
practices with the strategic process of the organization (Dyer, 1985). Second, horizontally, it 
highlights the coordination or synergy among the various HRM practices (Wright & Snell, 
1991; Baird & Meshoulam, 1988; Schuler & Jackson, 1987) through a pattern of planned 
action (Wright & McMahan, 1992). 
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A fundamental principle of SHRM research is that the impact of HRM practices on individuals 
as well as organizations can best be understood by examining a bundle (Lepak, Liao, Chung, 
& Harden, 2006a; Pil & MacDuffie, 1996; MacDuffie, 1995) or configuration (Delery & Doty, 
1996) of HR practices. Reflecting this background, studies on HRM have focused on High-
Performance Work Systems (HPWS), a term defined as a configuration of HRM practices 
intended to enhance employee’s skills, commitment, and performance in such a way that 
employees become a source of sustainable competitive advantage (Kim & Wright, 2010; 
Becker & Huselid, 2006; Datta, Guthrie, & Wright, 2005; Bowen & Ostroff, 2004; Youndt & 
Snell, 2004; Godard, 2004; Pfeffer, 1998; Lawler, 1996, 1992; Levine, 1995). Research (e.g. 
Datta, Guthrie, & Wright, 2005; Levine, 1995; Huselid, 1995; Arthur, 1994; Lawler, 1992) 
suggests these systems to include practices such as rigorous selection procedures, internal 
merit-based promotions, grievance procedures, cross-functional and cross-trained teams, 
extensive training, information sharing, participatory mechanisms, group-based reward, and 
skill-based pay. Although Macky & Boxall (2007) observe that there is no consensus on an 
ideal bundle or configuration of these policies and practices, the logic is that HPWS shape 
and align employees’ attitudes and behaviours (e.g. safety behaviours) with the strategic 
goals of the organization (e.g. workplace safety) thereby enhancing organizational 
performance (Schuler & Jackson, 1987). As Macky and Boxall (2007) put it, “while there are 
a number of theoretical, empirical, and practical dimensions on which these constructs differ, 
a common theme is the notion that the HR practices involved should form a coherent, 
integrated ‘bundle’; a system of complementarities whose effect is greater than the sum of 
parts” (p.537).  
 
Guided by Bowen and Ostroff (2004) who indicate that the content of HR systems “should be 
largely driven by the strategic goals and values of the organization” and that “the foci of 
human resource management practices must be designed around a particular strategic 
focus” (p. 206) such as workplace safety, this study developed a measure of HPWS for 
safety. HPWS for safety, in this context, is defined as a system of separate but 
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interconnected HR safety practices designed to enhance employee knowledge (i.e. skills or 
competencies) motivation, and safety-related performance. Thus, HPWS for safety includes 
such components as safety training, safety rewards, internal opportunity for promotion, safety 
involvement and participation, performance appraisals, self-managed team, safety 
information sharing, safety audit, safety campaign, and safety equipment maintenance. 
1.3.2. Safety Performance 
Safety performance has been looked at from different perspectives. For example, it has been 
used to refer to two different concepts. First, it has been referred to as a metric for safety-
related behaviours of individuals (e.g. Clarke, 2006; Zacharatos & colleagues, 2005; Neal & 
Griffin, 2004; Burke, Sarpy, Tesluk, & Smith-Crowe, 2002; Marchand, Simard, Carpentier-
Roy, & Quellet, 1998). On the other hand, it has also been conceptualized as an 
organizational metric for safety outcomes, such as number of injuries per year (e.g. 
Zacharatos & colleagues, 2005). Thus, it is paramount to distinguish safety-related 
performance/behaviours from safety outcomes of those behaviours because each of them 
might have differential pattern of relationships with antecedents (Christian & colleagues, 
2009). 
 
Christian and colleagues (2009) note that when safety performance is conceptualized as 
individual behaviours, it provides researchers with a measurable criterion that is more 
proximally related to psychological factors than safety outcomes such as accidents or 
injuries. Zohar (2000) observes that safety performance behaviours are better predicted than 
safety outcomes. In their model of safety performance, Burke and colleagues (2002) 
conceptualize safety behaviours as “actions or behaviours that individuals exhibit in almost 
all jobs to promote the health and safety of workers, clients, the public, and the environment” 
(p. 432). This study conceptualizes safety behaviours as actions or behaviours individuals 
demonstrate that promote health and safety in the workplace. 
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Marchand and colleagues (1998) contend that a unidimensional model of safety performance 
that focuses on employees’ compliance with safety rules and procedures is inadequate and 
therefore propose an expanded model that includes employee safety initiatives. 
Distinguishing between task and contextual performance, Neal and colleagues (Griffin & 
Neal, 2000; Neal & colleagues, 2000; Neal & Griffin, 1997) developed a two-dimensional 
model comprising safety compliance, defined as “adhering to safety procedures and carrying 
out work in a safe manner”, and safety participation, defined as “helping co-workers, 
promoting the safety programme within the workplace, demonstrating initiative, and putting 
effort into improving safety in the workplace” (Neal & colleagues, 2000, p.101).  
 
In this study, safety outcomes are defined in terms of accidents, injuries and safety-related 
events. Accidents have often been assumed to be caused by employee attributes (Laurence, 
2005; Zohar & Luria, 2003; Hobbs & Williamson, 2002; Barling & Hutchinson, 2000; Margolis, 
1973) or human error (Dekker, 2002). Thus, the extant workplace safety literature frequently 
suggests relationship between individual-level factors and workplace injury (e.g. Salminen & 
Tallberg, 1996; Hudson, Reason, Wagenaar, Bentley, Primrose, & Visser, 1994; Sutherland 
& Cooper, 1991; Feyer & Williamson, 1991; Reason, 1990a; Hansen, 1989; Hale & Glendon, 
1987) leading managers to control workplace safety through the selection of particular types 
of employees and to introduce interventions that are geared toward the modification of 
employee behaviours (Parker, Axtell, & Turner, 2001). 
 
Research shows that, although there might be evidence that links a small group of 
personality characteristics to injuries or accidents (See Hansen, 1989; Shaw & Sichel, 1971), 
this relationship is only indirectly. Wallace, Popp, and Mondore (2006) comment that 
although human error represents unsafe behaviours and accidents that are attributable to a 
person, it does not provide much insight into the behavioural mechanisms that lead to unsafe 
behaviours. Dekker (2002) believes that “human error is not an explanation for failure, but 
instead demands an explanation” (p.372). His new view of occupational accidents sees 
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human error and unsafe behaviours as symptoms and not direct causes. Thus, it is proposed 
that effective safety measures should focus not just on the individual employee who is mainly 
at the receiving end but also on the arrowhead such as the organizational factors (e.g. 
organizational leadership or HRM). 
 
Therefore, attempting to identify the organizational and managerial factors and the human 
factors that interact to impact workplace safety is an objective of the current study. Thus, the 
study examines the influence of a system of separate but interconnected safety-related 
human resource practices on workplace safety outcomes in terms of workplace injuries and 
safety-related events through their impacts on employees’ safety knowledge/safety 
motivation, and safety behaviours. 
 
1.4. Research Setting 
The data for this study will be collected from oil and gas industry in Nigeria. The choice of 
Nigeria’s oil and gas industry as a target population is motivated by some salient factors. 
First, research evidence shows that studies investigating HPWS and safety outcomes in 
‘critical skills occupations’ such as the oil and gas industry (See Cantor, 1992) are scant. 
Smith-Crowe, Burke, and Landis (2003) describe ‘critical skills occupations’ as occupations 
requiring high levels of knowledge and skills in order to perform jobs safely. Thus, this study 
posits that oil and gas industry in Nigeria falls within the purview of Smith-Crowe, Burke, and 
Landis’ (2003) description of critical skills occupations. Second, research indicates that, 
although similar work in this area has been carried out in Western (e. g. U.S., UK, Australia) 
and Asian (e.g. China, India) countries, little if any, has been done in less developed but 
emerging economies such as Nigeria. Third, Nigeria is presently the world’s 10th largest 
producer and 5th largest exporter of crude oil, petroleum and petroleum products forming 
95% of her commodity exports. Official statistics on fatalities and accidents are unreliable, 
largely because organizations are unwilling to expose themselves to compensation claims 
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and a lack of appreciation on the employees’ behalf of their rights despite relatively high 
levels (approximately 60%) of union membership (Fajana, Owoyemi, Elegbede, & Gbajamo-
Sheriff, 2011). However, estimates suggest that on average, 200 industrial accidents occur 
per day in Nigeria, with between 100 and 200 occupational fatalities per year (Fajana, 2010). 
 
HRM practices operate within economic, social, political, and legal settings. In order to gain 
an insight into the local conditions, processes, philosophies, and problems involved in 
developing national models of HRM practices, there must be a due consideration of the 
historical and cultural milieu (Hofstede, 1993) as well as the local values, and customs of the 
employees (Fajana & colleagues, 2011). Thus, research has begun to realise that HRM 
practices have to be tailor-made. For example, comparing data from 13 different countries 
based on HRM practices, Sparrow and Budhwar (1997) found world-wide differences in the 
use of HRM practices. Their findings suggest that countries are unique in their approach to 
HRM. What this means is that what works in one country (with regard to HRM practices) 
might not work well or as much in another country. The implication of their findings therefore, 
is that organizations will have to focus more on HRM practices designed to meet the needs 
of local employees. Additionally, research (e.g. Fajana & colleagues, 2011) reports that HRM 
practices in Nigeria are still much at infancy stage and that lack of indigenous and 
comprehensive HRM models characterize HRM practices in Nigeria. Thus, there is need for 
research to explore the indigenous and comprehensive HRM models particularly with regard 
to health and safety in the Nigerian context (Fajana & colleagues, 2011). Consequently, this 
study has proposed a conceptual model (See figure 2.1) that may be suitable to HRM 
practices in Nigeria and has developed a measure of HPWS (for safety) that is culture-free 
and suitable for use in an emerging economy like Nigeria. 
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1.5. Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter 2 reviews social exchange theory (SET) and social information processing 
perspective (SIP) as the theoretical perspectives that underpin the conceptual model I 
proposed and tested in this study. It also suggests the rationale for choosing SET and SIP as 
the most appropriate theoretical framework as against other possible theories such as 
regulatory focus theory, self-determination theory, and perceived organizational support 
theory. Furthermore, this chapter discusses the context of the study and presents AMO 
theory as the theoretical underpinning for the development and validation of HPWS for safety 
scale. Specifically, I discussed the tenets of these theories, their appropriateness for this 
study, and how they informed my choice of variables. Chapter 2 also presents the literature 
review and hypotheses development. 
 
Chapter 3 presents the development and validation of the HPWS for safety scale. This 
chapter discusses the scale development process starting with the rationale for a safety-
specific HPWS measure, the philosophical perspective adopted by the research, and then 
the generation of the initial pool of items, followed by three studies to validate the newly 
developed HPWS for safety scale. The ethical issues core to this research were also 
discussed. 
 
Chapter 4 describes the methodology of the main study. First,the ethical issues core to the 
research were clearly acknowledged, followed by the description of the sample and data 
collection procedure as well as measures of the study variables. Second, the chapter 
describes and justifies the use of multilevel structural equation modelling (MSEM) with Mplus 
to test the study’s hypotheses. 
 
Chapter 5 presents the results of the findings of the analyses. First, it reports results of 
analyses to ascertain the discriminant, convergent, and criterion-related validity of the study 
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constructs. Second, it reports the results of the MSEM analyses adopted to test the 
hypothesized relationships depicted in figure 2.1. Lastly, it presents a table of the summary 
of main findings. 
 
Chapter 6 is the discussion and conclusion chapter. It presents a summary of the key 
findings of the study and discusses the theoretical and practical implications of these 
findings, the limitations and strength of the study, and maps out directions for future 
research. 
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2.0. CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK, CONCEPTUAL 
 MODEL, AND DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
2.1 Introduction 
This study proposes and examines a multilevel model of why and when HPWS for safety 
impacts employees’ safety outcomes as well as the mechanisms hypothesized to mediate 
and moderate the relationships. The chapter discusses the context of the study and draws on 
social exchange theory (SET) and social information processing perspective (SIP) to account 
for the hypothesized relationships depicted in figure 2.1. It also considered other alternative 
theories such as regulatory focus theory, self-determination theory, and perceived 
organizational support theory, and advanced reasons why SET and SIP were found to be 
more appropriate theoretical frameworks as compared to these other possible alternative 
theories. It further draws on AMO theoretical framework to develop and validate an HPWS 
for safety scale. First, it is important to appreciate the context for the research and to this 
effect, I will first present a brief overview of the state of development of HRM in Nigeria and 
particularly in the oil and gas industry. 
 
2.2. Research Context 
This section presents the circumstances that form the setting for the conduct of this research 
and in terms of which it can be fully understood. The study was conducted in oil and gas 
industry in Nigeria. In Nigeria, the oil and gas industry contributes well over 95 percent of its 
foreign earnings and this suggests the importance of this sector to the overall development of 
the country. Nigeria, with a population of about 140 million people, has a growth rate of 3.2% 
(Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette, 2007). It is the 10th largest producer of oil in the 
world and, until recently when it was overtaken by Algeria, it was also the largest producer of 
the product in Africa (Oyejide & Adewuyi, 2011). It also ranks the ninth largest gas reserve 
holder in the world and the largest in Africa (Yakubu, 2013).  
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Relatively, little research has been conducted on HRM in developing countries in general 
(Budhwar & Debrah, 2001) and Nigeria in particular. Therefore, as elsewhere in developing 
countries, HRM practices and policies are not well documented in Nigeria as it is in the 
developed countries (e.g. Sission & Storey, 2000; Schuler & Jackson, 1999; Poole, 1999; 
Poole & Warner, 1998). However, due to the privatization and liberalization policies adopted 
by the federal government in the 2000s, there were more foreign investments. Therefore, as 
foreign firms increased their involvement in Nigerian economy, there was the need to build 
capabilities and utilize local competencies. Thus, the knowledge of HRM and more 
importantly, the knowledge of the factors that affect HRM in Nigeria became more 
increasingly critical to the way and manner business was done in Nigeria (Ovadje & 
Ankomah, 2001). Ovadje and Ankomah (2001) noted that Personnel Management was still 
very much an administrative function concerned with recruitment, payroll, and record 
keeping. Relatively, few companies, usually medium to large companies and multinational 
companies, have a formal Personnel or HR department. In addition, in most of these 
companies, the Personnel Manager typically reports to the head of the Finance and 
Administration (Ovadje & Ankomah, 2001). However, in very few cases, he or she is a 
member of the top management.  
 
The HRM is a strategic function in the oil and gas industry in Nigeria (Ovadje & Ankomah, 
2001). This is because the HR and HRM policies and practices in the oil and gas industry in 
Nigeria model those of the developed countries because of the presence of multinational 
corporations. For example, HRM evolved over time beginning with the transformation of 
Personnel Management into HRM and moving from there to the incorporation of industrial 
relations into HRM (Guest, 1991). Then, there was the integration of HRM into business 
strategies, devolvement of HRM to line managers (Brewster & colleagues, 1997; Budhwar 
&Sparrow, 1997), and now we look at HR as a source of competitive advantage for 
organizations (e.g. Wright & colleagues, 1994; Schuler & MacMillan, 1984). Currently, there 
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is a consensus that HRM contributes to firm’s performance (See Schuler & Jackson, 1999; 
MacDuffie, 1995; Huselid, 1995). Based on the foregoing, the present study posits that 
safety-related HRM practices contribute to employee safety outcomes via their safety 
behaviours. 
 
The federal government is the largest employer of labour in Nigeria. As a result, its actions 
and policies concerning HR and HRM go a long way in determining what happens in the 
entire public and private sectors. For example, when wages and salaries are reviewed in the 
public sector, the employees in the private sector also get their own wages and salaries 
reviewed by way of unions’ negotiations. Therefore, the HRM policies in Nigeria vis-à-vis oil 
and gas companies are subject to the whims and caprices of the government policies. To 
enhance the HR development in the oil and gas industry in Nigeria, therefore, the federal 
government established the Petroleum Training Institute (PTI) in Effurun in 1972 and 
Petroleum Technology Development Fund (PTDF) in Abuja in 1990. The PTDF was 
established with the sole aim to develop the work force capacity (HR) of the country to 
enable it to actively participate in the development, exploration, and exploitation of the 
mineral resources in the country. The PTDF was given the responsibility to upgrade the PTI 
to a Centre of excellence. The PTI was primarily charged with the specific mandate to, 
among others: 
1. Provide courses of instruction, training and research in oil and gas technology and to 
provide technicians and such skilled personnel that are normally required for oil and gas 
industry; 
2. Organize conferences, seminars, and study group relative to the requirements of oil 
and gas industry (Olorunsola, 2012). 
 
The Institute therefore provides training in professional HR and safety specifically for the oil 
and gas industry by serving as an Industrial Training Centre, offering job-oriented training in 
both regular and part-time programmes in order to meet the specific needs of the industry. 
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This is in line with Ovadje and Ankomah (2001) who observe that the training and 
development functions of HRM are regulated by government policies. Thus, in line with the 
government policy on HR and safety development, oil and gas companies in Nigeria have a 
set of formal HRM and safety policies and practices embedded in their structure. For 
example, they operate their HR and safety policies and practices with the aim to increase 
employees’ knowledge, skills, and abilities to perform their job; empower or motivate them to 
perform their job; and create opportunity for them to perform their job (Delery & Shaw, 2001; 
Becker & Huselid, 1998). One of the ways they do this is to provide their workers with 
education subsidies to enable them embark on job-related training. Some of the companies 
include this allowance in workers’ wages while others prefer to maintain educational and 
training subsidy programmes. In either case, it is expected that the training course be job-
related and beneficial to both employees and employers. 
 
All of the organizations surveyed have HR departments headed by HR managers and 
subordinated by HR line managers who are in charge of the units within the departments. 
Therefore, the HR functions are well represented on the board and affect, largely, the 
business strategy development of the organizations. The strategic partnership status enjoyed 
by the HR functions in oil and gas industry in Nigeria enables us to understand not only the 
role that HR plays in the organizational development, but also in the effective implementation 
of organizational strategy and ultimately, safety performance. Therefore, the oil and gas 
industry in Nigeria provides an appropriate context on which to investigate why and how the 
use of HPWS for safety facilitates employee safety outcomes in the workplace.  
 
2.3. Theoretical Framework 
2.3.1. Social Exchange Theory (SET) 
Social exchange theory (SET) is one of the dominant paradigms for understanding workplace 
behaviour. Its origin can be traced back to the 1920s (See Mauss, 1925; Malinowski, 1922) 
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and its use cuts across several disciplines such as sociology (Blau, 1964), social psychology 
(e.g. Gouldner, 1960; Thibault & Kelly, 1959), and anthropology (e.g. Sahlins, 1972; Firth, 
1967). Despite the fact that there are divergent views of social exchange, theorists have 
acknowledged that social exchange entails a series of interactions that generate obligations 
(Emerson, 1976) and has therefore been used to account for the development and 
maintenance of interpersonal relationships.  
Blau (1964) was among the first to distinguish between social exchange and economic 
exchange. Social exchange involves “favours that create diffuse future obligations, not 
precisely specified, and the nature of the return cannot be bargained...... but must be left to 
the discretion of the one who makes it” (Blau, 1964, p.93). Economic exchange, on the other 
hand, is established based on contractual relationship that requires specific performance of 
contractual obligations with no expectation of performance beyond the terms of reference 
specifically provided in the contract (Blau, 1964). It represents short-term economic 
inducements offered, for example, by employers to employees in exchange for well-specified 
contributions by the employees (Tsui, Pearce, Porter, & Hite, 1995). The basic difference 
between economic and social exchange therefore, is that social exchange entails 
unspecified, broad, and open-ended obligations on the part of both parties (Blau, 1964). 
Economic exchange is based mainly on transactions whereas social exchange relationships 
are based on mutual trust that the individual party to the exchange will be fair in discharging 
their obligations in the long run (Holmes, 1981). Konovsky and Pugh (1994) emphasize that 
this trust is necessary for maintaining social exchange, especially in the short-run, where 
some temporary or perceived deviations or differences may exist between an individual’s 
inducements- that is, the benefits received from participation in the social exchange 
relationship- and contributions, the individual’s inputs into the relationship. Again, the 
expectation of long-term fairness in social exchange differentiates it from the expectation of 
short-term fairness that generally defines economic exchange. Thus, like economic 
exchange, social exchange entails a relationship that elicits an expectation of some future 
return for contributions, whereas, unlike economic exchange, the exact nature of the return is 
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not indicated. In addition, social exchange does not occur on a quid pro quo or calculated 
basis (Konovsky & Pugh, 1994). 
 
Cropanzano and Mitchell (2005) suggest that one of the principles of SET is that 
relationships evolve over time into trusting, loyal, and mutual commitments. In order to 
achieve this, the parties involved must abide by certain “rules” of exchange. According to 
Emerson (1976), the rules of exchange characterize a “normative definition of the situation 
that forms among or is adopted by the participants in the exchange relation” (p. 351). In this 
manner, the rules and norms of exchange are “the guidelines” of exchange processes. 
Cropanzano and Mitchell (2005) posit that reciprocity is perhaps the best known exchange 
rule. 
 
Reciprocity entails interdependent exchange that involves mutual and complementary 
arrangements that define the characteristics of social exchange (Molm, 1994). It emphasizes 
contingent interpersonal transactions, whereby an action by one party leads to a response by 
another. For example, if a person supplies a benefit, the receiving party should respond in 
kind (Gergen, 1969). Gouldner (1960) explains that within SET, positive behaviours are 
promoted through the norm of reciprocity. Reciprocity is a condition whereby when one party 
receives a favour from the other party, the party that received the favour is required to 
provide something in return in a “mutually gratifying pattern of exchanging goods and 
services” (Gouldner, 1960, p.170).  
 
As earlier noted, although SET was originally developed to account for the development and 
maintenance of interpersonal relationships, it has since been extended to workplace 
relationships (Shore, Tetrick, & Barksdale, 1999). The theory posits that if one party in a 
social interaction acts in a way that benefits the other party, a mutual expectation will arise 
that this behaviour will be reciprocated at some later stage. In other words, the theory 
proposes that when individuals provide services that are valuable to others, the beneficiaries 
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of these services respond with a certain level of obligation (Mearns & colleagues, 2010). 
Beneficiaries experience an obligation to reciprocate the good deeds thereby making 
reciprocity the axis around which social exchange-based relationships revolve. 
 
Social exchange theorists distinguish between discretionary and mandatory actions which 
organizations undertake. They posit that discretionary or voluntary aid that the organization 
gives makes the employees believe that they are genuinely respected and valued by the 
organization, whereas mandatory or expected actions do not have any positive influence on 
their beliefs about the organization (Eisenberger & colleagues, 1997; Cotterell, Eisenberger 
& Speicher, 1992; Gouldner, 1960). This suggests that management behaviour that purports 
or demonstrates to offer supports to employees in a variety of ways would generate an 
obligation among employees to reciprocate by contributing to the goals of the organization. 
For example, it has been observed that where organizations invest in individual training and 
development programmes, employees reciprocate through desirable work-related behaviours 
(Moorman, Blakely, & Niehoff, 1998; Wayne, Shore, & Liden, 1997; Haas & Deseran, 1981). 
In addition to statutory provisions, investing in HPWS for safety practices signals to 
employees the organization’s care and concern for the safety and well-being of its 
employees. If employees interpret these activities to suggest appreciation, investment, and 
recognition of their contributions, they will perceive themselves as being involved in a long-
term social exchange (Shore & Shore, 1995) with its inherent reciprocal obligations.  
 
Given the above arguments, SET informs the relationships depicted in model 2.1. HPWS 
entails the creation of a mutual investment based on employment relationship, where an 
organization invests in employee skills and opportunities and, in turn, expects them to be 
qualified and motivated to contribute to work-related investments in the organization 
(Huselid, 1995). Thus, HPWS not only signal an organization’s interest to maintain a long-
term relationship with its employees but also to strengthen the socio-emotional (e.g. 
employee well-being, safety) aspect of the exchange. When HPWS practices are interpreted 
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by employees as expressing appreciation, investment, and recognition, they begin to 
perceive themselves in a social exchange relationship (Shore & Shore, 1995). This creates 
feelings of obligation on the part of employees, and because individuals return favours in the 
light of positive treatment received from others (Blau, 1964), employees are more likely to 
reciprocate the organization’s favourable treatment by developing appropriate behaviours 
that foster its goal attainment. 
 
SET has been utilized by researchers (e.g. Sun & colleagues, 2007; Takeuchi & colleagues, 
2007; Allen, Shore, & Griffeth, 2003) to justify the theoretical relationships between HRM 
practices and attitudinal, behavioural and performance outcomes. For example, Allen and 
colleagues (2003) found supportive human resource practices such as participation in 
decision-making, fairness of rewards, and growth opportunities to contribute to employees’ 
perceived organizational support, which mediated the relationships between HRM practices 
and organizational commitment, job satisfaction, and employee turnover. According to them, 
POS represents the strength of the employees’ perceived social exchange relationship with 
the organization. Sun and colleagues (2007) also contend that the mediating role of service-
oriented citizenship behaviour in the relationship between high performance human resource 
practices and both productivity and turnover represents a relational view of the employment 
relationship, with employees reciprocating the favourable treatment received from the 
organization. In a similar vein, Takeuchi and colleagues (2007) found high performance work 
practices rated by both managers and employees to be highly related to collective human 
capital, an establishment level social exchange, which mediated the relationship with a 
subjective measure of establishment performance. In this study, I tested the formulation of 
SET by examining the mechanisms through which experienced HPWS for safety influence 
individual safety outcomes. 
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2.3.2. Social Information Processing Theory (SIP) 
Social information processing (SIP) theory (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978) was developed as an 
alternative perspective to needs satisfaction theories (e.g. Hackman & Oldham, 1976; 
Alderfer, 1972; Herzberg, 1968; Vroom, 1964; Argyris, 1957; Maslow, 1943). Models of 
needs satisfaction posit that individuals possess different sets of needs which have to be 
met, and that jobs possess distinct objective characteristics that have the potentials to meet 
these needs and thus increase individuals’ levels of satisfaction (Pollock, Whitbred, & 
Contractor, 2000). Job attitudes and, sometimes, motivation, are assumed to be the outcome 
of the correspondence between the needs of the individual and the characteristics of the job 
or the job situation (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1977). The implication, therefore, is that jobs that 
meet the individual needs are satisfying whereas those that do not are not satisfying. Thus, it 
is assumed that if an individual is satisfied with his or her job, it is because the job has 
characteristics compatible with his or her needs and if the individual is not happy with his or 
her job, it is because the job is not satisfying his or her needs. 
 
Although the need-satisfaction model has been the theoretical framework almost universally 
applied to understand work-related attitudes (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1977), this approach has 
met with some criticisms (See Staw & Ross, 1985; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978; Salancik & 
Pfeffer, 1977). For example, it has been noted that these models appear to deny individuals’ 
capacity to provide their own satisfaction by cognitively reconstructing situations (Salancik & 
Pfeffer, 1977). Thus, the repeated failures to find empirical support for models of universal 
human needs (Hulin & Blood, 1968; Turner & Lawrence, 1965) prompted Salancik and 
Pfeffer (1978) to come up with SIP theory, suggesting that individual needs and perceptions 
of job characteristics are not fixed but are instead, influenced by the social environment or 
the network of social and informational relationships which surround an individual. 
 
The social information processing (SIP) perspective highlights the effects of social context, 
the individual’s past actions and experience with the job, and the individual’s perceptions of 
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the job’s characteristics to predict job satisfaction, rather than individual predispositions (or 
needs) and rational decision-making processes (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978). Thus, this theory 
is built on the premise that individuals tend to adapt their attitudes, behaviours, and beliefs to 
the information they obtain from the social context, cognitive evaluation of the dimensions of 
their work environment, the reality of their past and present behaviours and the situation 
(Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978). This implies that an individual can learn about behaviour by 
studying the information and social environment from which that behaviour emanates and to 
which it adapts. 
 
The SIP perspective posits an individual’s immediate social environment as an important 
source of information, and that this social context is the basic determinant of behaviour 
(Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978). The social context provides individuals with information both 
directly (about what an individual attitudes and behaviours should be) and indirectly (by 
making more or less salient the information about some behaviour: past activities, 
statements, thoughts). Salancik and Pfeffer (1978) further suggest that ‘social context binds 
people to behaviour through a process of commitment, affects the saliency of information 
about their past activities, and provides norms and expectations that constrain their 
rationalization or justification of those activities’ (p. 233). Thus, the social context can 
influence employees’ beliefs about the nature of the workplace (e.g. safety), the appropriate 
employee attitudes, and the needs employees are supposed to possess.  
 
SIP regards a need as an outcome produced by an individual employee instead of a static 
individual characteristic. Salancik & Pfeffer (1978) argue that these needs and the job 
characteristics that are assumed to satisfy them are socially constructed realities, rather than 
fixed. These realities are constructed and shaped through the application of the social 
information cues that individual employees receive from their work environment. Thus, if 
employees are exposed to more positive cues with regards to the organization or unit’s policy 
on and practice of individual safety, these employees will be more likely to express positive 
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feelings about safety. SIP has been employed to account for the development of unit values, 
perceptions, and norms (See Liao & Rupp, 2005; Robinson & O’Leary-Kelly, 1998). 
 
SIP has been criticized because it provides an over socialized view of individual satisfaction 
and for not articulating the process through which the social environment affects individual 
attitudes and perceptions (Staw & Ross, 1985; Blau & Katerberg, 1982). In response to this 
criticism, Pollock, Whitbred, and Contractor (2000) contend that the lack of consistent 
empirical support for SIP is not because of fundamental theoretical flaws, but because of its 
inadequate articulation in prior research. Thus, in spite of the criticism, research (e.g. Aryee 
& colleagues, 2012; Liao & Rupp, 2005; Zalesny & Ford, 1990; Fried & Ferris, 1987; Griffin, 
1983) has applied SIP with some success to examine perceptual and behavioural outcomes 
in addition to attitudinal outcomes. For example, Liao and Rupp (2005) have applied SIP to 
provide the theoretical underpinning for the emergence of justice climate as group-level 
property. Aryee and colleagues (2012) have also used SIP to account for the theoretical 
justification of the relationship between branch-level HPWS and experienced HPWS. 
According to them, branch-level HPWS provides a contextual cue for employees that 
enables them to psychologically interpret their work environment. Drawing on Aryee and 
colleagues (2012), Liao and Rupp (2005), I utilized SIP to account for the theoretical 
justification of the relationship between the use of HPWS for safety and experienced HPWS 
for safety, and as a theoretical underpinning for the emergence of safety climate as a unit-
level property. I also use SIP to explain the relationship between the use of HPWS for safety 
and unit-level safety climate. This is based on Bowen and Ostroff (2004) who suggest that 
the use of HPWS can serve as a signalling function by communicating messages to 
employees about a particular strategic focus, which in this research, is workplace safety. 
Thus, applying this perspective to workplace safety suggests that individual employees who 
work in a shared social environment will receive similar social cues or normative 
expectations regarding appropriate safety-related behaviours. 
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2.3.3. Alternative Theoretical Framework Considered for Inclusion 
A number of related alternative theoretical constructs were considered in developing the 
overall theoretical framework of this study. The dominant among these were regulatory focus 
theory (RFT), perceived organizational support (POS), and self-determination theory (SDT). 
2.3.3.1. Regulatory Focus Theory 
 
Regulatory focus theory (RFT) describes the process of self-regulation focus which indicates 
that people change their behaviours through two coexisting motivational systems (i.e. 
promotion focus and prevention focus) that cater to different needs during goal pursuit (Kark 
& colleagues, 2015). This theory suggests that individuals strive to accomplish tasks using a 
promotion focus strategy that is characterized by an eagerness focus or concern for 
accomplishing greater quantity of work more quickly, or using a prevention focus strategy, 
characterized by a vigilance focus or concern for adhering to work-related rules, 
responsibilities, and regulations. Although “both promotion and prevention involve motivation 
to approach or attain a new task goals, they differ in their orientations towards how to 
successfully attain the goals” (Kark & colleagues, 2015; Lanaj, Chang, & Johnson, 2012; 
Forster, Higgins, & Bianco, 2003; Higgins, Friedman, Harlow, Idson, Ayduk, & Taylor, 2001, 
p.21). Because of their achievement emphasis on getting work done more quickly, 
employees adopting promotion focus might behave unsafely in pursuit of their goals. Thus, 
while it is possible for the adoption of promotion regulatory focus to increase one’s 
accomplishment by increasing the quantity and speed with which the employee completes 
the task, it is likely that the overall effectiveness may reduce because of the possible 
increase in safety incidents and errors at work. On the other hand, employees adopting a 
prevention focus may strive to work in a safe manner to reduce the possibility of being 
involved in an accident and to ensure task completion. However, this is likely to reduce 
output because of a vigilant work focus and thus increase the overall effectiveness by 
reducing the possibility of accidents involvement (Forster & colleagues, 2003). 
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Research (e.g. Wallace, Chen, & Kanfer, 2005; Forster & colleagues, 2003) seems to 
indicate that promotion focus increases speed at the expense of accuracy whereas 
prevention focus increases accuracy at the expense of speed. For example, Wallace and 
colleagues (2005) found promotion focus to be positively related to productivity performance 
while prevention focus is positively related to safety performance. However, they found that 
when production and safety were viewed as competing variables, promotion focus was 
negatively related to safety while prevention focus was negatively related to production. 
Therefore, it seems likely that, in a more demanding work context, promotion focus fosters 
productivity at the expense of safety whereas prevention focus tends to foster safety at the 
expense of productivity (Wallace & Chen, 2006; Beersma, Hollenbeck, Humphrey, Moon, 
Conlon, & Ilgen, 2003). However, Wallace and Chen (2006) contend that productivity and 
safety are both important dimensions of overall performance on many jobs. In addition, a 
meta-analytic research (e.g. Viswesvaran, Schmidt, & Ones, 2005) indicates an evidence for 
a general factor in performance ratings, meaning that productivity and safety are positively 
related dimensions of performance. The above explanations indicate that what RFT speaks 
to is not what this current research is interested in. Thus, the suitability of the complete 
theory will be questionable if utilized to facilitate the relationships hypothesized in the study’s 
conceptual model. 
 
2.3.3.2. Perceived Organizational Support 
 
Perceived organizational support (POS) reflects employees’ perceptions concerning the 
degree to which their organization values their contributions and cares about their well-being. 
The underpinning or framework of POS is derived from SET that was developed to explain 
the maintenance of interpersonal relationship in the context of work environment. The only 
important distinction made by social exchange theorists is the issue of discretionary versus 
mandatory actions that organizations exhibit. Social exchange theorists contend that favours 
received from others will be highly valued if they are given based on discretionary choice 
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rather than circumstances that are beyond the giver’s control. The recipient sees such 
voluntary favours as a demonstration of the giver’s genuine value and respect for the 
recipient (Cotterell, Eisenberger, & Speicher, 1992; Eisenberger, Cotterell, & Marvel, 1987; 
Blau, 1964; Gouldner, 1960). However, mandatory actions do not have any positive effect on 
employees’ beliefs of the organization (Cotterell & colleagues, 1992; Gouldner, 1960). Thus, 
although POS is relevant to extricate the relationships postulated in the study’s conceptual 
model, the theoretical arguments will be similar to those of SET since it is a part of the 
underpinning SET agenda. Therefore, it is more appropriate to adopt SET as against POS as 
the theoretical underpinning of this study. 
 
2.3.3.3. Self-Determination Theory 
 
Self-determination theory (SDT) posits that people are intrinsically motivated to actively seek 
challenges and new experiences to develop and perform at their best (Deci & Ryan, 1985). 
Although these actions tend to be self-determined to the extent that they are approved or 
endorsed by one’s sense of self (Deci, Vallerand, Pelletier, & Ryan, 1991), certain 
environmental factors are needed in order to enhance this sense of intrinsic motivation. 
Thus, SDT is described as organismic-dialectical metatheory that sees people as proactive 
organisms whose intrinsic functioning can be either facilitated or impeded by social context 
(Deci & Ryan, 1991, 1985). 
 
SDT is characterized by the relative strength of autonomous versus controlled motivation as 
opposed to the total motivation that characterizes other work motivation theories (Gagne & 
Deci, 2005). Research indicates that, whereas autonomous motivation facilitates effective 
performance and well-being, controlled motivation can detract from those outcomes, 
particularly if the task requires creativity, cognitive flexibility or deep processing of information 
(Gagne & Deci, 2005). Thus, the two aspects can be considered to be contradictory in the 
sense that more time is needed to, for example, engage safety behaviours (safety 
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compliance and safety initiative) which can distract employees from their core duties. This 
will tend to create in the employees a dissonance behaviour because they will have to think 
of prioritizing certain behaviours over others. What is relevant in the current study is the 
concern of the organization for the health and well-being of the individual employees and 
how employees would reciprocate the good treatment received from the organization if given 
based on discretion. Thus, SDT does not seem to speak to what the current research is 
interested in. Therefore, I see the use of SET to be more appropriate in the theoretical 
underpinning of the relationships depicted in the study’s conceptual model.  
 
2.3.4. Ability-Motivation-Opportunity (AMO) Theory 
Boxall and Purcell (2011) posit that although the ability-motivation-opportunity (AMO) 
framework has been around for quite some time, the work of Campbell and colleagues 
(1993) presents a formal and more explicit version of AMO theory. Prior research has drawn 
upon the AMO framework (See Bailey, Berg, & Sandy, 2001; Appelbaum, Bailey, Berg, & 
Kalleberg, 2000) to posit employee performance as a function of three key components: 
ability, motivation, and opportunity to perform (Jiang & colleagues, 2012). Representing it 
mathematically, it means: 
                  P = f (A - M - O) 
Ability describes the practices that equip employees with the necessary skills needed to 
undertake their jobs (Cox, Higgins, & Speckesser, 2009). Motivation describes the 
willingness of employees to exert effort to the achievement of organizational objectives and 
may arise from extrinsic/financial rewards, intrinsic drive or from mutual trust/employees as 
stakeholders (Appelbaum & colleagues, 2000). Appelbaum and colleagues (2000) describe 
opportunity as involvement in the decision-making process of the organization. This 
framework suggests that organizational interests are best served by an HRM system that 
attends to employees’ interests such as skill requirements, motivations, and the quality of 
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their job (Boselie & colleagues, 2005; Bailey & colleagues, 2001; Appelbaum & colleagues, 
2000). 
 
Appelbaum and colleagues (2000), Bailey and colleagues (2001) argue that effective HPWS 
are characterized by three basic components: First, HPWS help to build the employees’ 
“skills to participate” (i.e. ability) (Appelbaum & colleagues, 2000; Bailey, 1993). It represents 
the discretionary effort model that suggests that employees in a HPWS need more skills than 
those in traditional work settings. HPWS expects employees to be familiar with and execute 
a wider range of tasks to enable them to develop better skills such as interpersonal and 
behavioural skills. It is also expected that they should be able to take on supervisory and 
coordination function (Bailey & colleagues, 2001). Thus, it is expected that the employees in 
HPWS should receive more formal and informal training. 
 
The second component is “motivation to participate” which comprises incentives that 
encourage employees to participate in decision-making activities. This will include contingent 
compensation, employment security, and transformational leadership (Mendelson, Turner, & 
Barling, 2011). HRM policies that motivate employees to provide more effort that is 
discretionary indicate that firms adopt some type of pay-for-performance such as profit- or 
gain-sharing, or bonuses for meeting production or quality targets (Bailey & colleagues, 
2001). It is believed that when pay is linked to actual performance (e.g. safety performance), 
it will elicit greater discretionary effort from employees. Thus, given the conducive milieu and 
the right incentives, Appelbaum and colleagues (2000) argue that employees may be willing 
to exert additional effort for the organization by being more creative, helpful, giving extra 
attention to details or taking on more tasks (Cox & colleagues, 2009). 
 
Third, is work organization that provides employees with the “opportunity to participate” 
which will include information sharing, reduced status distinctions, and self-managed teams. 
Researchers (e.g. Boxall & Macky, 2009; Wood & Wall, 2007; Appelbaum & colleagues, 
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2000) see the features of AMO as that which make HPWS stand out from other HRM 
practices. This indicates that, for employees to perform above the minimum requirements, 
they must possess the appropriate ability (i.e. the requisite knowledge and skills) to 
participate; be motivated (i.e. given appropriate incentives) to participate and be given the 
opportunity to use their skills and appropriate incentives to provide discretionary effort 
(Purcell, Kinnie, Hutchinson, Rayton, & Swart, 2003; Bailey & colleagues, 2001). They 
describe discretionary effort (e.g. safety initiative) as that contribution of effort beyond what is 
called for or required (e.g. safety compliance) in the job description. They suggest that the 
nucleus of an HPWS is to organize the work process in such a manner that non-managerial 
employees have the opportunity to contribute discretionary effort through participation in 
shop floor problem solving and decision-making. In other words, employees can contribute 
only when they have the autonomy to solve problems and make proposals that can bring 
about positive changes in organizational routines (Doty & Delery, 1997). 
 
Thus, according to Appelbaum and colleagues (2000), discretionary effort is the key to 
HPWS and AMO serves as the conceptual tool to elicit this effort. Specifically, it suggests 
that HPWS increase employee ability to do their job, the motivation to do the job beyond the 
terms of their job descriptions, and the opportunity to exert discretionary effort (Cox & 
colleagues, 2009). The idea of discretionary effort means that employees may be in the 
position to contribute more to the organization than to simply get the job accomplished. 
 
Based on research on AMO framework (e.g. Combs & colleagues, 2006; Wall & Wood, 2005; 
Boselie & colleagues, 2005), the practices that constitute each of the three components of 
AMO have been identified. For example, in an overview of 104 studies published in leading 
academic journals from 1994 to 2003, and relating to HPWS-performance relationship, 
Boselie and colleagues (2005) identify ten (10) top HRM practices that have been frequently 
included in HPWS-performance studies. Similarly, Combs and colleagues’ (2006) meta-
analysis of 92 HPWP-performance studies identify the single HRM practices domains that 
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have been found to be directly related or unrelated to organizational performance outcomes 
(See Table 3.1). A comparison of the work of Combs and colleagues (2006), Boselie, and 
colleagues (2005) reveal two fundamental implications: One is that both studies 
independently identified similar domains of interventions that previous research had included 
as HRM practices. This is in consonant with the emerging consensus that suggests that 
HRM practices should be examined in an HPWS framework (Dorenbosch, 2009). Two, 
Dorenbosch (2009) observes that we can categorize the type of HRM domains among the 
top 10 of the most frequently included HRM practices in accordance with AMO framework. 
Consistent with the preceding discussion, Lepak and colleagues (2006) suggest that it might 
be worthwhile to conceptualize HRM practices as belonging to one of three main AMO 
components: skill-enhancing HRM practices (i.e. ability), motivation-enhancing HRM 
practices, and opportunity-enhancing HRM practices (See Table 3.1). According to Jiang and 
colleagues (2012), the skill-enhancing HRM practices that are designed to ensure 
appropriate development of employee skills include comprehensive recruitment, rigorous 
selection, and extensive training. The motivation-enhancing HRM practices that are designed 
to promote employee motivation include developmental performance management, 
competitive compensation, incentives and rewards, extensive benefits, promotion and career 
development, and job security. The opportunity-enhancing HRM practices that are designed 
to empower employees to utilize their skills and motivation to achieve organizational goals 
include flexible job design, work teams, employee involvement, and information sharing. 
These practices together define the AMO components and thereby foster the discretionary 
behavior central to HPWS 
2.4. Conceptual Model 
Figure 2.1 represents the mechanisms through which HPWS for safety relates to individual 
safety outcomes. As shown in that Figure, HPWS for safety is posited to relate directly to unit 
safety climate but indirectly to individual safety outcomes through a chain of mediating 
mechanisms. Specifically, HPWS for safety relates directly to unit safety climate and 
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experienced HPWS for safety. It also posits that employees’ experienced HPWS for safety 
indirectly influences safety outcomes (measured in terms of workplace injuries and safety-
related events) through the mediating effects of safety knowledge/safety motivation and 
safety compliance/safety initiatives (safety behaviours). Furthermore, it proposes unit safety 
climate to have a cross-level moderating influence on the relationship between safety 
knowledge/safety motivation and safety behaviours (safety compliance and safety initiative). 
This multilevel model is characterized by the simultaneous examination of the mechanisms 
through which HPWS for safety influence individual safety outcomes. Drawing on SET, I 
examined all the hypothesized relationships between experienced HPWS and safety 
outcomes: experienced HPWS for safety-safety knowledge/safety motivation relationship, 
experienced HPWS for safety-safety behaviour relationships, experienced HPWS for safety-
safety knowledge/safety motivation-safety behaviours-safety outcomes relationships, and so 
on. However, underpinned by SIP, I examined the relationship between the use of HPWS for 
safety and safety climate as well as experienced HPWS for safety. In the same vein, 
informed by both SET and SIP, I examined the moderation role of unit safety climate on the 
effects of safety knowledge/safety motivation on safety behaviours on one hand, and on 
safety outcomes of safety-related events and workplace injuries via the mediating roles of 
safety behaviours of safety compliance and safety initiative on the other. 
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2.5. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.5.1. Unit-Level Relationships 
2.5.1.1. HPWS for Safety and Unit-Level Safety Climate 
 
HRM systems emphasize different objectives and therefore, have been known by different 
labels such as high commitment work practices (Collins & Smith, 2006; Wood & de Menezes, 
1998; Walton, 1985), and high involvement work practices (Lawler, 1996, 1986, 1992) and 
HPWS (Becker & Huselid, 1998). As earlier noted, HPWS combines elements of both high 
commitment work practices and high involvement work practices (Zacharatos & colleagues, 
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2005). Researchers in SHRM consider an HPWS to include coherent practices (Appelbaum 
& colleagues, 2000) or a bundle of HRM practices (/Lepak & colleagues, 2006a) that are 
intended to enhance employees’ skills, participation in decision making, and motivation to put 
forth discretionary effort.  Although a number of HRM practices thought to constitute an 
HPWS vary from one study to the other (Posthuma, Campion, Masimova, & Campion, 2013), 
an HPWS typically includes selective staffing, extensive training, performance appraisals, 
compensation, job design, and involvement and participation (Sun, Aryee, & Law, 2007; 
Zacharatos & colleagues, 2005). These practices have been consistently found to have 
positive relationship with employee outcomes as well as the operational and financial 
outcomes of firms. This study expects HPWS to relate to safety climate, a type of 
organizational climate with a specific strategic focus. 
 
Zohar (1980) defines climate as “a summary of molar perceptions that employees share 
about their work environments…...a frame of reference for guiding appropriate and adaptive 
behaviours” (p. 96). Employees develop this shared perception by collecting and interpreting 
information from their work environment (Schneider, Ehrhart, & Macey, 2013). When these 
perceptions are shared and summarized for individual employees within the unit, they are 
referred to as unit climate. Unit climate can be operationalized by aggregating individual 
perceptions to the unit level, using the direct consensus model (Chan, 1998). 
 
It has been argued that different climates can be formed in the same organization as a 
function of various strategic foci of the organization (Schneider, 1990). In support of the 
existence of multiple climates, Schneider and Bowen (1992) posit that a positive climate for 
employees’ safety may be different from a positive climate for employees’ empowerment. 
They suggest, inter alia, that an organization might operate HRM policies and practices that 
promote, for example, employees’ safety and this will have little or no bearing on, for 
example, the empowerment climate except and unless the organization also puts in place 
HRM policies and practices that foster a shared perception of empowerment. Drawing on the 
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work of Schneider and Bowen (1992), research has linked climate to shared, specific foci 
such as climate for service or customer service (e.g. Borucki & Burke, 1999; Schneider, 
White, & Paul, 1998; Burke, Borucki, & Hurley, 1992; Schneider, Wheeler, & Cox, 1992; 
Schneider, 1990), climate for innovation (e.g. Anderson & West, 1998), climates of concern 
for employees and customers (Chuang & Liao, 2010), climate for social exchange (Takeuchi, 
Chen, & Lepak, 2009), and empowerment climate (e.g. Aryee & colleagues, 2012). Based on 
the foregoing, this study investigated employees’ perceptions of the work environment in 
terms of unit safety climate as the unit’s strategic focus and examined the relationship 
between HPWS for safety and employees’ perception of unit safety climate. Unit level safety 
climate is defined as shared perceptions of work environment characteristics as they relate to 
safety issues that affect individuals within the unit.  
 
Although much research has examined antecedents of safety climate, research examining 
the impact of HRM practices on unit safety climate is scant. Consonant with the predictions 
of the SIP perspective (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978), Bowen and Ostroff (2004) observed that 
the use of HPWS can serve as a signalling function by communicating messages to 
employees about a particular strategic focus, which in this context is workplace safety. When 
practices of HPWS are targeted to safety, for example, safety-related training, rewards 
contingent on safety-related performance, safety information sharing, and employee 
involvement in safety-related decision-making, they provide an opportunity to experience a 
sense of choice in initiating and regulating one’s actions (Aryee & colleagues, 2012). 
Employees’ shared perception of these practices and the ingrained messages as facilitating 
safety will come to define their work environment. 
 
In support of this argument, prior research has shown HRM practices to relate to service 
climate (e.g. Jiang, Chuang, & Chiao, 2015; Chuang & Liao, 2010; Salanova, Agut, & Peiró, 
2005). Hong, Liao, Hu, and Jiang (2013) found this relationship to be stronger for service-
oriented HRM practices than general HRM practices. Similarly, Zacharatos and colleagues 
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(2005) found HPWS to relate to perceived safety climate, although at the individual level of 
analysis. Consistent with the preceding theoretical explanations and empirical findings, I 
propose a positive relationship between HPWS for safety and safety climate: 
 
Hypothesis 1: HPWS for safety will positively relate to unit safety climate 
 
2.5.2. Cross-Level Relationships 
2.5.2.1. HPWS for Safety and Experienced HPWS for Safety 
 
Researchers have noted that experience of, rather than implementation of, HPWS is what 
drives the demonstrated outcomes of HPWS (Kehoe & Wright, 2013; Nishii & Wright, 2007; 
Nishii, Lepak, & Schneider, 2008). Although empirical studies that link managerial reports of 
the use of HPWS to employee outcomes are found to be methodologically consistent with 
the earlier research in SHRM, there is still a need for research to assess the role of 
employees’ perceptions of HRM practices in determining their attitudinal and behavioural 
outcomes (Kehoe & Wright, 2013; Nishii & Wright, 2007, Nishii, Lepak, & Schneider, 2008). 
This is because there may be a disconnection between the managerial reports of what the 
organization actually does as formal policies and practices and employees’ experiences of 
these policies and practices (Liao & colleagues, 2009). 
 
Recent studies indicate that macro-level HRM practices are not uniformly applied across 
employee groups (Lepak, Taylor, Tekleab, Marrone, & Cohen, 2007; Wright & Boswell, 
2002). For example, it has been observed that there is the likelihood that variability could 
occur in the styles of management, resource availability, and differences in the unit’s task 
(Jensen, Patel, & Messersmith, 2013) and these may invariably bring about variability in 
HRM practices. Liao and colleagues (2009) note that between-group and within-group 
differences are potential sources of variability in employees’ experiences of HPWS. They 
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suggest that employees in groups of different employment status will have differential 
experiences in their exposure to HPWS practices. This indicates that employee experiences 
of HRM practices are germane in understanding the connection between HRM practices and 
organizational effectiveness. Organizations may also adopt specific HRM practices to match 
the demand of some employee groups (Miles & Snow, 1984). For instance, Lepak and Snell 
(2002) reported that core employee groups were more exposed to commitment-oriented 
HRM practices that entail high investment (Lepak & colleagues, 2007) compared to their 
noncore counterparts. Thus, based on the preceding arguments, Liao and colleagues (2009) 
posit that the between-group differences can make a fundamental contribution to the 
variability that exists in employees’ experiences of HPWS. 
 
The preceding discussions resonate with Guzzo and Noonan (1994) who observe that all 
HRM policies and practices convey messages in unintended manner, and these messages 
can be differently understood leading to employees interpreting the same HRM practices 
differently. The lack of uniformity in the application of HRM policies and practices across 
employee groups (Lepak & colleagues, 2007; Wright & Boswell, 2002) suggests the 
existence of a potential disconnection between the use of HPWS and employees’ actual 
experiences (Aryee & colleagues, 2012; Liao & colleagues, 2009). Thus, experienced HPWS 
(for safety) may establish a pathway through which the use of HPWS (for safety) may 
influence employees’ safety knowledge/safety motivation and behavioural variables at the 
individual level of analysis. 
 
While Liao and colleagues (2009) reported a nonsignificant relationship between the use of 
HPWS and experienced HPWS, the SIP perspective proffers a theoretical argument 
suggesting why the two constructs should be related. The use of HPWS (for safety) creates a 
contextual cue that helps employees who work in a shared social environment to interpret 
their work environment (Aryee & colleagues, 2012) and generate common perceptions in a 
way that will convince them that some types of HRM practices are acceptable adaptations to 
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their collective working conditions (Robinson & O’Leary-Kelly, 1998). In view of the preceding 
arguments, coupled with the argument that most work-related incidents such as injuries and 
safety-related events result from employees’ unsafe behaviours (Margolis, 1973), it is 
pertinent that particular attention be paid to employees’ actual experiences of the use of 
HPWS for safety. Therefore, it is expected that the use of HPWS for safety will relate to 
employees’ experienced HPWS for safety: 
 
Hypothesis 2: HPWS for safety will relate to employees’ experienced HPWS for  
 safety. 
 
2.5.3. Individual-Level Relationships 
 
2.5.3.1. Experienced HPWS for Safety, Safety knowledge/safety motivation, and 
 Safety Behaviours 
 
SHRM researchers such as Bowen & Ostroff (2004) contend that HRM practices are likely to 
have desired consequences on employees’ attitudes and behaviours only to the extent that 
they are consistently experienced and perceived by employees. Specifically, Bowen and 
Ostroff (2004) noted that employees’ attitudinal and behavioural responses to an HRM 
system depend on the HRM practices that employees perceive to exist in their work context. 
Therefore, employees’ perceptions of HRM practices are more proximal predictors of their 
attitudinal and behavioural outcomes than manager rated HRM practices. This study 
therefore, examines linkages between employees’ experienced HPWS and their safety 
knowledge/safety motivation and safety behaviours. 
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2.5.3.1.1. Experienced HPWS for Safety and Safety Knowledge 
Campbell (1990), Campbell, McCloy, Oppler, and Sager (1993) conceptualize knowledge as 
comprising declarative and procedural knowledge. Declarative knowledge represents 
employees’ knowledge about their work requirements. In other words, it includes knowledge 
of the principles, facts, and ideas about one’s work. Procedural knowledge, on the other 
hand, describes knowledge pertaining to how to do the work. Procedural knowledge involves 
education, experience, training, and interest (Randhawa, 2008). Safety knowledge reflects 
both declarative and procedural knowledge. In other words, it describes the extent to which 
an employee feels that he or she knows the safety-related principles, practices and 
procedures of their job and how to perform their work safely (Griffin & Neal, 2000; Griffin, 
Neal, & Burley, 2000; Neal & colleagues, 2000).  
 
When employees experience the use of HPWS for safety, their safety knowledge may be 
enhanced in some ways. First, employees’ safety knowledge can be directly developed or 
improved through safety-related training programmes (Guest, 2002). For example, induction 
programmes that emphasize safety practices and on-the-job safety-related training 
programmes may help to facilitate employees’ safety knowledge. Second, employees’ safety 
knowledge can also be enhanced through safety information sharing. For example, 
organizations can share information about new development in safety practices with 
employees and thus, enhancing their safety-related knowledge. Third, employees’ 
knowledge of safety-related activities and hence, safety knowledge can also be fostered 
through safety campaigns. For example, organizations that organize health and safety 
awareness through specific health and safety campaign programmes can also enhance their 
employees’ safety knowledge. These components of HPWS for safety may jointly contribute 
to employees’ safety knowledge. 
 
SET (Blau, 1983) suggests that individuals are drawn to participate and invest in rewarding 
relationships, after which they become bound to reciprocate the benefits or favours received 
59 
 
from their exchange partners. Implementation of HPWS for safety signals an employer’s care 
and concern for employees’ health and safety. Grounded in SET, it is proposed here that if 
employees experience the practices that constitute HPWS for safety, they are likely to 
perceive that their exchange relationships with the organization is characterized by 
supportive environment based on investments in employee knowledge and skills 
development. In return, employees are likely to be obliged to the organization by developing 
positive attitudes towards the achievement of organizational goals. Thus, this study proposes 
that treating employees as a valuable resource and ensuring that they have access to 
extensive safety-related training, safety-related information, and providing them with the 
opportunity to work in self-managed teams, will have a significant influence on their safety 
knowledge. Although there is no direct evidence demonstrating the relationship between 
experienced HPWS for safety and safety knowledge, prior research (e.g. Jiang & colleagues, 
2015; Jiang & colleagues, 2012; Takeuchi, Lepak, Wang, & Takeuchi, 2007) has indicated 
the positive impact of HRM practices on human capital in general. Thus, this study proposes 
a positive relationship between experienced HPWS for safety and safety knowledge. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Experienced HPWS for safety positively relates to safety        
 knowledge 
 
2.5.3.1.2. Experienced HPWS for Safety and Safety Motivation 
Safety motivation describes “an individual’s willingness to exert effort to enact safety 
behaviours and the valence associated with those behaviours” (Neal & Griffin, 2006, p. 947). 
It is a reflection of an employee’s drive to perform safety-related activities and procedures 
(Griffin & Neal, 2000; Griffin & colleagues, 2000; Neal & colleagues, 2000). Thus, an 
employee must have the knowledge of how to do his or her work safely and the motivation to 
do his or her work safely (Neal & colleagues, 2000). While safety knowledge provides 
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employees the capabilities to contribute, safety motivation deals with the extent to which 
employees are willing to utilize the capabilities resulting from their safety knowledge. 
 
Delery and Shaw (2001) observe that motivation is one of the employees’ features that are 
capable of adding value to the organization. I argue that individual employees could be 
motivated not only to comply with safe working practices but also to proactively engage in 
activities that will enhance safety in the workplace. This can be done in several ways. First, 
employees can be motivated when, for example, the organizations provide them with a 
favourable working environment through the provision of extensive safety-related training 
and development. Two, when the organizations deliberately consider the investment of 
managerial time in appraising the performance and training needs of employees. Three, Liao 
and colleagues (2009) posit that one of the reasons for employees to be motivated by HPWS 
is a favourable social exchange with the organization. SET predicts that if employees 
perceive that the organization is concerned about their safety and well-being, they are likely 
to develop an implicit obligation to reciprocate. Grounded in SET (Blau, 1983), it is proposed 
that, in this circumstance, individual employees would reciprocate these benefits or favours 
with appropriate attitudes. Thus, in the present study, it is expected that employees will add 
value to the organization (Delery & Shaw, 2001) by exhibiting greater safety motivation. 
 
Based on prior research that linked experienced HPWS to other motivational constructs such 
as psychological empowerment (e.g. Aryee & colleagues, 2012; Seibert, Wang, & Courtright, 
2011; Liao & colleagues, 2009), I expect HPWS for safety to relate to safety motivation.  
Thus, I hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Experienced HPWS for safety positively relates to safety   
 motivation. 
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2.5.3.2. Experienced HPWS for Safety and Safety Behaviours: Mediating Roles   of 
 Safety Knowledge and Safety Motivation 
In the preceding discussion, it was argued that experienced HPWS for safety would be 
related to safety knowledge and safety motivation. In this section, I posit that experienced 
HPWS will be related to safety behaviours in terms of safety compliance and safety initiative 
and that these relationships will be mediated by safety knowledge and safety motivation. 
Employees’ safety is associated with their safety behaviours which Griffin and Neal (2000) 
and Neal & colleagues (2000) originally differentiated to two types: safety participation, which 
is described as employees’ voluntary safety behaviours, and safety compliance, described as 
mandated safety activities that are normally part of the formal requirements of employees’ 
work roles and procedures. Thus, previous research mainly examined safety compliance and 
safety participation as two aspects of safety behaviour. Although obtaining compliance with 
safety rules and procedures is fundamental for enhancing safety, there is need for 
organizations to also have individual employees who will proactively participate in safety 
(Didla, Mearns, & Flin, 2009). Therefore, in line with contemporary theoretical trends (e.g. 
Kark, Katz-Navon, & Delegach, 2015; Fugas, Silva, & Meliá, 2012; Parker, Williams, & 
Turner, 2006) that emphasize employee roles that extend beyond normal rule enforcement to 
include discretionary individual behaviour (Hofmann & colleagues, 2003), the present study 
focuses on two dimensions of safety behaviours, namely safety compliance and safety 
initiative.  
 
Safety compliance is defined as describing employees’ behaviours in a manner that 
increases their personal health and safety. It reflects the circumstances in which employees 
adhere to safety-related rules and procedures, and tend to work in a safe manner (Williams, 
Turner, & Parker, 2000; Griffin & Neal, 2000; Thompson, Hilton, & Witt, 1998; Simard & 
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Marchand, 1994). Safety initiative, which is one specific aspect of safety participation 
behaviours (Kark & colleagues, 2015), describes the circumstances in which employees do 
not just work within the confines of the safety standards but actually go beyond compliance 
and act proactively to improve safety in the workplace. It is believed that an employee acts 
proactively when he or she voluntarily participates in safety activities that add value to the 
organization. For example, when an employee helps to teach safety procedures to new 
members of staff or assists co-workers to ensure that they perform their work safely. In 
addition, an employee is said to be proactive when he or she makes safety-related 
suggestions about workplace activities and encourages his or her supervisor to engage in 
actions that promote safety (Griffin & Neal, 2000; Williams & colleagues, 2000; Simard & 
Marchand, 1994; Andriessen, 1978). In this sense therefore, safety initiative reflects 
discretionary individual behaviour that is not explicitly recognized by job descriptions or 
formal rewards systems (Hofmann & colleagues, 2003). 
 
As earlier noted, there are some reasons why it is expected that experienced HPWS should 
be related to safety behaviours. One, it has been argued that an organization’s HRM is 
instrumental in eliciting high levels of organizational citizenship behaviour (Morrison, 1996; 
Rousseau & Greller, 1994), and safety initiative can be likened to safety organizational 
citizenship behaviours (See Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Paine, & Bachrach, 2000). Two, it has 
been observed that HPWS promotes employees’ shared perceptions of a supportive 
organizational environment that motivates discretionary behaviours (e.g. safety initiative) that 
contribute to organizational effectiveness (Sun & colleagues, 2007). As a way to manage 
employment relationship, an organization may provide HPWS practices such as extensive 
safety training, safety rewards, and internal opportunity for promotion that serve to 
communicate a positive valuation of employees’ contribution and therefore contribute to 
employees’ perceptions of supportive work environment in terms of employee safety and 
well-being. SET provides that there is a perceived obligation on the part of employees to 
reciprocate this relationship (Blau, 1964; Gouldner, 1960). One way in which employees can 
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reciprocate this relationship is by enlarging their roles so that they extend beyond normal role 
of rule enforcement (i.e. safety compliance) to include safety initiative. 
 
Prior research (e.g. Snape & Redman, 2010; Kehoe & Wright, 2013; Sun & colleagues, 
2007; Liao & Chuang, 2004) has demonstrated the relationship between HRM (HPWS) 
practices and employee behaviours. For example, Sun and colleagues (2007) found that 
high performance HR practices were positively related to service-oriented OCB. Similarly, 
Liao and Chuang (2004) found employee involvement practices to be positively associated 
with employee self-rating of specific customer service-related behaviours. Although these 
studies focused on employee service-oriented behaviours, similar results have been 
obtained in the context of safety. For example, Zacharatos and colleagues (2005) found 
HPWS to be related to safety compliance and safety initiative (described in terms of personal 
safety orientation). Thus, I expect experienced HPWS for safety to be related to safety 
compliance and safety initiative. I therefore hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 4a: HPWS for safety positively relates to safety compliance 
Hypothesis 4b: HPWS for safety positively relates to safety initiative 
 
However, I expect this relationship to be indirect through safety knowledge and safety 
motivation. I next discuss why safety knowledge and safety motivation relate to safety 
behaviours of safety compliance and safety initiative. 
 
Before the mediating role of safety knowledge and safety motivation in the relationship 
between experienced HPWS for safety and safety behaviours is discussed, there is need to 
explain why safety knowledge and safety motivation are related to these safety behaviours. 
This study previously suggested that employees who have experienced the use of HPWS for 
safety practices are likely to demonstrate increased safety knowledge based on a kind of 
obligatory reciprocation in their exchange relationship (See SET: Blau, 1983). This enhanced 
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safety knowledge is then likely to influence safety behaviours in several ways. First, it is 
expected that once the capacity for using knowledge is acquired, it is more likely that this 
knowledge will be transferred to the job in order to affect on-the-job behaviour (Smith-Crowe 
& colleagues, 2003). Second, as earlier noted, individual employee knowledge has been 
proposed as one of the only three main factors that directly determine individual differences 
in performance (Campbell & colleagues, 1993). Third, Griffin and Neal (2000) have argued 
that safety performance (i.e. safety behaviour) must be determined by knowledge and skills 
that are required to perform particular behaviours. Fourth, Christian and colleagues (2009) 
suggest that knowing how to perform safely, for example, proper handling of hazardous 
chemicals and emergency procedures is a precondition to enacting safe behaviours. 
Therefore, safety knowledge should be strongly related to safety behaviours. 
 
Several studies have found empirical support for the positive relationships between 
perceived safety knowledge and safety performance (safety behaviours). For example, 
Burke, Sarpy, Tesluk, and Smith-Crowe (2002) reported that safety knowledge was positively 
related to safety performance (safety behaviour). For these reasons and coupled with the 
support from previous studies suggesting a positive relationship between safety knowledge 
and safety behaviours (e.g. Christian & colleagues, 2009; Griffin & Neal, 2000), I expect 
safety knowledge to be related to safety behaviours in terms of safety compliance and safety 
initiative. However, consistent with Campbell and colleagues (1993), Neal and colleagues 
(2000) found safety knowledge to be more strongly related to safety compliance than safety 
participation. Following Neal and colleagues, I anticipate that safety knowledge should be 
more strongly related to safety compliance than discretionary safety behaviour of safety 
initiative. Therefore, I hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis: 5: The relationship between safety knowledge and safety   
 compliance will be stronger than the relationship between safety  
 knowledge and safety initiative 
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Hypothesis 5a: Safety knowledge positively relates to safety compliance 
Hypothesis 5b: Safety Knowledge positively relates to safety initiative 
 
It was earlier argued that when employees feel that their organization is concerned about 
their well-being and safety, for example, safety-training needs, they would reciprocate by way 
of developing appropriate attitudes toward the organizational goals, for example, increased 
motivation to perform safely. It is here argued that this increased motivation to perform safely 
will affect safety behaviours in a variety of ways. First, as previously noted, Campbell and 
colleagues (1993) identified motivation as one of the three factors that determine 
performance (behaviour). Second, as Griffin and Neal (2000) noted, safety performance 
(safety behaviour) is influenced by knowledge and skills necessary or required to perform 
particular behaviours and by the motivation to perform these behaviours. Third, Neal and 
Griffin (2006) maintain that individual employees who are motivated to engage in safety 
behaviours should, in turn, be more likely to exhibit those behaviours. 
 
Several studies (e.g. Neal & Griffin, 2006; Probst & Brubaker, 2001; Griffin & Neal, 2000; 
Andriessen, 1978) have found empirical support for the positive relationship between safety 
motivation and safety performance (safety behaviour). For example, in their studies 
conducted across a range of manufacturing and mining organizations, Griffin and Neal 
(2000) found motivation to perform safely to influence individual reports of safety 
performance (safety behaviours). Similarly, in their study of the effects of job insecurity on 
employee safety outcomes, Probst and Brubaker (2001) found safety motivation to be 
positively related to safety behaviour. The preceding discussions and arguments support the 
notion that employees’ behaviours could be a reaction to their responses to the use of 
appropriate HRM practices (Tsui & colleagues, 1997), suggesting that their responses 
(possibly as a result of increased knowledge and enhanced motivation) to the use of HRM 
practices could predict behaviours (Probst & Brubakar, 2001). However, building on 
Campbell and colleagues (1993), Neal and colleagues (2000) found safety motivation to be 
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more strongly related to safety participation than safety compliance. In this study, it is 
expected that safety motivation should play a larger role in discretionary safety behaviour of 
safety initiative than safety compliance. Consequently, I hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis: 6: The relationship between safety motivation and safety initiative  
 will be stronger than the relationship between safety motivation and  safety
 compliance 
Hypothesis 6a: Safety motivation positively relates to safety compliance 
Hypothesis 6b: Safety motivation positively relates to safety initiative 
 
To explain the mediating roles of safety knowledge and safety motivation in the relationships 
between experienced HPWS for safety and safety behaviours (i.e. safety compliance and 
safety initiative), social exchange theory (Blau, 1964, Gouldner, 1960) is used. Social 
exchange theorists contend that favours received from others are more valued if they are 
given based on discretionary choice rather than circumstances that are beyond the 
benefactor’s control. The recipient as a demonstration that the benefactor genuinely values 
and cares for him or her (Cotterrel, Eisenberger, & Speicher, 1992; Blau, 1964; Gouldner, 
1960) accepts such discretionary favour. Thus, HPWS practices such as safety-related pay 
and safety-related appraisals that are linked to employees’ internal opportunity for promotion 
contribute more to safety knowledge and safety motivation and consequently, safety 
behaviours, if employees believe that they are outcome of organization’s voluntary actions 
instead of the pressure from the external bodies such as the government regulation or labour 
union pressure. Therefore, a favourable social exchange with the organization can be 
considered as one of the reasons why employees should be influenced by HPWS. Drawing 
on SET, it has been contended that “positive, beneficial actions directed at employees by the 
organization and/or its representatives contribute to the establishment of high quality 
exchange relationships that create obligations for employees to reciprocate in positive, 
beneficial ways” (Settoon, Bennett, & Liden, 1996, p. 219). 
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Consistent with SET, it is here argued that HPWS for safety will promote employees’ safety 
knowledge (e.g. safety training, a shift in the approach to performance management, safety 
reward packages, effective communication of safety performance expectations, and 
recognition when these had been met or exceeded: Tregaskis, Daniels, Glover, Butler, 
&Meyer, 2012) and will signal that the organization is interested in the safety and well-being 
of the employees. This will be considered by the employees as being in a social exchange 
relationship (Shore & Shore, 1995). Thus, employees will, in turn, reciprocate the 
organization’s treatment by developing appropriate safety knowledge that is likely to enhance 
their safety behaviours. Based on the preceding discussion, it is argued that safety 
knowledge will mediate the relationship between experienced HPWS for safety and safety 
behaviours in terms of safety compliance and safety initiative. Thus, I hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 7a: Employee safety knowledge will mediate the positive relationship  
 between employees’ experienced HPWS for safety and safety  
 compliance 
Hypothesis 7b: Employee safety knowledge will mediate the positive   
 relationship between employees’ experienced HPWS for safety and safety 
 initiative 
 
Also examined here is safety motivation as a mediator of the experienced HPWS for safety-
safety behaviour relationship. The constituent HRM dimensions that define HPWS for safety 
include extensive safety training, rewards contingent on safety performance, safety 
information sharing, and performance appraisal system based on safety performance. 
Collectively, the experience of these practices will motivate employees to perform safely. 
Therefore, further relying on the SET, safety motivation should give a similar indirect 
explanation of the relationship between HPWS for safety and safety behaviours in terms of 
safety compliance and safety initiative. Prior studies (e.g. Probst & Brubaker, 2001; Griffin & 
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Neal, 2000) provide support for the mediating role of safety motivation. For example, Griffin 
and Neal (2000) found motivation to perform safely to mediate the link between 
organizational factor (safety climate) and safety performance (safety behaviours). Based on 
the preceding argument, the relationships between experienced HPWS for safety and safety 
behaviours in terms of safety compliance and safety initiative will be mediated by safety 
motivation. 
 
Hypothesis 8a: Employee safety motivation will mediate the positive relationship  
 between employees’ experienced HPWS for safety and safety  
 compliance; 
Hypothesis 8b: Employee safety motivation will mediate the positive relationship  
 between employees’ experienced HPWS for safety and safety  
 initiative. 
 
2.5.3.3. Safety Behaviours and Safety Outcomes 
 
An issue that is yet to be fully addressed in safety literature is the question of what 
constitutes safety performance and the need for better conceptualization. Christian and 
colleagues (2009) therefore called for a distinction between safety behaviours and safety 
outcomes. Again, another issue is often overlooked in safety literature. This is the final 
linkage between safety performance as behaviours and safety outcomes and this has rarely 
been examined in the same study.  Safety behaviours focus on the safety-specific actions or 
behaviours which employees exhibit in the workplace (Burke & colleagues, 2002). 
 
Although prior research (e.g. Christian & colleagues, 2009; Neal & Griffin, 2006; Simard & 
Marchand, 1994) has examined the relationship between safety behaviours (such as safety 
compliance, safety initiative, and safety participation) and safety outcomes (such as 
accidents and injuries), this study builds on and extends these studies to link these safety 
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behaviours (i.e. safety compliance and safety initiative) to two aspects of safety outcomes, 
namely, workplace injuries and safety-related events. Workplace injuries describe the 
workplace incidents that lead to employees’ personal harm and these range from slips, trips, 
and some other minor occurrences (Evans, Michael, Wiedenbeck, & Ray, 2005; Oliver 
&colleagues, 2002) to those that require first aid treatment (Michael, Evans, Jansen, & 
Haight, 2005; Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996) or time off work (Neal & Griffin, 2006). Although the 
term safety-related events has been used in prior research about marine vessel accidents 
(e.g. Talley, 1995), it is here described as human-related incidents (Barling & colleagues, 
2002) that occur in the workplace such as exposure to dangerous chemicals or gases. As 
previously argued, safety outcomes constitute performance variables just as operational and 
financial outcomes. 
 
Research (e.g. Zohar, 2003; Zohar, 1980) has shown that when management is seen to be 
conspicuously involved in safety activities such as job training programmes (e.g. relating to 
safety), participation in safety committees, and putting safety into consideration when 
designing jobs, they signal an organization’s priority of safety. From a SET perspective, when 
employees perceive these management safety activities as commitment toward safety and 
concern for employees’ health and well-being, they will develop appropriate safety 
behaviours which, in turn, cause a reduction in safety outcomes. This supports the notion 
that safety behaviour is a more proximal predictor of safety outcomes (Christian & 
colleagues, 2009; Neal & Griffin, 2006). 
 
Prior studies (e.g. Simard & Marchand, 1994) have found safety initiative to be positively 
correlated with lower frequency of lost-time work accidents. Similarly, Neal and Griffin (2006) 
found improvements in safety behaviours within groups to be associated with a subsequent 
reduction in accidents and injuries. Therefore, with improved safety compliance and safety 
initiative as defined in this study, employees would observe unit’s safety rules and 
procedures and take informal initiative to improve safety at work. They will also make 
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suggestions to, as well as put pressures on the supervisor to improve safety in the work 
environment. Accordingly, I posit safety behaviours of safety compliance and safety initiative 
to be directly related to the safety outcomes of safety-related events and workplace injuries.  
 
Hypothesis 9a: Safety compliance negatively relates to safety-related events; 
Hypothesis 9b: Safety compliance negatively relates to workplace injuries; 
Hypothesis 10a: Safety initiative negatively relates to safety-related events; 
Hypothesis 10b: Safety initiative negatively relates to workplace injuries.  
 
2.5.3.4. Experienced HPWS for Safety and Safety Outcomes: The Mediating Influence 
 of Safety Knowledge/Safety Motivation, and Safety behaviours 
So far, I have argued that employees’ experienced HPWS for safety directly influence safety 
knowledge and safety motivation that, in turn, directly influence safety behaviours such as 
safety compliance and safety initiative, leading to safety outcomes such as safety-related 
events and workplace injuries. In this section, it is argued that experienced HPWS for safety 
can facilitate the safety outcomes of safety-related events and workplace injuries through the 
mediating influences of safety knowledge/safety motivation, and safety behaviours. 
 
Whereas there is a convergence in the opinion of researchers that HRM practices are 
associated with organizational outcomes through their influence on employee attitudes and 
behaviours (e.g. Wright, McCormick, Sherman, & McMahan, 1999; Huselid, 1995; Wright, 
McMahan, & McWilliams, 1994), Nishii and Wright (2007), Bowen and Ostroff (2004) suggest 
that this causal chain might be more complex than expected. They note that employees’ 
perceptions of HRM practices are likely to precede the employee attitudes and behaviours 
links in the causal chain. That is, in order for HRM practices to exert their direct effect on 
employees’ attitudes and behaviours, they must first have to be perceived and subjectively 
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and objectively interpreted by employees in manners that will engender or create such 
attitudinal and behavioural responses. 
 
Research provides evidence that HRM systems function by influencing employee knowledge 
and motivation (Delery & Shaw, 2001; Huselid, 1995; Wright & Snell, 1991). Furthermore, 
Takeuchi and colleagues (2007) indicate that employee behaviours may serve as potential 
mediators in the HRM practice-outcomes relationship. This study posits that if HRM system 
can be presumed to work by influencing both employee attitudes (Delery & Shaw, 2001; 
Huselid, 1995; Wright & Snell, 1991) and employee behaviours (Takeuchi & colleagues, 
2007) in such a manner that it affects performance (Zacharatos & colleagues, 2005), it is 
logical to argue, drawing on and extending this conceptual framework or literature, that the 
relationships between experienced HPWS for safety and employees’ safety outcomes are 
likely to be mediated by employees’ safety knowledge/safety motivation, and safety 
behaviours. 
 
As previously noted, it has been contended by social theorists that resources received from 
others are given more value if it is believed by the recipient that the donor gave it based on 
choice rather than being coerced by circumstances beyond their control. This is because 
such voluntary action is an implicit demonstration of the fact that the donor values and cares 
for the recipient (See Blau, 1964; Gouldner, 1960). Therefore, one of the ways by which 
experienced HPWS for safety can enhance employees’ safety knowledge/safety motivation 
is the creation of favourable social exchange within the organization (Liao & colleagues, 
2009). In this scenario, SET will predict that employees reciprocate by getting more involved 
in safety compliance and initiating steps to improve workplace safety in terms of safety-
related events and workplace injuries. 
 
There are several reasons why safety knowledge/safety motivation and the safety 
behaviours of safety compliance and safety initiative mediate the relationship between 
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experienced HPWS for safety and safety outcomes. First, research has shown that the 
predictor variable (e.g. experienced HPWS for safety) is related to both mediating variables 
of safety knowledge (Jiang & colleagues, 2015; Jiang& colleagues, 2012; Takeuchi & 
colleagues, 2007) and safety motivation (Aryee & colleagues, 2012; Seibert & colleagues, 
2011; Liao & colleagues, 2009). Second, research has shown that safety knowledge (e.g. 
Christian & colleagues, 2009; Smith-Crowe & colleagues, 2003; Burke & colleagues, 2002; 
Campbell & colleagues, 1993) and safety motivation (e.g. Neal & Griffin, 2006; Griffin & Neal, 
2000; Campbell & colleagues, 1993) are related to safety behaviours. In addition, safety 
behaviours have been shown to be related to safety outcomes such as lost-time accidents, 
accidents, and injuries (Neal & Griffin, 2006; Simard & Marchand, 1994). Furthermore, the 
predictor variable (e.g.  HPWS) has been found to have a direct effect on safety outcomes 
such as lost-time injuries (Zacharatos & colleagues, 2005). These are the conditions for the 
traditional stages of the Baron and Kenny’s (1986) mediation process model. Finally, there is 
a consensus among researchers that HRM practices are associated with organizational 
outcomes through their influence on employee attitudes and behaviours (e.g. Wright & 
colleagues, 1999; Huselid, 1995; Wright & colleagues, 1994). Based on the foregoing, I 
hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 11: Employee safety knowledge and safety compliance will mediate the 
 negative relationship between experienced HPWS for safety and safety-
 related events; 
 
Hypothesis 12 Employee safety knowledge and safety compliance will mediate the 
 negative relationship between experienced HPWS for safety and   workplace 
 injuries;  
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Hypothesis 13: Employee safety knowledge and safety initiative will mediate the 
 negative relationship between experienced HPWS for safety and safety-related 
 events;   
 
Hypothesis 14: Employee safety knowledge and safety initiative will mediate the  
 negative relationship between experienced HPWS for safety and workplace 
 injuries; 
 
Hypothesis 15: Employee safety motivation and safety compliance will mediate the 
 negative relationship between experienced HPWS for safety and safety-related 
 events; 
 
Hypothesis 16: Employee safety motivation and safety compliance will mediate the 
 negative relationship between experienced HPWS for safety and workplace 
 injuries;  
 
Hypothesis 17: Employee safety motivation and safety initiative will mediate the  
 negative relationship between experienced HPWS for safety and safety-related 
 events; 
   
Hypothesis 18: Employee safety motivation and safety initiative will mediate the 
 negative relationship between experienced HPWS for safety and workplace 
 injuries. 
 
2.5.4. Moderating Effect of Unit-Level Safety Climate 
Unit safety climate describes employees’ shared perception of the priority management 
attaches to workplace safety (Zohar & Tenne-Gazit, 2008; Gonzalez-Roma, Peiro, & 
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Tordera, 2002). Unit safety climate evolves as individual employees attribute meaning to 
their unit context based on the significance of the environment for individual safety values 
(James, James, & Ashe, 1990; James & James, 1989). In other words, it represents an 
aggregate measure of individual employee’s responses (Dawson, González-Romá, Davis, & 
West, 2008). It is conceptualized as a higher order factor that involves employee perceptions 
of workplace safety-related attributes and the relative priority when compared with other 
competing goals (e.g. productivity, speed, etc.) (Jiang & colleagues, 2010; Zohar & Luria, 
2005; Griffin & Neal, 2000). 
 
A body of safety literature indicates that organizational climate moderates the relationships 
between individual difference variables to the extent that organizations promote strategically 
focused climates, that is, climates that are aligned with organizational goals. This body of 
research is built on the notion that human beings make great efforts to cohere with their 
environment (Smith-Crowe & colleagues, 2003). For example, one would expect that in a 
supportive climate for safety, employees would endeavour to be productive by transferring 
the knowledge and skills that they have learned, for example, during safety training, to their 
jobs. On the other hand, in an organization that lacks such a climate, a weak relationship 
between safety knowledge and safety performance (behaviour) would be expected because 
employees would be neither willing nor able to exhibit acquired safety knowledge and skills 
(Smith-Crowe & colleagues, 2003).  The arguments that have been presented about the link 
between safety climate and safety knowledge (See Smith-Crowe & colleagues, 2003) are 
also applicable to the link between safety climate and safety motivation. For example, Zohar 
(2000) contends that unit safety climate influences safety motivation because it informs 
employees within the unit of the desired role behaviours and thereby shapes the expectancy 
and valence associated with safe and unsafe behaviours. 
 
Griffin and Neal (2000) contend that theories of work performance have provided an 
important foundation for conceptualizing the link between safety climate and safety 
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behaviour. Based on Campbell and colleagues (1993), Griffin & Neal (2000) suggest that 
perceived safety climate is an antecedent of safety behaviour. However, I propose that 
although safety climate is an antecedent of safety behaviour, it (unit safety climate) 
moderates the effect of safety knowledge/safety motivation on safety behaviours of safety 
compliance and safety initiative. Thus, although much research (e.g. Jiang & colleagues, 
2010; Clarke, 2006; Neal & Griffin, 2006; Zohar, 2000; Griffin & Neal, 2000) consistently 
demonstrates the existence of relationships between safety climate and safety behaviours, to 
the best of the author’s knowledge, only limited research has examined the moderating 
influence of unit safety climate on the relationships between employees’ safety knowledge 
and safety behaviours (e.g. safety compliance and safety initiative)on one hand, and safety 
motivation and safety behaviours(e.g. safety compliance and safety initiative), on the other. 
SIP perspective provides the theoretical underpinnings for the emergence of safety climate 
as a unit-level property. SIP (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978) contends that individuals use 
information gathered from others in their direct social context to form judgements about 
organizational practices, values, and norms. Because members of the same group are 
exposed to the same practices, leaders, and other contextual characteristics (Naumann & 
Bennett, 2000), they are likely to possess shared information and form common perceptions 
concerning their work environment within the unit. Thus, from a SIP perspective, Salancik 
and Pfeffer (1978) argued that climate should influence how employees think and feel about 
aspects of their work environment. Particularly, employees depend on cues from the work 
environment to interpret organizational events, develop appropriate attitudes, and 
understand behaviour-outcome expectancies. Drawing on SIP, therefore, it is here posited 
that, when safety climate is high, the effect of safety knowledge/safety motivation on safety 
behaviour will be enhanced and, as a result, employees would be more likely to engage in 
behaviours that are beneficial to both the employees and organization (Jiang & colleagues, 
2010). In contrast, in a low safety climate, safety performance would attract less emphasis 
and as a result, the effects of safety knowledge and safety motivation on employees’ safety 
behaviours would diminish. 
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Although research examining cross-level safety climate effects is limited, prior studies (e.g. 
Probst, 2004; Smith-Crowe & colleagues, 2003; Rouiller & Goldstein, 1993; Tracey, 
Tannenbaum, & Kavanagh, 1995; Brown, 1981) support the fact that safety climate 
moderates the relationships between individual difference variables. For example, Probst 
(2004) reported that safety climate moderated the relationship between job insecurity and 
workplace safety (e.g. safety knowledge, safety compliance, accidents, injuries) such that a 
high rather than low safety climate reduces or eliminates the adverse effect of job insecurity 
on safety behaviours such as safety compliance. Prior studies that have examined the 
relationships between safety climate and safety knowledge/safety motivation found that when 
safety perceptions (i.e. safety climate) increased, employees’ safety knowledge and 
motivation to comply with safety policies and procedures increased (Neal & Griffin, 2006; 
Morrison & colleagues, 1997; Brown & Leigh, 1996). As a result, reported safety behaviour 
was positively affected. However, with decreased safety climate perceptions, employees 
subsequently reported decreased safety behaviours (Neal & Griffin, 2006; Hofmann & 
Stetzer, 1996) compared to increased safety climate perceptions. Consequently, unit safety 
climate will have a cross-level moderation effects on the relationship between safety 
knowledge/safety motivation and safety behaviours of safety compliance and safety initiative. 
Therefore, I hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 19a: Unit-level safety climate moderates the effects of safety knowledge 
 on safety compliance such that this relationship will be stronger when safety 
 climate is high rather than low; 
   
Hypothesis 19b: Unit-level safety climate moderates the effects of safety knowledge 
 on safety initiative such that this relationship will be stronger when safety 
 climate is high rather than low; 
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Hypothesis 20a: Unit-level safety climate moderates the effects of safety motivation on 
 safety  compliance such that this relationship will be stronger when safety 
 climate is high rather than low; 
   
Hypothesis 20b: Unit-level safety climate moderates the effects of safety motivation 
 on safety initiative such that this relationship will be stronger when safety 
 climate is high rather than low 
  
This study further posits that the effects of unit safety climate on employees’ safety outcomes 
are moderated by the extent to which the unit is seen as valuing and emphasizing safety. In 
other words, the unit’s priority for or emphasis on safety is likely to play a significant role in 
determining the extent to which employees’ safety outcomes are affected. For example, in 
units in which safety is a priority, employees’ safety knowledge may be emphasized by, for 
example, providing safety-related training to employees, and this may motivate employees to 
pay attention to safety in order to enhance their safety behaviours. Conversely, when the unit 
does not place a strong emphasis on safety, employees may focus more on other job-related 
activities such as production at the expense of safety (Probst, 2004). Thus, safety behaviours 
will be adversely affected. From SET perspective, if priority of safety is valued by unit line 
managers (meaning positive safety climate), they would demonstrate their commitment to 
safety and concern for employees’ health and well-being, and the employees, in response, 
would behave in a safe manner for an implied obligation (Hofmann & colleagues, 2003; 
Hofmann & Morgeson, 1999) which, in turn, would affect their safety outcomes. In other 
words, when employers are perceived to meet their obligations, treat employees fairly, and 
provide valued services and benefits, employees reciprocate with higher levels of 
performance (Mearns, Lorrains, Ford, & Tetrick, 2010). Furthermore, a body of research 
demonstrates that a number of factors considered to be important components or 
dimensions of safety climate predict workplace safety-related outcomes such as accidents 
and injuries (Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996; Niskanen, 1994; DeJoy, 1994; Dedobbeleer & 
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Beland, 1991; Brown & Holmes, 1986; Zohar, 1980). These components or dimensions 
include management concern for employees’ well-being, adequacy of training, provision of 
safety equipment, quality of safety management system, and employee involvement in 
workplace health and safety (Neal & colleagues, 2000). Although there is concrete evidence 
to demonstrate the main effect of safety climate on employee safety outcomes, there is yet a 
scant empirical evidence to show how unit safety climate might moderate the effects of 
safety knowledge/safety motivation on safety outcomes through the mediating effects of 
safety behaviours. As earlier noted in safety literature, it seems likely that unit safety climate 
will play a significant role in determining whether and to what extent safety knowledge/safety 
motivation would affect safety outcomes through safety behaviours. For example, Probst 
(2004) suggests that organizational safety climate provides employees with cues concerning 
what behaviours and outcomes would be reinforced. Therefore, when employees are 
concerned about their workplace safety, they are likely to look to the organizational climate 
for cues as to the best means by which they will retain their jobs. Conversely, organizations 
that are seen to place less emphasis on safety might be conveying the message that 
enhanced employee attention to safety may not be important for them to retain their jobs. 
Janssens, Brett, and Smith (1995) suggest that the more an organization is seen to 
emphasize more on production, the more employees perceive that safety is subordinated to 
the demands of production. Thus, high unit safety climate provides opportunities in terms of 
safety training that enhances employee safety knowledge and motivate employees to 
increase, for example, their safety compliance (Brown & Holmes, 1986; Neal & colleagues, 
2000; Probst, 2004). Thus, it seems likely that safety behaviours of safety compliance and 
safety initiative may be enhanced when the safety training and the motivational opportunities 
provided by a high unit safety climate have positive effect on employees’ safety knowledge 
and safety motivation. Consequently, I expect that a high unit safety climate will allow 
increased employee safety knowledge and safety motivation, leading to higher levels of 
safety behaviours of safety compliance and safety initiative and, subsequently, improved 
safety outcomes of safety-related events and workplace injuries. This scenario has been 
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described as the first stage of moderated mediation, but the proposed mediating effect takes 
place across levels of analysis (See Kenny, 2008; MacKinnon, 2008; Preacher, Rucker, & 
Hayes, 2007; Edward & Lambert, 2007). Based on the foregoing, I proposed as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 21a: The negative indirect effect of employee safety knowledge on safety-
 related events via safety compliance is moderated by unit safety climate such 
 that the indirect effect becomes stronger as unit safety climate is higher; 
 
Hypothesis 21b: The negative indirect effect of employee safety knowledge on 
 workplace injuries via safety compliance is moderated by unit safety climate 
 such that the indirect effect becomes stronger as unit safety climate is higher; 
 
Hypothesis 21c: The negative indirect effect of employee safety knowledge on safety-
 related events via safety initiative is moderated by unit safety climate such that 
 the indirect effect becomes stronger as unit safety climate is higher; 
 
Hypothesis 21d: The negative indirect effect of employee safety knowledge on 
 workplace injuries via safety initiative is moderated by unit safety climate such 
 that the indirect effect becomes stronger as unit safety climate is higher; 
 
Hypothesis 22a: The negative indirect effect of employee safety motivation on safety-
 related events via safety compliance is moderated by unit safety climate such 
 that the indirect effect becomes stronger as unit safety climate is higher; 
 
Hypothesis 22b: The negative indirect effect of employee safety motivation on 
 workplace injuries via safety compliance is moderated by unit safety climate 
 such that the indirect effect becomes stronger as unit safety climate is higher; 
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Hypothesis 22c: The negative indirect effect of employee safety motivation on safety-
 related events via safety initiative is moderated by unit safety climate such that 
 the indirect effect becomes stronger as unit safety climate is higher; 
 
Hypothesis 22d: The negative indirect effect of employee safety motivation on 
 workplace injuries via safety initiative is moderated by unit safety climate such 
 that the indirect effect becomes stronger as unit safety climate is higher; 
 
2.6. Conclusion 
This chapter presented an extended discussion of SET and SIP as theoretical underpinnings 
of the relationships proposed and tested in this study. It also presented and discussed Figure 
2.1 that provides a schematic representation of the relationships examined. Specifically, the 
chapter reviewed the literatures that link the use of HPWS for safety to unit safety climate 
and the individual level safety outcomes through employees’ experienced HPWS for safety, 
safety knowledge/safety motivation, and safety behaviours. These linkages or relationships 
hypothesized in the conceptual model were theoretically explained utilizing social exchange 
theory (SET) and social information processing perspective (SIP). The next chapter 
discusses the development and validation of the new HPWS for safety scale.      
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3.0. CHAPTER 3:  DEVELOPMENT OF HIGH-PERFORMANCE WORK 
SYSTEM FOR SAFETY SCALE 
3.1. Introduction 
Predicated on the assumption that different organizational strategies (foci) are linked to 
different sets of HRM practices (contingency perspective of SHRM: e.g. Schuler & Jackson, 
1995; 1987b), this study developed and validated an HPWS for safety scale. This chapter 
describes the methodology of this study, starting with the research philosophical perspective. 
It discusses the method used to develop and validate the scale that consists of three main 
parts. First, and given the scale’s grounding in AMO theory, this chapter reviews the 
literature inspired by this theory. Second, it presents the three different studies conducted to 
develop and validate the scale. Study 1 adopts an inductive approach to the generation of 
the initial pool of items whereas Studies 2 and 3 ascertained the validity of the newly 
developed HPWS for safety scale. 
3.2. Research Philosophical Perspective 
One of the issues that permeate the conduct of research in organizational psychology as a 
field of study concerns the question of what should genuinely be accepted as knowledge. 
The concern is whether the same principles, procedures, and the distinctive character that 
underpin the natural sciences should guide the study of social world. The philosophical 
stance that positively align with the tenets of natural sciences is constantly associated with 
an epistemological position that is denoted as positivism (Bryman & Bell, 2011, 3rd Ed.) 
Bryman and Bell (2011) describe positivism as an epistemological position that advocates 
the application of the methods that are adopted in the study of natural sciences to the study 
of social reality. 
  
Ponterotto (2005) identifies three major emphasis of the epistemological perspective of 
positivism. First, the positivists lay emphasis on dualism and objectivism, implying that the 
82 
 
researcher, the research participant, and the topic of investigation are assumed to be 
independent of one another (dualism) (Remenyi, Dan, Williams, Brian, Money, Arthur, 
Swartz, & Ethne, 1998). And by undertaking rigorous, and standard procedures, the 
participant and the topic of investigation can be studied by the researcher without bias 
(objectivism) (Ponterotto, 2005). Second, the positivists assert that the researcher can 
investigate his research participants without influencing them and vice versa. Finally, the 
positivists consider replicated findings as “true” and these enhance theory verification 
evidence. 
 
The exponents of positivism argue that the scientific method provides for the acquisition of 
knowledge through observation and experiment, irrespective of context and related concepts 
such as feelings, opinions, values, or cultures (Cibangu, 2010). Thus, the positivists rely on 
the assumption that there is no place for value in the research process. In other words, one’s 
values, hopes, expectations, and feelings do not have place in scientific inquiry (Ponterotto, 
2005). Ponterotto (2005) suggests that positivism provides the primary foundation and 
anchor for quantitative research. 
 
In spite of the fact that the quantitative researchers contend that they do not aim to produce a 
science of laws but just aims to produce a set of cumulative generalizations to enhance the 
development of the universal knowledge based on critical examination and sifting of data, the 
philosophical stance of positivism is still subject to criticisms. This is because a true 
positivism depends on a number of assertions that have often been criticized and ultimately 
discredited (Lee & Lings, 2008). For example, positivists are criticized on the basis of the fact 
that they ignore the difference that exists between the natural and social world by failing to 
take into cognizance the ‘meanings’ that are brought to social life as they are merely refining 
and possibly extending what is already known (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, & Lowe, 1991). In 
their conception of science, positivists only consider things to be in existence if they are 
directly observable, and any proposition that cannot be directly empirically tested is regarded 
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as a mere nonsense (Lee & Lings, 2008). For example, the positivists’ philosophy of science 
considers variables such as employee’s safety motivation and safety knowledge as 
unobservable constructs (latent variables) and therefore do not actually exist because one 
cannot directly observe them (Lee & Lings, 2008). However, research (e.g. Lee & Lings, 
2008) indicates that although one cannot directly observe some constructs, for instance, 
employee’s motivation to perform his work safely in the workplace, we can however, observe 
the actual result or outcome of a motivated employee which is improved or enhanced safety 
performance behaviour. Positivists have also been criticized for being concerned only with 
the issue of association and neglecting that of causality (Lee & Lings, 2008). Positivists 
contend that only associations can truly be observed, implying that causality is an irrelevant 
concept. 
 
Whilst positivism, in one form or the other, has been seen as the most dominant (or 
standard: Lee & Lings, 2008) view in research linking HRM and performance outcomes (See 
Boselie & colleagues, 2005), it should be noted that there are other philosophical approaches 
that have been identified to provide for the acquisition of reliable and ‘genuine’ knowledge. 
For example, interpretivism (e.g. Sheppeck & Millitello, 2000; Gratton, Hope-Hailey, Stiles, & 
Truss, 1999; Boxall & Steeneveld, 1999; Chend & Brown, 1998) and realism (e.g. Bacon & 
Blyton, 2001; Truss, 2001), among others, are other philosophical positions that have been 
adopted in research to provide an account of the linkages that exist between HRM and 
organizational performance outcomes (See Boselie & colleagues, 2005). 
 
As earlier pointed out, Boselie and colleagues (2005) suggest that a few studies (e.g. 
Sheppeck & Millitello, 2000; Gratton& colleagues, 1999; Boxall & Steeneveld, 1999; Chend & 
Brown, 1998) have adopted interpretivist’s philosophical perspective to provide an account of 
the linkages between HRM and organizational performance outcomes. The interpretivist’s 
philosophical perspective is often perceived as an alternative to positivist’s viewpoint 
(Bryman & Bell, 2011; Ponterotto, 2005). It was established on the view that there was a 
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need for a strategy that recognizes the differences between people and the objects of the 
natural sciences and thus requiring the investigator to grasp the subjective meaning of social 
action (Bryman & Bell, 2011). Interpretivism in social research has developed from the 
common features of the philosophical viewpoints of hermeneutics, phenomenology and 
existentialism, ethnographic research, critical research, feminist tradition, Weber’s notion of 
Verstehen, and symbolic interactionism (Lee & Lings, 2008; Blaikie, 2004; Bryman, 2004). 
 
The interpretivists argue that the world is subjective, complex and socially constructed by the 
inherent elements in a social situation (Lee & Lings, 2008). In other words, they hold that 
reality is not objective but, instead, a social construction generated within the minds of 
individuals interacting in a given social context, rather than it being an externally singular 
entity (Lee & Lings, 2008; Hansen, 2004). Thus, the interpretivist’s philosophy espouses a 
hermeneutical perspective that maintains that meaning is hidden and must be brought to 
consciousness through deep reflections (See Ponterotto, 2005; Schwandt, 2000; Sciarra, 
1999). The interactive dialogue between the investigator, the research participant, and the 
topic of investigation can engineer this reflection. Because the actor (e.g. research 
participant) constructs reality, we cannot separate an objective reality from the person 
(research participant) who is experiencing, processing, and labelling the reality (Sciarra, 
1999). Therefore, the distinguishing characteristic of interpretivism is the fact that, principally, 
there is interaction between the investigator and the object of investigation. It is only through 
this interaction can deeper meaning be discovered (Ponterotto, 2005). Thus, in this 
perspective, knowledge is highly context-dependent thereby rejecting the idea of seeking 
abstract and generalizable knowledge (Lee & Lings, 2008) as suggested by positivism. 
 
Another difference between positivism and interpretivism is that, while the former 
emphasizes the acquisition of knowledge through observation and experiment, and hence 
scientific explanation, the later emphasizes the goal of understanding (Verstehen) the “lived 
experiences” or the “meaning” of social phenomena from the point of view of those who live it 
85 
 
day by day (Schwandt, 2000, 1994). Thus, the interpretivists consider knowledge to consist 
of rich, emic and idiographic description of experiences within their context (Lee & Lings, 
2008; Ponterotto, 2005). It is important to note that interpretivism is an empirical concept that 
is amenable to human science (qualitative) research (Herman, 1997) and hence it provides 
the primary foundation and anchor for qualitative research (Ponterotto, 2005). 
 
As earlier indicated, positivism has received unequalled condemnation claiming that its 
approach is not suitable to the study of social science phenomena. Some of the critics are of 
the opinion that its explanatory success in the natural sciences has not been successfully 
established and celebrated in the social sciences because of its flaws (Mack, 2010; Holden & 
Lynch, 2004). These critics suggest interpretivism as an alternative and a more appropriate 
approach to the study of social sciences because of the complex nature of social science 
research, that is, human beings. Furthermore, the supporters of interpretivism argue that the 
researchers who have used nominalistic approach and its attendant epistemology obtained 
more explanatory success (Holden & Lynch, 2004). This does not, however, rule out the fact 
that interpretivism also has its own flaws (Mack, 2010; Holden & Lynch, 2004; Hughes & 
Sharrock, 1997). For example, the critics of interpretive philosophies regard its inability to 
replace positivism with a better approach as its greatest flaw (Hughes & Sharrock, 1997). 
 
Due to the heated and seemingly unending controversy between the critics of both traditions, 
many researchers observe that these debates are not likely to end in any philosophical 
solution as there is no question of right or wrong philosophical stance. For instance, it has 
been contended that: (i) if reality is external and unknown to humans, then how do we 
accumulate knowledge about it? Moreover, (ii) if we are accumulating knowledge about it, 
how do we know that we are doing so? (Connell & Nord, 1996). According to Connell and 
Nord (1996), philosophical debates do not offer solutions to these queries because we do 
“…not know how to discover a correct position on the existence of, let alone the nature of, 
reality” (p.1). This resonates with Hughes and Sharrock (1997) who state that it is difficult to 
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provide any guideline to an appropriate philosophical stance, pointing out that “since the 
nature of philosophy, and its relationship to other forms of knowledge, is itself a matter of 
philosophical dispute, there is, of course, no real basis for us to advocate any one view on 
these matters as the unequivocally correct conception of the relationship between philosophy 
and social research” (p.13). 
 
This study adopted realism as an alternative philosophical perspective different from both 
positivist and interpretive philosophies. Two major forms of realism have been identified: 
empirical realism and critical realism. Empirical realism suggests that reality can be 
understood through the utilization of appropriate methods (Bryman & Bell, 2011). This 
description does not take into cognizance the fact that there are enduring structures and 
generative mechanisms that underpin and produce observable phenomena and events and 
is therefore, ‘superficial’ (Bhaskar, 1989).  Critical realism, on the other hand, is a specific 
form of realism that takes into cognizance the reality of the natural order and the events and 
discourses of the social world. It fundamentally holds that “we will only be able to 
understand-and so change-the social world if we identify the structures at work that generate 
those events and discourses …...These structures are not spontaneously apparent in the 
observable pattern of events; they can only be identified through the practical and theoretical 
work of the social sciences” (Bhaskar, 1989, p.2). Critical realism therefore suggests two 
things. The first is that, while positivism is of the view that the “scientist’s conceptualization of 
reality actually directly reflects that reality, realists argue that the scientist’s conceptualization 
is simply a way of knowing that reality” (Bryman & Bell, 2011, p.17). This resonates with 
Bhaskar (1975) who describes science as a systematic attempt to express in thought the 
structures and ways of acting of things that exist and act independently of thought. Thus, 
critical realists admit that there is difference between the objects of investigation and the 
terms they use to describe, account for, and understand them. The second is that, unlike 
positivists, the realists satisfactorily admit into their explanations theoretical concepts that are 
not directly observable (e.g. safety motivation & safety knowledge) and therefore can use 
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hypothetical entities to account for regularities in the natural or social orders (Bryman & Bell, 
2011; Lee & Lings, 2008). Therefore, contrary to the positivist’s idea that theoretical terms or 
concepts are solely defined by their empirical observations, the realists argue that some 
concepts are almost never defined by their observations and yet refer to entities that are 
‘real’. Thus, the realists believe that although many concepts the scientists are interested in 
studying cannot be directly observed, it is possible to usefully measure and study them in the 
context of theoretical explanations (Lee & Lings, 2008).  
 
Realist philosophies share positivist’s beliefs in several ways (Bryman & Bell, 2011; Lee & 
Lings, 2008; Ponterotto, 2002; Lincoln & Guba, 2000): (i) a belief in an objective world that 
we can observe and measure (Lee & Lings, 2008). Therefore, the natural and social 
sciences can and should apply the same kinds of approach to the collection of data and to 
explanation (Bryman & Bell, 2011). Thus, positivism and realism proffer an objective, 
detached investigator role (Ponterotto, 2005). (ii) a commitment to the claim that there is an 
external reality to which scientists direct their attention, suggesting that there exists a reality 
that is separate from our description of it (Bryman & Bell, 2011). (iii) Both positivism and 
realism operate from both nomothetic and etic perspective (Ponterotto, 2005).  
 
However, there are essential distinctions that exist between positivism and realism. Whereas 
the positivists emphasize “theory verification”, realists hold that it is possible to measure 
unobservable entities and hence emphasizing “theory falsification” (Popper, 2002, 1968; 
Lincoln & Guba, 2000). Guba and Lincoln (1994) highlight Popper’s (1968) work by 
presenting an interesting scenario to demonstrate the verification-falsification difference: 
“Whereas a million white swans can never establish, with complete confidence, the 
proposition that all swans are white, one black swan can completely falsify it” (p.107). The 
positivists are mainly concerned with association whereas the realists are concerned not only 
with association but also with causality, that is, there exist some independent causes that 
lead to the observed effects (Lee & Lings, 2008; Remenyi & colleagues, 1998). This is 
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consistent with Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, and Lowe (1991) who contend that the relationship 
between man and society is deterministic and that we are born into a world in which there 
are causal laws that explain the patterns to our social behaviour. 
 
In her study of the complexities and controversies in linking HRM with organizational 
outcomes, Truss (2001) adopted a realist philosophical perspective (See Boselie & 
colleagues, 2005). This study undertook a longitudinal research to analyze in detail the HR 
policies and practices of one case study firm (Hewlett-Packard) and how these policies were 
enacted. She utilized an exploratory approach to data collection “using a variety of 
methodologies” and drawing on a broad range of HR practices (at the two time points of data 
collection) and informants (Truss, 2001, p. 1121). In other words, the research adopted four 
principal methods in collecting data: interview, questionnaires, focus groups, and the 
collection of documentary evidence, and collected data from employees at all levels of the 
firm, from ‘operating core’, middle managers, HR departments, and senior executives. 
According to her (Truss, 2001, p.1128), this was done in order to “access not only the 
rhetoric of what the HR group was trying to achieve, but also the ‘reality’ experienced by 
employees” (Truss, Gratton, Hope-Hailey, McGovern, & Stiles, 1997; Legge, 1995). 
 
The present study investigated the issue of safety in the context of strategic human resource 
management (SHRM), adopting a multilevel model of intermediate mechanisms through 
which HPWS for safety influence individual-level safety outcomes through employee 
experienced HPWS for safety. In order to carry out this research, multiple methods were 
employed starting with literature reviewing and hypotheses statements. Both qualitative (i.e. 
use of interview method) and quantitative surveying (i.e. use of questionnaires) were adopted 
to collect data. The study obtained data from employees at both unit and individual levels of 
the organizations (that is, from front-line employees, line managers, including HR and Health 
and Safety line managers). This is consistent with previous research (e.g. Truss, 2001, 
p.1128) which suggests that multiple-source data collection is necessary because it gives the 
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opportunity to “access not only the rhetoric of what the HR group was trying to achieve, but 
also the ‘reality’ experienced by employees” (Truss & colleagues, 1997; Legge, 1995).  In 
other words, the researcher believes that there is an underlying reality that needs to be 
discovered, and which contains regular and consistent patterns that can ultimately be 
generalized (Lee & Lings, 2008). Consistent with the realist philosophies (and contrary to the 
positivist’s view) (See Lee & Lings, 2008), the researcher also believes that unobservable 
constructs like safety motivation and safety knowledge can be measured in a systematic and 
reliable manner. 
 
Furthermore, in line with Creswell (2008), the current study presented a conceptual model 
(See figure 2.I) which clearly shows, at the unit-level, the use of HPWS for safety as the 
independent variable and unit safety climate as the dependent variable. However, at the 
individual-level, experienced HPWS for safety has been shown to foster or facilitate safety 
outcomes of safety-related events and workplace injuries through the mediating influences of 
safety knowledge/safety motivation and safety behaviours of safety compliance and safety 
initiative. This study was carried out following a scientific method that involves a systematic 
survey and description of phenomena contextualized within a model (See figure 2.1) (See 
Ponterotto, 2005). 
 
All the variables: use of HPWS for safety, employee experienced HPWS for safety, unit 
safety climate, safety knowledge/safety motivation, safety compliance, safety initiative, 
safety-related events, and workplace injuries were operationally conceptualized. For 
example, the HPWS for safety and all its dimensions as developed and validated through 
inductive and deductive methods were defined to suit Creswell (2008) criterion of operational 
definition in the concept of realism. In the same vein, the study was carried out to address 
some gaps in previous research (e.g. Zacharatos & colleagues, 2005). 
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This study directed its efforts to test several hypotheses which were derived after a 
systematic review of the literature and presenting theoretical (SET and SIP) and empirical 
arguments to justify their propositions. Some analytical techniques including Mplus were 
utilized to express the functional relationships between the variables. And subjecting the 
priori hypotheses to statistical test analysis indicates that the researchers’ inferences can 
either be confirmed or rejected. 
  
3.3. Background to the Development of an HPWS for Safety Scale 
Despite the progress made in our understanding of the performance implications of HPWS 
(e.g. Aryee & colleagues, 2012; Combs & colleagues, 2006; Wright & colleagues, 2005; 
Bartel, 2004; Delery & Shaw, 2001), this stream of research has been noted to be plagued 
with a number of methodological issues. Primary among these issues is the lack of 
consensus among researchers with regard to the specific HRM practices that should be 
included in the bundling of HPWS and this makes it difficult to make consistent inferences 
from empirical findings in HPWS-performance research (Collins & Smith, 2006; Datta & 
colleagues, 2005; Boselie & colleagues, 2005; Delery & Shaw, 2001; Delaney & Huselid, 
1996). The work of Gerhart and colleagues (2000) has identified the items used to measure 
the HRM practices content as a potential source of measurement error in HPWS-
performance research. For example, Gerhart and colleagues (2000) contend that studies in 
HPWS reflect considerable unreliable measurement because of the items that are used to 
assess the HPWS. This indicates that the effect size estimates that are found in the 
relationship between HPWS and performance outcomes so far should be interpreted with 
caution (Gerhart & colleagues, 2000) because these flaws of HPWS measurement can have 
substantial implications for the validity and reliability of the conclusions that are reached from 
HPWS-performance studies (Dorenbosch, 2009). Although Delaney and Huselid (1996) note 
that, “the relevant literature is distinguished by the fact that virtually no two studies measure 
HRM practices in the same way… As a result, we see the development of reliable and valid 
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measures of HRM systems to be one of the primary challenges (and opportunities) for……. 
advancing this line of research” (p. 967), the current study is motivated by the need for a 
strategically-focused HPWS which is related to but different from the motivation for Delery 
and Huselid’ call. Thus, one of the objectives of this study was to attempt to systematically 
address the measurement issues such as items generation in a HPWS framework. 
 
Motivated by an aim to develop a system of high performance work practices, Zacharatos 
and colleagues (2005) conducted two separate studies in which they developed and 
validated an HPWS scale. While their first study investigated the impact of human resource 
management practices on safety at the organizational level, the second study focused on the 
underlying mechanisms through which employees’ perceived HPWS related to safety 
performance. In the first study, they developed 63 items to measure high performance 
management practices while in their second study, they developed a 51-item HPWS 
measure. According to the authors, the items used to measure HPWS in Study 2 are 
different from those used in Study 1 in two ways: First, the items used for Study 2 
emphasized employees’ perception of the extent to which the organization had adopted the 
human resource practices. Second, in Study 2, item responses were all on Likert-type 
scales. Many of the items were similar between the two studies (Zacharatos & colleagues, 
2005). Put together, their measurement scales addressed several critical issues. First, in 
order to address the limitations of previous research, they used multi-measure approach to 
identify both the existence and extent of each HRM practice. Second, consistent with their 
conceptualization of HPWS, they used an additive approach to create a unitary index. 
However, there is one main limitation in their studies, and that is, the utilization of 
generalized management practices measure to assess the effects of HPWS on occupational 
safety. In other words, the high performance management practices proposed as part of their 
organization and employee level models were assessed in general as opposed to safety-
specific terms. Thus, this study extended previous research (e.g. Zacharatos & colleagues, 
2005) by approaching the understanding of HPWP measures from a different perspective. 
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First, I developed a system of HRM practices that is safety-specific (HPWS for safety scale). 
Second, this scale is grounded in the Ability-Motivation-Opportunity (AMO) perspective. 
Because the existing AMO theory was not formulated specifically for understanding HRM in 
the context of workplace safety, this study translated and adapted it to suit its requirement 
. 
Table 3.1: Most frequently included HRM practices in HPWS-performance relationship 
AMO Category Most Frequently included HRM 
Practices in Research 
Rank Order Relationship with 
Organizational 
Performance 
Ability Training and development 
 
Recruitment and selection 
1 
 
4 
 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 
Motivation Contingent pay and rewards 
Performance 
management/appraisal 
Good (above market) wages 
 
 
Internal opportunities for 
Promotion 
2 
3 
 
7 
 
 
9 
Yes 
No 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Opportunity Team working and collaboration 
Direct participation 
 
Communication/information 
sharing 
Enriched job design 
5 
6 
 
8 
10 
No 
Yes 
 
No 
Not included 
Sources:  Combs and colleagues (2006); Boselie and colleagues (2005) 
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3.4. High Performance Work System Practices Identified Through 
 Deductive Method 
Table 3.2 presents the general HRM practices that are often included in generic measures of 
HPWS and tend to reflect AMO framework. These generic measures of HPWS inform the 
generation of HRM practices (and items) included in the present HPWS for safety measure. 
The last column of Table 3.2 represents features of Ability-Motivation-Opportunity framework 
and these include: Safety training and development, hiring for safety, compensation 
contingent on safe performance, employment security, internal opportunities for promotion, 
employee safety involvement/participation, performance appraisals, self-managed team and 
collaboration, safety information sharing, and job and work design. These reflect the HRM 
domains that have been most frequently studied and have been tied by previous research to 
other positive organizational outcomes (See Combs & colleagues, 2006; Boselie & 
colleagues, 2005). These HR practices are expected to enhance employee ability, 
motivation, and opportunity to perform or behave safely in the workplace. The next section 
presents the scale development process.
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Table 3.2: Deductive Selection of High Performance Work System for Safety Domains That Were Included in This Study 
HPWPs in AMO 
Research (Boselie & 
colleagues, 2005) 
HPWPs in 
Research 
(Posthuma & 
colleagues, 
2013)  
Bamberger & 
Meshoulam, 
2000 
Combs & 
colleagues, 
2006 
Zacharatos & 
colleagues, 
2005 
Sun & 
colleagues, 
2007 
Chuang & 
Liao, 
2010 
AMO Research 
Based on the 
Literature 
Review 
Selected 
Domains in the 
Current Study 
(Initial Pool) 
Training and 
Development 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Safety Training 
Recruitment and 
Selection 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Hiring for Safety 
Contingent 
Compensation 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Safety Rewards 
 Good Wages Yes No Yes No NI No No Employment 
Security 
Internal Opportunity for 
Promotion 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Internal 
Opportunity for 
Promotion 
Direct Participation Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Safety 
Involvement and 
Participation 
Performance Appraisals Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Performance 
Appraisals 
Team Working and 
Collaboration 
No No No Yes NI NI Yes Self-Managed 
Team 
Communication and 
Information Sharing 
Yes No No Yes NI NI Yes Safety Information 
Sharing 
Clear Job Descriptions Yes Yes NI No Yes NI Yes Clear Job 
Description 
Source: Posthuma & colleagues (2013); Combs & colleagues (2006); Boselie & colleagues (2005); Bamberger & Meshoulam,  
2000; Sun & colleagues (2007) 
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3.5. Dimensions of Safety-Specific HPWS 
3.5.1. Safety Training 
The training dimension of HPWS represent practices that foster employee skills and 
competencies that are required for their present and future jobs (Posthuma & colleagues, 
2013). Safety training focuses on safe work procedures and the importance of safety. Lauver 
(2007) suggests that safety training affects employees by making an improvement on their 
safety skills and abilities, as well as by communicating, through training, essential safety 
information. Safety training is important in the sense that an organization that has safety as a 
strategic focus will depend on frontline employee safety skills and safety initiatives to identify 
and resolve safety-related problems and to initiate changes in safe work methods (Pfeffer 
&Veiga, 1999). Training that is based on attitudes and beliefs toward safety has been shown 
to be very effective (Harvey, Bolam, Gregory, & Erdos, 2001; DeJoy, Searcy, Murpgy, & 
Gershon, 2000). Barling, Kelloway and Iverson (2003) observed that training enables 
employees to acquire greater competencies to control their work, leading them to perform 
their jobs more safely. Thus, increasing investment in safety-related training can enhance an 
organization’s safety performance just as much as it improves economic performance 
(Zacharatos & colleagues). Safety training is a skill-enhancing component of AMO. 
 
3.5.2. Safety Rewards 
Rewards represent practices that deal with the direct and indirect rewards and payments 
employees receive from their organizations (Posthuma &colleagues, 2013). Posthuma and 
colleagues (2013) suggest that rewards in the form of compensation and benefits are 
important in the sense that they help to focus an employee’s energy on specific behaviours 
that are desired by the organizations. It is therefore essential that organizations have 
employee rewards tied to the strategic focus or foci, which, in the context of the current 
study, are safety behaviours. Thus, if an organization, for example, considers safety as a 
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main performance indicator, then it follows that the organization will reward employees for 
their efforts to promote safety. Research shows that when employees are rewarded 
contingent on their safety performance, they become more effective in reducing workplace 
injuries. For example, in a study of roofing crews, Austin, Kessler, Riccobono, and Bailey 
(1996) found safety compliance levels of crews provided with time off as a reinforcer for 
complying with certain safety behaviours to increase from 55% to 95%. Safety reward has 
been conceptualized as belonging to motivation-enhancing component of AMO. 
 
3.5.3. Internal Opportunities for Promotion 
Internal opportunities for promotion include those practices that enable employees to move 
up to higher level positions within an organization. The notion of internal labour market is a 
critical component of internal opportunity for promotion. The principles associated with the 
traditional internal labour market recognize the offer of a combination of permanent 
employment contracts, a steady career progression from low skilled to high skilled posts (in 
this context safety-related skills), transparent and integrated pay structures (e.g. tied to 
safety), and internal training (e.g. safety training) to employees (Grimshaw, Ward, Rubery, & 
Beynon, 2001). These principles may be safety-related and targeted to foster employee 
internal opportunity for promotion. These are introduced not only to meet the internal 
productive requirements of the organizations such as employee commitment (e.g. to 
workplace safety) but also to meet certain external conditions such as ensuring strong trade 
unions, low unemployment and steady national economic growth (See Elbaum, 1984; 
Jacoby, 1984; Rubery, 1978).  
 
It is here argued that, when these principles are introduced to enhance employees’ internal 
opportunity for promotion based on their safety skills and safety performance, the employees 
are motivated to perform safely. Thus, high performance promotion for safety may include 
using promotions as a reward system for high safe performance such as reduction of 
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accidents and injuries in the workplace. Internal opportunity for promotion has been 
conceptualized as belonging to motivation-enhancing component of AMO. 
 
3.5.4. Safety Involvement and Participation 
Employee involvement and participation dimension of HPWS for safety deals with those 
practices that provide employees with the opportunity to participate in making safety-related 
decisions of the organization. Marchington and Kynighou (2013) identify three types of 
employee involvement and participation: direct, indirect, and informal.  Direct EIP is where 
employees personally get involved in a formal practice such as, for example, team briefing 
on safety-related issues, upward safety-related problem solving and safety-related 
suggestion schemes. Indirect EIP concerns a situation where employees are represented by 
one or more of their co-workers or trade union officials on a formal committee such as health 
and safety (Hall, Hutchinson, Purcell, Terry, & Parker, 2011, Dobbins & Gunnigle, 2009). 
Although informal EIP is less well researched (Marchington & Kynighou, 2013), it has been 
either as a substitute for or a supplement to formal schemes (Marchington & Suter, 2013). 
 
Research (e.g. Wilkinson, Dundon, Marchington, & Ackers, 2004; Freeman & Medoff, 1984) 
has shown that employee voice through unions can foster organizational performance. For 
example, Wilkinson and colleagues (2004) suggest that whether through union or non-union 
channels, EIP can have a positive influence on an organization in three ways. First, 
employee attitudes and behaviours can be improved and loyalty and commitment to the 
organizational goals enhanced when management legitimately value employees’ opinions. 
Second, lower absenteeism and greater cooperation can be achieved through employee 
increased loyalty and commitment. Third, accessing employee input and ideas can bring 
about improved managerial systems. 
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 It is here argued that, by extension, employee safety involvement and participation (ESIP) 
will enhance organizational safety through the improvement of employee safety attitudes and 
safety behaviours. Simard and Marchand (1995) indicate that a participative management 
style was the only best predictor of the extent to which employees were proactively involved 
in their own safety.  The finding of Shannon, Walters, Lewchuk, Richardson, Moran, Haines, 
and Verma’s (1996) study of 718 Canadian workplaces reveal that those workplaces in which 
employees participated in decision-making had lower cost-time accident rates than those 
workplaces where employees were expected to adhere to the instructions of management in 
doing their jobs. Safety involvement and participation has been conceptualized as belonging 
to motivation-enhancing component of AMO. 
 
3.5.5. Performance Appraisals 
Research (e.g. Kinicki & colleagues, 2013; Aguinis, 2009; Cascio, 2006; DeNisi & Pritchard, 
2006) posits performance management as a set of processes and managerial behaviours 
that define, measure, motivate, and develop the desired employee performance. 
Performance appraisal, which is a part of performance management (Kinicki & colleagues, 
2013) is described as involving the identification, measurement, revision as well as the 
development of human performance in organizations (Carroll & Schneider, 1982). Although 
Cleveland, Murphy, and Williams (1989) note that performance appraisals are conducted in 
organizations for the purpose of documentation, within-person decisions (feedback on 
strengths and weaknesses), and between-person decisions (who to promote), both they and 
others (e.g. Ilgen, 1993; Beehr, Ruh, Dawson, McCaa, & Kavanagh, 1978) are of consensus 
that the ultimate goal of performance appraisal in organizations is to help them to improve 
employee performance as part of a larger performance management system. Since the 
purpose of performance appraisal is to improve employee performance in general, I here 
argue that safety-related high performance appraisal can as well enhance the employee 
safety performance. Thus, it is essential that we have performance appraisal as a dimension 
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of the HPWS for safety scale. I further argue that frequent safety-related performance 
appraisals and feedback will help employees to see how well they are improving in safety 
activities related to their jobs, and this will increase their motivation to perform more safely. 
 
Previous studies show that the factors emphasized by performance appraisals affect the 
safety behaviours of employees (Lauver, 2007). Cooper (2001) demonstrates that what gets 
measured and rewarded is what gets done well. Zhang and Li (2009) argue that this is 
fundamental because it can align individual and team performance with organizational 
strategies. Performance appraisal is conceptualized as belonging to motivation-enhancing 
component of AMO. 
 
3.5.6. Self-Managed Team 
Self-managed teams are described as groups of interdependent individuals that are capable 
of regulating their behaviour on relatively whole task (Goodman, Devadas, & Hghson, 1988; 
Cumming & Griggs, 1977). Pfeffer (1998a) identifies four benefits of team-based work 
organizations. One, an individual’s behaviours are better controlled by his or her peers than 
someone else from a higher rung of the organizational ladder. Two, teams have the tendency 
of making their members feel more highly responsible for the success of the organization. 
Three, hierarchical layers are reduced as a result of teams’ work and this, in effect, gives 
autonomy to those individual employees who best understand the situation.  Four, working 
as a team enables the employees to put their ideas together in a manner that they become 
more creative. 
 
Self-managed teams are expected to be effective and contribute to employee quality of work 
life (Cumming, 1978; Susman, 1976), quality improvements (e.g. Kapstein & Hoerr, 1989; 
Walton, 1972), cost savings and productivity improvements (e.g. Kapstein & Hoerr, 1989; 
Goodman, 1979; Walton, 1972), decreased absenteeism and turnover (e.g. Beekun, 1989), 
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and safety improvements (Goodman, 1979; Walton, 1972). The study of Geller, Roberts, and 
Gilmore (1996) is consistent with Goodman’s (1979) and Walton’s (1972) reports where a 
sense of belongingness to a group and a sense of personal control were found to predict 
employees’ propensity to actively care for co-worker safety. In their study, Trist, Susman, and 
Brown (1977) found employees who work in autonomous teams to experience fewer 
accidents than their counterparts who worked individually. Similarly, Smith (1994) reported 
an incidence in a Mobil Oil Corporation where it was found that the implementation of joint 
safety committees in which management and employees met on a regular basis to discuss 
safety issues had significant impact in fostering workplace safety. While there is paucity of 
research that has investigated teams and safety, the preceding reports are good reasons to 
believe that the implementation of teams in organizations is likely to be an effective way to 
foster workplace safety. Self-managed team is conceptualized as belonging to motivation-
enhancing component of AMO. 
 
3.5.7. Safety Information Sharing 
Information sharing dimension of HPWS is concerned with HR practices that deal with the 
channels and methods that are used to exchange information in an organization (Posthuma 
& colleagues, 2013). Access to information is very important if employees must work 
effectively.  Fitz-Enz (1997) opines that information is one of the company’s most valuable 
resources.  According to Pfeffer (1998a) employees’ access to information enables them to 
have a clearer understanding of the organizational operations and its goals and this, in turn, 
enhances the overall organizational effectiveness. 
 
It will be difficult for employees to work safely if they are not well informed about all aspects 
of the job they do in particular and about the organization in general. For example, as injuries 
occur and the organization learns the particular behaviour that should be changed, there is 
need for these changes to be communicated to all employees. Mendelson and colleagues 
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(2011) emphasize that when organizations promote a free exchange of information, they 
tend to demonstrate that they do so in order to enhance participation in organizational 
decisions.  
 
Prior studies support the importance of information sharing for workplace safety. For 
example, research (e.g. Smith, Cohen, Cohen, & Cleveland, 1978; Cohen, 1977) suggests 
that organizations with better safety records are those where there is a greater contact and 
open discussion between management and frontline employees. Zohar (1980a) found 
factories rated by trained, independent observers as having better safety programmes to be 
embodied by open communication between management and employees. Hofmann (1999) 
reports that employees feel they are a significant part of the organization when there is 
increased sharing of safety-related information. The preceding findings indicate that there are 
positive consequences of safety information sharing if included as a dimension of HPWS for 
safety scale. Safety information sharing is conceptualized as belonging to opportunity-
enhancing component of AMO. 
3.5.8. Safety Audit 
Audit has been defined as “a structured, proactive management tool to assess systematically 
compliance with defined standards, legislation, policy, or best practice” (Allford & Carson, 
2015, p. 7). Safety audits characterize the qualitative approaches used by organizations to 
identify those areas of the safety management system that affect the level of risk. They also 
include the analysis framework that help to assess the safety culture of an organization by 
measuring whether safety performance indicators are present or not (Kennedy & Kirwan, 
1998). To determine the extent to which the organization’s safety policies and procedures 
are followed and whether there is need for improvement or not, there is need for safety 
audits. Process safety audit verifies whether what the business does in reality matches up to 
both what it says it does in terms of policies and procedures and what it should do in terms of 
continuous accident or risk reduction (Allford & Carson, 2015). 
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The objectives of safety audits include the identification of areas for improvement with the 
overall intent to reduce the chance of an accident or incident with the concomitant 
consequences such as death, injury, prosecution, financial loss, and so on (cf Allford & 
Carson, 2015). Safety audits provide organization with feedback that enables it to maintain, 
reinforce, and develop its ability to manage workplace safety.  In a random audit process 
carried out in a hospital setting, Ursprung, Gray, Edwards, Horbar, Nickerson, Plsek, Shiono, 
Suresh, and Goldmann (2005) found a total of 338 errors to be detected and these errors 
represent a broad spectrum of systems problems. Although research linking safety audits to 
workplace safety is scant, the preceding report suggests that including safety audit as a 
dimension of HPWS for safety scale is fundamental. Safety audit is conceptualized as 
belonging to opportunity-enhancing component of AMO. 
 
3.5.9. Safety Campaign 
Safety campaigns refer to purposeful attempts to inform, persuade, and motivate employees 
to change their attitudes and behaviours in order to improve workplace safety. Together with 
other behavioural measures such as safety training, law enforcement, and perhaps 
infrastructure, safety campaigns are used as a means of influencing the target population to 
behave more safely (Hoekstra & Wegman, 2011). For any campaign message seeking to 
effect a change in behaviour to achieve its purpose, it must be persuasive. However, 
opinions about what types of message are persuasive are divergent. For example, it is 
believed that persuasion is usually a rational attempt to present data. However, research 
(e.g. Elliot, 1993) suggests that the effect can be more if an emotional message is used. 
Whether a campaign message uses factual or emotional persuasion, the objective of many 
safety campaigns is to highlight the risks associated with certain behaviour (Lewis, Watson, 
Tay, & White, 2007; Weber, Martin, & Corrigan, 2006) 
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Although there seems to be limited research linking safety campaigns to workplace safety, 
there are a number of related research that has demonstrated the potential effects of safety 
campaigns. For instance, World Health Organization (WHO) (2004) indicates that road safety 
campaigns were able to influence behaviour when used in conjunction with legislation and 
law enforcement. In the same vein, Elvik, Vaa, Hoye, Erke, and Sorensen (2009) report that 
the effects of safety campaigns combined with other measures are more effective than the 
effects of mass media alone. Elvik and Vaa (2004) suggest that safety campaign reduce 
accidents levels by somewhere between 0 and 49% depending on the type of campaign and 
accident used. However, it was shown that the local, personally directed campaigns (as it is 
suggested in the current study) demonstrate “by far the biggest effect on road accidents” 
(Hoekstra & Wegman, 2011, p. 81). Thus, I argue that safety campaign is very important as a 
dimension of HPWS for safety scale. Safety campaign is conceptualized as belonging to 
opportunity-enhancing component of AMO. 
 
3.5.10. Safety Equipment Maintenance 
Equipment maintenance is a deliberate attempt to prevent system failure as well as to 
restore the system function when a failure occurs. Ramalhoto (1999) suggests that one main 
objective of maintenance is to maintain or improve the system reliability, production and 
operation regularity. Through regular inspections or proper preventive maintenance, failures, 
which are the most obvious interruptions of operation can, most of the time, be prevented 
(Ramalhoto, 1999). Swanson (2001) argues that effective equipment maintenance is critical 
to many operations because it extends equipment life, improves equipment availability and 
retains equipment in appropriate condition. 
 
Research has identified maintenance management strategies to include reactive, preventive, 
predictive (Bateman, 1995), total production maintenance (Weil, 1998), and aggressive 
maintenance (Swanson, 2001). Reactive maintenance strategy has been described as a fire-
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fighting approach to maintenance in which equipment is allowed to run until it fails. Then the 
failed equipment is either repaired or replaced (Paz & Leigh, 1994). Preventive and 
predictive maintenance are both referred to as proactive maintenance. It describes a 
maintenance strategy whereby breakdowns are completely avoided through activities that 
help to monitor equipment deterioration and undertake minor repairs in order to restore 
equipment to appropriate condition. 
 
Aggressive maintenance strategy seeks to improve overall equipment operation through 
involvement in efforts to improve the design of new and existing equipment (Swanson, 2001). 
Maggard and Rhyne (1992) describe total production maintenance as a partnership 
approach to maintenance where small teams or groups come together to create a 
cooperative relationship between maintenance and production in order to accomplish 
maintenance work. 
  
Although research linking equipment maintenance to workplace safety (i.e. safety outcomes) 
is scant, it has been shown that both proactive and aggressive maintenance strategies have 
significant positive relationships with the measures of performance (i.e. product quality, 
equipment availability, and reduction in production costs) while reactive maintenance 
strategy has a marginally significant negative relationship with the three measures of 
performance (i.e. product quality, equipment availability, and reduction in production costs)  
(Swanson, 2001). Drawing on prior research (e.g. Swanson, 2001), I include safety 
equipment maintenance as an important dimension of the new HPWS for safety scale. 
Safety equipment maintenance is conceptualized as opportunity-enhancing component of 
AMO. 
 
 
105 
 
3.6. Scale Development Process 
3.6.1. Introduction 
Several criteria have been suggested to assess the psychometric adequacy of behavioural 
measures. For example, the American Psychological Association (1985) highlights that 
measures should have an evidence of the content-related validity, criterion-related validity, 
construct-related validity, and internal consistency. Hinkin (1995) defines content validity as 
the adequacy with which a measure assesses the domain of interest, while criterion-related 
validity relates to the relationship that exists between a particular measure and another 
independent measure. Construct validity refers to the relationship of the measure to the 
underlying attributes that the measure attempts to assess whereas internal consistency is the 
homogeneity of the items within the measure or rather, the extent to which item responses 
correlate with the total test scores. Schwab (1980) notes three stages in the development of 
measures: the item development or the generation of individual items stage; the scale 
development stage (i.e. the manner in which items are combined to form scales); and the 
scale evaluation stage (i.e. the psychometric examination of the new measure). Thus, in line 
with Schwab (1980) and others (e.g. Hinkin, 1998), this study developed a new measure of 
HPWS for safety utilizing the following procedure: (i) item development and content validity 
assessment; (ii) pilot-testing the items/scale; and (iii) psychometric examination of the scale. 
 
3.6.2. Ethics-1 
Before I went to the field for collecting data for the development and validation of HPWS for 
safety scale, I drafted the research proposals in line with the Aston University’s ethical 
guidelines for research. This was submitted to and subsequently approved by the Aston 
University Research and Ethics Committee. Because it was initially difficult to gain access 
into the organizations of interest for the purpose of the qualitative interview, I decided to 
establish personal and direct contacts with the HR and safety professionals and experts 
within those organizations. Before I finalized the agreement to participate with these 
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individuals, I arranged a meeting with those who indicated interest to participate in the 
interview. During these meetings, each of the prospective participants was provided with a 
sample of the interview schedule upon request. However, I was later able to gain access into 
NNPC and General Hospitals in Niger State of Nigeria through a letter from the NNPC Group 
Managing Director (HR) and Director of Hospital Management Services, directing nine of the 
eleven NNPC subsidiaries and all the General Hospitals in the State, respectively, to 
participate in the research. The HR managers in the organizations used for this purpose 
acted as intermediaries between the researcher and the prospective participants and this 
channel of communication remained open to both the prospective participants and the 
researcher throughout the research exercise. 
 
In both the interview schedule and the questionnaires distributed to the prospective 
participants in Studies 1, 2, and 3, I provided a covering statement outlining the issues of 
informed consent, confidentiality and anonymity procedures involved in this study. The issue 
of informed consent was my primary ethical concern.  In considering this issue, I made the 
prospective participants to be aware of the purpose and nature of the study, the nature and 
extent of their participation, and the potential risk and benefits involved. I ensured that they 
understood the information that were given concerning their participation. Concerning the 
confidentiality, I assured the participants that all information provided would be protected and 
that it would not be linked to them as individuals or as a group. The prospective participants 
were also informed as well that they could withdraw from the interview or the research 
process (as the case may be) at any time if they so desired. However, they were advised that 
once they start filling the questionnaires after they have read this message, it would show 
their informed consent to participate. I gave them my personal contact details directly to 
interviewees and indirectly through HR managers to other prospective participants in case 
there was need to get in touch with me. The obtained data were stored in a secure folder and 
these would be destroyed after the dissemination of the research findings.  
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3.6.3. Study 1: Item Development 
In an attempt to adequately capture the specific content domains of HPWS for safety, this 
study adopted deductive and inductive approaches to scale development. This is necessary 
because there is a need to understand the phenomenon to be examined through a thorough 
review of the literature to develop the theoretical definition of the construct under 
investigation (Hinkin, 1995). Hinkin’s (1995) review of scale development practices suggests 
that a deductive technique to item generation can be done in two primary ways: (i) a 
researcher can derive items that are “designed to tap a previously defined theoretical 
universe” (p.969). In other words, items can be generated through the adoption or adaptation 
of, for example, previous HPWS scale items that are not safety specific; and (ii) a researcher 
can also develop a conceptual definition of the construct under investigation grounded in 
theory, “but then utilizes a sample of respondents who were subject matter experts to provide 
critical incidents that are subsequently used to develop items” (p.969). The present study 
adopted Hinkin’s (1995) suggestions by:  
1. Reviewing literature on similar work to identify ten (10) content domains and some 
items that underpin HPWS practices;  
2. Developing a theoretical foundation by defining HPWS for safety through an 
extensive review of the literature on the ability, motivation, and opportunity (AMO) 
theoretical framework; and  
3. Using HR and Health and Safety professionals to provide critical incidents that 
subsequently guided the researcher in the development of the items. 
 
To assure the scale’s validity, this study isolated or singled out all of the initial content 
domains and items from measures that had been reported in previous studies (Takeuchi & 
colleagues, 2007). Specifically, the study isolated the initial content domains and items from 
three of the measures reported in the review of the literature (See Chuang & Liao, 2010; Sun 
& colleagues, 2007; Zacharatos & colleagues, 2005) to generate the initial domains and pool 
of items that subsequently guided the researcher in the development of interview schedule. 
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As earlier indicated, ten (10) HPWS content domains were isolated and adapted for the 
purpose of item generation from the previous measures reported in the review of the 
literature. They include: safety training (training: Chuang & Liao, 2010; extensive training: 
Sun & colleagues, 2007; training: Zacharatos & colleagues, 2005), safety rewards 
(compensation/rewards: Chuang & Liao, 2010; incentive reward: Sun & colleagues, 2007; 
contingent compensation: Zacharatos & colleagues, 2005), internal opportunity for promotion 
(internal mobility: Sun & colleagues, 2005), safety involvement and participation (involvement 
and participation: Chuang & Liao, 2010; participation: Sun & colleagues, 2007), performance 
appraisals (performance appraisals: Chuang & Liao, 2010; results-oriented appraisals: Sun & 
colleagues, 2007), self-managed team (teams and decentralized decision-making: 
Zacharatos & colleagues, 2005), safety information sharing (information sharing: Zacharatos 
& colleagues, 2005), Clear job description (clear job description: Sun & colleagues, 2007), 
hiring for safety (staffing: Chuang & Liao, 2010; selective staffing: Sun & colleagues, 2007; 
selective hiring: Zacharatos & colleagues, 2005), and employment security (employment 
security: Sun & colleagues, 2007; Zacharatos & colleagues, 2005). 
 
3.6.3.1. Step 1: Inductive Approach to the Development of an HPWS for Safety 
 Scale 
To supplement the deductive technique, the study also adopted an inductive technique using 
subject matter experts drawn from the relevant organizational context. This was essential 
because there is a need to ask a sample of the potential respondents to describe some 
aspects of their organization’s safety-related HR practices not deductively identified (Kinicki, 
Jacobson, Peterson, & Prussia, 2013; Hinkin, 1998, 1995) and to know the extent to which 
those deductively identified are relevant to HRM practices relating to safety in the Nigerian 
context (See Sun & colleagues, 2007). In other words, the inductive or qualitative aspect of 
this study aimed to achieve two basic purposes: the first was to find out if the HRM practices 
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used in Nigeria’s oil and gas industry to promote safety are in consonant with each of the 
deductively identified content domains ((e.g. safety training, safety rewards, internal 
opportunity for promotion, safety involvement and participation, performance appraisals, self-
managed team, safety information sharing, clear job description, hiring for safety, and 
employment security)); second, to explore and identify safety-related HRM practices unique 
to the oil and gas industry in Nigeria. 
 
3.6.3.1.1. Procedure and Participants 
I developed a semi-structured interview schedule utilizing the ten (10) content domains and 
some items identified in the review of the literature. Sample questions are shown in Table 3.3 
below: 
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Table 3.3: Sample Questions in Semi-Structured Interview Schedule 
HR Domain Questions 
Workplace safety as 
an organizational 
objective    
 
Please explain briefly how workplace safety is reflected in your organization’s vision and 
mission. Answer to be backed up with relevant organizational documents 
Does your organization emphasize workplace safety as an objective in the same way as 
it emphasizes the bottom-line (profits)? If yes, how is this accomplished 
 
Hiring for Safety Does your organization emphasize long-term employee safety potentials in its hiring 
practices? Can you please give examples of how this is accomplished? 
 
Safety Training Does your organization provide extensive safety training programmes for employees? 
What are some of these programmes or practices? 
 
Safety Reward How do you compare the average pay level (including incentives) of your employees 
(especially front-line employees) with that of similar organizations (competitor) in the 
industry? 
 
Employment Security How much emphasis does your organization attach to employment security for its 
employees? 
 
Internal Opportunity 
for Promotion 
Using safety-related qualifications and performance as criteria, do qualified employees 
have good opportunities for internal promotion in your organization 
 
Information Sharing To what extent do supervisors keep open safety communications with employees in your 
organization? To what extent does your organization share with employees information 
about how well the organization is performing in safety-related issues? Can you please 
give specific examples of how this is done? 
 
Performance 
Appraisals 
How often does your organization measure employee safety performance in terms of 
objective quantifiable results? 
 
Self-Managed Team To what extent are team suggestions on safety issues implemented within your 
organization? 
 
Clear Job 
Descriptions 
Do the jobs employees do have up-to-date safety-related descriptions?  
Safety Involvement 
and Participation 
To what extent do supervisors keep open safety communications with employees in your 
organization? To what extent do you ask your employees for their opinions in advance if 
a decision made might affect their safety at work?   
 
Others Are there other practices that your organization has developed or uses to promote health 
and safety? Please, state them 
(See Appendix A for details). 
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To obtain access to respondents, letters were distributed to twenty-eight (28) oil and gas 
companies in Nigeria requesting for their participation in the research. The letter specified the 
objective of the research, the different stages of the research process and the level or extent 
of participation expected of the management, supervisory staff as well as frontline 
employees. The letter also emphasized that participation was voluntary and confidential (See 
Appendix B). This was essential because it was problematic to get individuals’ direct consent 
to participate in the research process without the approval of their respective organizations. 
The Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), the regulatory body of oil and gas 
companies in Nigeria, provided a letter of introduction (See Appendix C) which was 
submitted to sixteen (16) of the leading national and multi-national oil and gas companies in 
Nigeria. Furthermore, a letter was obtained from the Group General Manager (GGM-HR) at 
the corporate head office of the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), Abuja, 
granting access to nine (9) of its subsidiaries around the country (See Appendix D). 
 
Although I was not officially granted access to the private oil and gas companies, some of the 
HR managers and HS managers used their good offices to grant me access to their 
companies. Utilizing this opportunity as well as the letter of introduction from NNPC, I 
interviewed eighteen (18) managers and professionals including seven (7) HR managers and 
eleven (11) health and safety (HSE) managers drawn from two (2) private and six (6) 
government owned oil and gas companies. All the eighteen (18) participants were male and 
they had spent between one (1) and eight (8) years (mean = 4years) in their current position 
and their organizational tenure ranged from twenty-two (22) to thirty-three (33) years (mean = 
26 years). The duration of each interview session ranged from 30 minutes to 1 hour 30 
minutes with a mean duration of 1 hour. All the interview sessions were both manually and 
electronically recorded. This was necessary in order to: (i) avoid the human error of taking 
notes manually; and (ii) enable me to compare the two records at the end of each interview 
session. In addition, in order to ensure the interview approximates a natural conversation, the 
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electronically recorded interview session was played at the end of each session so as to 
provide the interviewee the opportunity to confirm the content and to make corrections where 
necessary. A summary of the interview is presented in Appendix E.  
 
3.6.3.1.2. Interview Findings 
The outcome of this interview process confirmed eight (8) out of the ten (10) a priori content 
domains of HPWS, including safety training (5 items), safety rewards (4 items), internal 
opportunity for promotion (5 items), safety involvement and participation (4 items), 
performance appraisals (7 items), self-managed team (5 items), safety information sharing (6 
items), and clear job description (4 items). Hiring for safety and employment security did not 
seem to promote safety in the Nigerian oil and gas industrial context. In addition, six (6) new 
HRM and safety practices (content domains) that are used for promoting safety in the 
Nigerian oil and gas companies were identified: safety audit (4 items), safety campaign (5 
items), safety equipment maintenance (4 items), accident prevention (4 items), total loss 
control community (3 items), and safety initiative (4 items). 
 
In all, findings from interviews coupled with the a priori item generation from the deductive 
phase of scale development generated sixty-four (64) unique safety-related items that were 
deemed to be widely used in the Nigerian context. Some items that were originally adapted 
and used as the bases for developing the interview schedule were either completely deleted 
or modified while others, for example, “The company invests considerable time and money in 
safety-related training programmes” (Safety Training: Chuang & Liao, 2010), “There is 
fairness and equity in the distribution of rewards in this company” (Rewards Contingent on 
Safety Performance: Chuang & Liao, 2010), “Employees who have acquired safety-related 
skills have career paths in this company ” (Internal Opportunities for Promotion: Sun & 
colleagues, 2007), “My company supports employees with the necessary equipment and 
resources to provide high quality safety performance” (Safety Involvement and Participation: 
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Chuang & Liao, 2010), “The supervisors in my company often meet with their subordinates to 
set performance objectives” (Performance Appraisals: reverse of Chuang & Liao, 2010), and 
“The job description for each position is well and clearly defined in the document given to 
employees” (Clear Job Description: adapted from Sun & colleagues, 2007) were retained. 
 
My decision to identify this large number of items at this stage was deliberate because I 
anticipated that after the process of item reduction and refinement, there should still be a 
minimum number of items that should adequately capture the domains of interest. This is 
consistent with Hinkin’s (1998) observation that approximately one half of the initially 
generated pool of items are retained for use in the final scale, and therefore, “at least twice 
as many items as will be needed in the final scale should be generated” (p.109). 
 
3.6.3.2. Step 2: Content Validity Assessment 
3.6.3.2.1. Items Sorting or Classification  
Research (e.g. Kinicki & colleagues, 2013; American Psychological Association, 1999; 
Nunnally, 1978) indicates that the content evaluation of the responses (i.e. items) generated 
from a focus group (i.e. HR and Safety experts) can be obtained by having a panel of judges 
assign items to the theoretical domains that underpin the content construct. This item 
reduction exercise provides an initial assessment of the extent to which the pool (second 
pool) of items generated measures or describes the HR content domains (Kinicki & 
colleagues, 2013). The present study thus assessed the content validity of the pool of sixty-
four (64) items generated deductively and inductively by using eleven doctoral researchers 
drawn from Aston Business School as judges. I used a sample of doctoral students at this 
stage of the scale development because sorting or classification is a cognitive task requiring 
intellectual ability rather than work experience or an understanding of the phenomenon under 
investigation (Schriesheim, Powers, Scandura, Gardiner, & Lankan, 1993; Schriesheim & 
Hinkin, 1990).  
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I distributed a template (both hard and soft copies) containing the detailed descriptions of 
each of the fourteen (14) HPWS domains or dimensions, and all of the sixty-four (64) items 
identified through deductive and inductive techniques to the respondents (i.e. judges). I then 
asked the judges to critically look at the items and the descriptions of the domains or 
dimensions and assign the randomly ordered items into one of the fourteen (14) categories 
(i.e. HPWS domains) as well as the “does not match any” category. The percentage of the 
correct assignments given by the judges for each item was calculated at the end of the 
exercise. Consonant with prior research (e.g. Kinicki & colleagues, 2013; MacKenzie, 
Podsakoff, & Fetter, 1991), I used a standard of 80% consensus among the judges to retain 
items for further analysis. Items on which the judges did not reach consensus, or which were 
assigned to “does not match any” category were discarded (Kinicki & colleagues, 2013; 
Nunnally, 1978). This classification procedure is consistent with that described in the 
literature (e.g. Kinicki & colleagues, 2013; Hinkin, 1998, 1995; MacKenzie & colleagues, 
1991; Hinkin & Schriesheim, 1989; Schriesheim, 1978; Nunnally, 1978). 
 
On examination of the outcome of this exercise, it was identified that three (3) of the 
proposed domains: accident prevention, total loss control community, and safety initiative 
“appeared to measure outcomes rather than practices”. Consequently, these domains were 
deleted. In all, eleven (11) domains and forty-one (41) items were retained for further 
analysis. These were safety training (4 items), safety rewards (3 items), internal opportunity 
for promotion (4 items), safety involvement and participation (4 items), performance 
appraisals (3 items), self-managed team (4 items), safety information sharing (4 items), Clear 
Job description (3) safety audit (4 items), safety campaign (4 items), and safety equipment 
maintenance (4 items) (See Appendix F). 
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3.6.3.2.2. Inter-Rater Reliability Assessment 
The scores of ten (10) out of the eleven (11) doctoral researchers who sorted the items in the 
preceding section were used for the purpose of interrater reliability assessment. The 41 
items that survived this sorting exercise were further subjected to inter-rater reliability 
assessment. It was expected that the reliability coefficient would be high if the judges’ ratings 
were similar. Thus, in order to further refine the forty-one (41) items from the verdicts of the 
judges in the classification of the items into categories (i.e. HPWS domains), I utilized 
Schriesheim, Kinicki, and Schriesheim’s (1979) three-stage process of inter-rater reliability 
assessment  by: (i) dividing the ten (10) judges randomly into two equal groups; (ii) 
calculating the number of times each judge assigned each of the forty-one (41) items to each 
of the eleven (11) categories; and (iii) establishing the correlation coefficients between the 
two groups of judges across the pool of items for each of the  categories (i.e. content 
domains) using Pearson Product Moment Correlation Coefficient. 
 
The inter-rater reliability coefficients for the eleven (11) domains are: safety training (.91), 
rewards contingent on safety performance (.50), internal opportunities for promotion (.33), 
safety involvement and participation (.33), performance appraisals (.99), self-managed team 
(.99), safety information sharing (.99), clear job description (.50), safety audit (.99), safety 
campaign (.99), and safety equipment maintenance (.99). Although two of the domains: 
“internal opportunities for promotion” and “safety involvement and participation” (r = .33 each) 
exhibited medium values of reliability coefficient (r) (Cohen, 1988), it could be logically 
argued that there was a high level of similarity in the ratings of the judges with the average 
rating of 0.77.  This is consistent with Cohen (1988), who found the reliability coefficients of r 
= .33 to .39 to be strong, whereas the reliability coefficients of r = .50 to 1.0 represent quite a 
stronger similarity between the judges’ ratings. In other words, the inter-rater reliability 
assessment test demonstrates a high level of similarity among the judges’ rating. The next 
section describes the dimensions of the HPWS for safety. 
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3.7 Study 2: Scale Development and Construction 
3.7.1. Step 1: Exploratory Factor Analysis 
Having established a high level of similarity among the judges’ ratings through the inter-rater 
reliability assessment, I then used exploratory factor analysis (EFA) to ascertain the validity 
of the newly developed HPWS for safety scale. The purpose of the EFA was to uncover the 
underlying factor structure of the 41 items. 
 
3.7.1.1. Sample and Procedure  
The data for the EFA were collected from two sources. First, were managers, deputy 
managers, assistant managers, superintendents, assistant superintendents, and supervisors 
(hereafter referred to as supervisory employees) of selected oil and gas companies in 
Nigeria. The choice of this sample was informed by the fact that they represent the target 
population of my main study. 200 questionnaires were distributed to supervisory employees 
purposively drawn from four branches of two different NNPC subsidiaries in Nigeria. 
 
The second source of respondents was the Petroleum Training Institute (PTI), Effuru, Warri, 
Nigeria. The institute was particularly relevant because it trains junior, including front-line 
employees, of oil and gas companies in Nigeria. This category of employees constituted the 
target population of my main study. I personally visited the Petroleum Training Institute (PTI), 
Effuru, Nigeria to obtain access to their trainees to participate in the pilot study. A supervisor 
in charge of the part-time programmes of the institute was officially assigned to help me to 
identify potential respondents. 
 
It should be noted that many of the part-time students of the institute are full time employees 
in the oil and gas industry who attend lectures on weekends for the purpose of obtaining 
either Ordinary National Diploma (OND), Higher National Diploma (HND) or a Certificate in 
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specialized programme such as diving, etc. Two hundred and fifteen (215) among the two 
hundred and eighteen (218) students randomly selected participated in the study. 
 
The main objective for involving both the supervisory employees and frontline employees 
was to ascertain the extent of the use of HPWS for safety practices and the extent to which 
frontline employees experience these safety practices in their organizations. In order to 
ascertain whether there is a significant difference between the mean scores of frontline and 
supervisory employees (See the measure and scaling method in the next section), an 
independent t-test statistics was conducted. The result (See Table 3.4) indicates that there 
was no significant difference in mean scores for frontline employees (M = 3.88, SD = 1.20) 
and supervisory employees (M = 3.86, and SD = 1.16) at t = .177, df = 301, p >.05 (two-
tailed). In line with Pallant (2013), the effect size statistics that provide an indication of the 
magnitude of the differences between the mean scores of the frontline and supervisory 
employees was also conducted using eta squared formula as follows: 
 
Eta squared =             
𝑡2
𝑡2+(𝑁1+𝑁2−2 )
 
Replacing with the appropriate values from the t-test analysis, we have the following: 
Eta Squared =     
.1772
.1772+(205+98−2
 
 
Eta squared = .00010 
 
This result indicates that the magnitude of the differences in the mean scores (i.e. mean 
difference = .026, 95% CI: -.26 to .31) was very small (eta squared = .00010 [.01%]) 
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Table 3.4:  Mean scores and standard deviation of the difference between frontline and 
supervisory employees 
 
Scale Job Title N M SD Df t p 
 
 
 
HPWS for safety 
Frontline Employees 205 3.88 1.20  
 
 
301 
 
 
 
0.177 
 
 
 
0.05 
 Supervisory Employees 98 3.86 1.16    
Not significant at P < 0, 05 
 
As indicated in Table 3.4, the results of the independent t-test demonstrate that there was no 
significant difference in mean scores for frontline employees (M = 3.88, SD = 1.20) and 
supervisory employees (M = 3.86, and SD = 1.16) at t = .177, df = 301, p >.05 (two-tailed) 
and that the effect size statistics which provide an indication of the magnitude of the 
differences between the mean scores of the frontline and supervisory employees was also 
small (eta squared = .00010 [.01%]). Accordingly, I combined the data from both frontline and 
supervisory employees to conduct the EFA. In total, 98 (i.e. 49%) usable questionnaires 
were retrieved from the 200 supervisory employees who received questionnaires and of the 
215 questionnaires distributed to the frontline employees, 205 usable questionnaires (95.3%) 
were retrieved. Thus, 303 usable questionnaires were retrieved in total, of which 67.7% were 
from frontline employees and 32.3% from supervisory employees. 
 
The age range of the participants is between 21 and 59 years. Two hundred and thirteen 
(213) (70.3%) participants were male while ninety (90) (29.7) were female. One hundred and 
sixteen (116) (38.3%) participants had qualifications below a first degree, one hundred and 
twenty-eight (128) (42.2%) among them had a degree or its equivalence while fifty-nine (59) 
(19.5) of them had postgraduate qualifications. The participants had spent between 1 and 32 
years in their current position, between 1 and 32 years in their current organization, and 
between 1 and 35 years in the oil and gas industry. 
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3.7.1.2. Measures  
The HPWS for safety scale was designed to measure both the unit’s use of HPWS for safety 
and employees’ experiences of the use of HPWS for safety. The supervisory and front-line 
employees were asked to give an accurate description of the use and experiences 
respectively, of HPWS for safety practices adopted in their companies. Response options 
ranged from (1) = ‘strongly disagree’ to (5) = ‘strongly agree.’ 
 
3.7.1.3. Data Analytic Technique 
The responses to the forty-one (41) survey items were factor analysed using principal axis 
factoring (PAF) analysis with IBM SPSS version 21. In order to verify whether a data set is 
suitable for factor analysis, Pallant (2013) recommends checking that: (i) the Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO) value is .6 or above. The KMO statistic varies 
between 0 and 1. A value of 0 shows that the sum of partial correlations is large compared to 
the sum of correlations, suggesting diffusion, hence factor analysis is likely to be 
inappropriate. A value close to 1 would mean that patterns of correlations are relatively 
compact and as a result, factor analysis should yield distinct and reliable factors. Values 
between 0.5 and 0.7 are mediocre, values between 0.7 and 0.8 are good, values between 
0.8 and 0.9 are great, and values above 0.9 are superb (Field, 2005). For this data, the value 
is 0.96 which falls into the range of superb.(ii) The Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity is a test 
statistics used to examine the null hypothesis that the original correlation matrix is an identity 
matrix. In order for factor to work, we need some relationships between variables under 
investigation and if the R-matrix were an identity matrix then all correlation coefficients would 
be zero. As a result, there is need for this test to be significant (i.e. to have a significant value 
of 0.05 or less: Pallant, 2013). When the test is significant, it tells us that the R-matrix is not 
an identity matrix, and therefore, some relationships exist between the variables that are 
included in the analysis (Field, 2005). 
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For the present data, the Bartlett’s test is highly significant (p < 001); and (iii) many of the 
items should indicate correlation coefficients of .3 and above (Pallant, 2013). I also examined 
the internal consistency of the new scale using Cronbach’s alpha coefficient (Cronbach, 
1951) while I used Fornell and Larcker’s (1981) Index of construct reliability to measure the 
scale’s construct reliability. The results are presented in the next section. 
 
3.7.1.4. Result 
The result of the analysis in Table 3.5 indicates that in distribution, Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
(KMO) Measure of Sampling Adequacy value was 0.96, exceeding the recommended value 
of 0.6 (Kaiser, 1974, 1970). This value falls within the range of superb (Field, 2005), 
suggesting that the data set is suitable for factor analysis.  The Bartlett’s Test (Bartlett, 1954) 
was significant (𝑥2 = 11604.803, df = 820, p = 000 < 0.001), indicating that relationships exist 
among the variables that are included in the analysis (See Table 3.5). The analysis also 
indicates the presence of many correlation coefficients of .3 and above. The analysis 
therefore supports the factorability of the correlation matrix (Pallant, 2013). 
 
Table 3.5: KMO and Bartlett's Test of Sphericity 
KMO Measure of Sampling 
Adequacy 
 0.96 
 Approx. Chi-Square 11604.80 
 df 820 
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity Significance .000 
 
 
As previously noted and in line with extant research (Sun & colleagues, 2007), I conducted 
EFA with principal axis factoring to uncover the underlying factor structure of the new HPWS 
for safety scale. To ease the interpretation of the factor loadings, I used Direct Oblimin with 
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Kaiser Normalization rotation. Furthermore, in addition to selecting those items with loadings 
of .3 or above on only one factor, Eigenvalues greater than 1.0 and Scree Test (Catell, 1966) 
were used to retain factors. Consequently, the EFA results yielded a three-factor solution that 
accounted for 65.97% of the variance, with 29 items loading uniquely on three components. 
 
A close observation of the scree plot demonstrates a clear break after the third component 
and using Catell’s (1966) Scree Test (See Figure 3.2), the three components were retained 
for further analysis. The three-component solution explained a total of 65.97% of the 
variance, with Component 1 contributing 55.88%, Component 2 contributing 6.15%, and 
Component 3 contributing 3.94% (See Table 3.6). 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Scree plot of the factors 
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Table 3.6: Results of Factor Analysis (EFA) of the New High Performance Work 
 System for Safety Scale 
 
 Domains/Items 1 2 3 
1 Safety Training    
 TRA1   .86 
 TRA2   .69 
 TRA3   .74 
 TRA4 
 
  .44 
2 Safety Rewards    
 REW1 .62   
 REW2 
 
.72   
3 Internal Opportunity for 
Promotion 
   
 PRO1 .74   
 PRO2 .74   
 PRO3 
 
.76   
4 Safety Involvement and 
Participation 
   
 PAR1 .68   
 PAR2 
 
.60   
5 Performance Appraisals    
 APP1 .55   
 APP2 .78   
 APP3 
 
.69   
6 Self-Managed Team    
 TEA1 .73   
 TEA2 
 
.56   
7 Safety Information Sharing    
 SHA1 .50   
 SHA2 
 
.42   
8 Clear Job Description    
 DES1 .49   
 DES2 
 
.32   
9 Safety Audit    
 AUD1  .61  
 AUD2  .55  
 AUD3 
 
 .56  
10 Safety Campaign    
 CAM1  .81  
 CAM2  .85  
 CAM3 
 
 .88  
11 Safety Equipment Maintenance    
 MAI1  .75  
 MAI2  .73  
 MAI3 
 
 .67  
Eigenvalues  16.21 1.78 1.14 
Variance 
Explained (%) 
 55.88 6.15 3.94 
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As earlier explained, Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization was performed in order to enhance 
the interpretation of the three components. The rotated solution yielded 9 iterations and 
indicated the presence of three components demonstrating a number of strong loadings and 
seven variables (domains): safety rewards (items 6, 7), internal opportunity for promotion 
(items 8, 9, 11), safety involvement and participation (items 12, 15), performance appraisals 
(items 16, 17, 18), self-managed team (items 21, 22), safety information sharing (items 25, 
26), and clear job descriptions (items 27, 28) loading on Component 1; three variables: 
safety audit (items 30, 31, 32), safety campaign (items 34, 36, 37), and safety equipment 
maintenance (items 38, 39, 40) loading on Component 2; and one variable: safety training 
(items 1, 2, 3, 4) loading on Component 3. 
 
The three components are consistent with AMO framework, with human resource 
management items (domains: safety rewards, internal opportunity for promotion, safety 
involvement and participation, performance appraisals, self-managed team, safety 
information sharing, and clear job descriptions) loading strongly on Component 1 
(Motivation), organization management items (domains: safety audit, safety campaign, and 
safety equipment maintenance) loading strongly on Component 2 (Opportunity), and skills 
items (domain: safety training) loading strongly on Component 3 (Ability) (See Tables 3.6 
and 3.7). 
 
Table 3.7: Configuration of HPWS for safety Domains in Relation to AMO   
HRM Subsystem AMO Dimensions HPWS for Safety Dimensions 
Skill Ability Safety Training 
 
 
Human Resource management 
 
 
Motivation 
 
 
Safety Rewards 
Internal opportunity for promotion 
Safety involvement and participation 
Performance appraisals 
Self-managed team 
Safety information sharing 
Clear job descriptions 
 
Organization management 
 
Opportunity 
 
Safety audit 
Safety campaign 
Safety equipment and maintenance 
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The second analysis conducted on these data aimed to uncover the underlying factor 
structure of the eleven (11) domains constituting the HPWS for safety as a synergistic 
system for safety measure. Therefore, consistent with Drasgow and Kanfer’s (1985) and 
Comrey’s (1978) subscale summation approach, the mean scores of each subscale (domain) 
were calculated and used for conducting EFA. Then following Zacharatos and colleagues 
(2005), I used principal components extraction with listwise deletion and a single factor 
solution emerged from the data. This single factor solution that now constitutes the high 
performance work system (HPWS) for safety scale accounted for 66.22% of the cumulative 
variance explained with an Eigenvalue of 7.28. The results of this analysis are shown in 
Table 3.8. 
 
Table 3.8: Factor Loadings of Eleven (11) Domains of the New High Performance Work             
 System for Safety Scale 
 
Factor Component 1/Factor Loadings 
Safety Information Sharing 0.87 
Safety Audit 0.85 
Clear Job Description 0.84 
Safety Equipment Maintenance 0.81 
Self-Managed Team 0.81 
Safety Training 0.81 
Safety Involvement and Participation 0.81 
Safety Campaign 0.81 
Performance Appraisals 0.80 
Internal Opportunity for Promotion 0.77 
Safety Rewards 0.76 
 
 
3.7.2. Step 2: Reliability Assessment of the Scale 
Two basic issues of concern in assessing the reliability of a new measure are: (i) the internal 
consistency of the items within the measure; and (ii) the stability of the measure over time 
(Hinkin, 1995). The two important ways by which this study demonstrated the reliability 
properties of this new measure are to examine, at the construct level, its internal consistency 
(Kinicki & colleagues, 2013; Pallant, 2013; Hinkin, 1995; Price & Mueller, 1986; Cronbach, 
1951) and construct reliability (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). Specifically, the study examined 
125 
 
whether (i) the internal consistency reliability (Cronbach, 1951) of the set of indicators is 
greater than 0.70; and (ii) Fornell & Larcker’s (1981) index of construct reliability is greater 
than 0.70. The internal consistency of the scale (which is also known as the construct 
reliability: Fornell & Larcker, 1981) refers to the degree to which the items that constitute the 
scale or subscale measure the same underlying construct. Fornell & Larcker, (1981) define 
construct reliability as a summary measure of convergence among a set of items that 
constitute a construct. In other words, it is expected that the items within each dimension as 
well as the dimensions should correlate with one another. 
 
The reliability coefficients (Cronbach, 1951) for the measures of each of the eleven (11) 
subscales or dimensions of the HPWS for safety scale are reported in Table 3.9. 
 
Table 3.9: Reliability Coefficients of the 11 Subscales Constituting HPWS for Safety 
 (Study 2) 
 
Serial 
Number 
Subscales Number of 
Items 
Reliability Coefficients 
1 Safety Training 4 0.88 
2 Safety Rewards 2 0.85 
3 Internal Opportunity for Promotion 3 0.82 
4 Safety Involvement And Participation  2 0.73 
5 Performance Appraisals 3 0.84 
6 Self-Managed Team 2 0.82 
7 Safety Information Sharing 2 0.88 
8 Clear Job Descriptions 2 0.81 
9 Safety Audit 3 0.91 
10 Safety Campaign 3 0.92 
11 Safety Equipment Maintenance 3 0.90 
 
Furthermore, the reliability of each subscale was assessed in order to determine whether the 
second-order latent construct (i.e. HPWS for safety) explains or accounts for the majority of 
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its variance. This was done by showing whether the squared multiple correlation for the 
subscale is greater than 0.50 (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). Table 3.10 indicates that the squared 
multiple correlations of the subscales or dimensions (ranging from 0.59-0.75) are each 
greater than 0.50, the recommended value by Fornell and Larcker (1981). This demonstrates 
that the second-order latent construct accounts for the majority of the sub-scales’ variances, 
thereby demonstrating a high level of construct reliability.  
 
Table 3.10: Squared Multiple Correlations of the Sub-Scales 
Serial Number Sub-Scales Squared Multiple 
Correlations 
1 Safety Training 0.65 
2 Safety Rewards 0.59 
3 Internal Opportunity for Promotion 0.62 
4 Safety Involvement and Participation 0.70 
5 Performance Appraisals 0.68 
6 Self-Managed Team 0.68 
7 Safety Information Sharing 0.75 
8 Clear Job Description 0.70 
9 Safety Audit 0.75 
10 Safety Campaign 0.67 
11 Safety Equipment Maintenance 0.71 
 
The second-order factor loadings and the residual variances that are associated with the 
first-order sub-dimensions were used to calculate Fornell & Larcker’s (1981) index of 
construct reliability. In other words, a squared sum of the factor loadings of the HPWS 
dimensions (numerator) was divided by the squared sum of the factor loadings plus the sum 
of residual variances of the factor loadings (denominator). Corroborated by Netemeyer, 
Johnston, and Burton (1990), the Fornell and Larcker’s (1981) formula for calculating the 
construct reliability of an instrument is: 
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Construct Reliability = 
(∑ 𝜆)2
                                                        (∑ 𝜆)2+∑ 𝜀
 
Where  (∑ 𝜆)2 = 𝑆𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠, 𝑎𝑛𝑑                                                      
∑ 𝜀
= 𝑠𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠                                                                                                                                                                                             (∑ 𝜆)2
=    (0.87 + 0.85 + 0.84 + 0.81 + 0.81 + 0.81 + 0.81 + 0.81 + 0.80 + 0.77 + 0.76 )2     
= 79.92                                           
∑ 𝜀 = 0.37 + 0.40 + 0.50 + 0.48 + 0.45 + 0.37 + 0.26 + 0.30 + 0.27 + 0.26 + 0.22 = 3.88 
Construct-Reliability = 
(∑ 𝜆)2
                                                        (∑ 𝜆)2+∑ 𝜀
=
79.92
79.92+3.88
  = 0.95 
 
The above result indicates that the Fornell and Larcker’s (1981) index of construct reliability 
is 0.95 while the overall Cronbach’s (1951) alpha value is 0.97, suggesting very good 
construct reliability and internal consistency reliability respectively for the scale. This is 
consistent with previous research (e. g. Pallant, 2013; MacKenzie, Podsakoff, & Podsakoff, 
2011; DeVellis, 1991; Fornell & Larcker, 1981; Nunnally, 1978; Cronbach, 1951) which 
suggests that the minimum level of internal consistency reliability coefficient (α) and construct 
reliability coefficient that should be considered acceptable for a scale should be greater than 
0.70.  
 
Because the study assumes that each indicator (or item) is associated with only one factor 
that constitutes the HPWS for safety, MacKenzie and colleagues (2011) recommend that the 
construct reliability of each indicator (item) should be assessed by examining the squared 
multiple correlation for the indicator (or item). Table 3.11 indicates that each of the indicators 
had a squared multiple correlation value (i.e. ranging from 0.51 to 0.83) greater than 0.50 
(Fornell & Larcker, 1981), suggesting that the majority of the variances in the indicators are 
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due to the latent construct (i.e. HPWS for safety).Furthermore, and as shown in Table 3.11, 
an examination of the inter-item correlation matrix indicates that all of the items were 
positively correlated, meaning that the items are measuring the same underlying 
characteristics. 
  
Table 3.11: The High Performance Work System for Safety Scale and inter-item 
correlations  
Serial 
Number 
Items Corrected 
Item Total 
Correlation 
(r) 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
1 This company provides safety-related training programmes for all employees 0.71 0.74 
2 This company invests considerable amount of time and money in safety-related training 0.69 0.70 
3 This company provides regular safety-related training programmes for its employees 0.76 0.76 
4 Safety-related issues are well emphasized during the apprenticeship (or induction) programmes for new employees 0.60 0.51 
5 There is fairness and equity in the distribution of rewards contingent on safe performance in this company 0.71 0.69 
6 The management recognizes the safety-related efforts by individual employees in the company by issuing outstanding 
employees letters of commendation, among others 
0.70 0.68 
7 This company gives priority to safety-related experience of internal candidates in terms of job openings 0.71 0.61 
8 Safety-related efforts enhance employees’ opportunity for upward movement in this company 0.64 0.62 
9 Employees who have acquired safety-related skills have clear career paths in this company     0.61 0.58 
10 Employees in this company are represented in meetings when issues, including safety-related matters, affecting them are 
discussed before they are implemented 
0.67 0.57 
11 This company acts upon the suggestions provided by employees (e.g. through suggestion boxes) 0.78 0.66 
12 In this company, supervisors set performance objectives or goals (including safety goals) with their subordinates 0.72 0.62 
13 Performance appraisals provide employees feedback on their understanding of safety issues 0.70 0.67 
14 Immediate superior officers appraise their subordinates on their safety performance 0.68 0.61 
15 Teams are held responsible for the safety performance of their members 0.69 0.66 
16 Teams are encouraged to make suggestions regarding improvements in safety-related practices 0.75 0.68 
17 This company shares safety-related information with employees 0.80 0.74 
18 This company shares information regarding new developments in safety practices with employees 0.81 0.75 
19 Job descriptions are clearly defined in line with safety rules and procedures 0.80 0.73 
20 Jobs are clearly designed to highlight safety requirements 0.70 0.63 
21 This company carries out a safety audit of its plant and facilities on a regular basis 0.79 0.79 
22 This company carries out a safety audit of the plants and facilities provided by contractors 0.77 0.77 
23 This company acts on issues raised as a result of the safety audit 0.81 0.76 
24 This company gives priority to periodic safety campaigns 0.76 0.73 
25 Employees are encouraged to discuss safety-related issues during the safety awareness week   0.75 0.83 
26 Safety briefings are provided during the safety awareness campaigns 0.72 0.82 
27 This company provides adequate safety equipment in strategic or appropriate locations on its premises 0.66 0.65 
28 This company ensures that its safety equipment are regularly maintained 0.78 0.83 
29 Safety equipment are inspected on a regular basis 0.77 0.80 
Note: Cronbach Coefficient alpha (α) for the whole scale = 0.97. r refers to corrected 
item-total correlations, defined as the correlation between one item and other items in 
the scale (Pallant, 2013; Hayes, 1994); Average Squared Multiple Correlation = 0.70 > 
0.50 
 
 
The descriptive statistics and inter-correlations among the eleven (11) domains comprising 
the HPWS for safety scale are displayed in Table 3.12.
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Table 3.12: Means, Standard Deviations, Reliability Estimates, and Inter-correlations between the Measures  
 of the Eleven (11) Subscales of the High Performance Work System for Safety Scale (HPWSSS) 
 
 Variables M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 Safety Training 4.07 0.95 (0.88)           
2 Safety Rewards 3.62 1.18 0.60 (0.85)          
3 Internal Opportunity for Promotion 3.68 1.02 0.53 0.63 (0.82)         
4 Safety Involvement and Participation 3.98 1.00 0.61 0.62 0.63 (0.73)        
5 Performance Appraisals 3.75 1.01 0.62 0.64 0.64 0.64 (0.84)       
6 Self-Managed Team 3.92 1.01 0.56 0.57 0.63 0.63 0.65 (0.82)      
7 Safety Information Sharing 4.04 1.02 0.71 0.58 0.64 0.64 0.68 0.70 (0.88)     
8 Clear Job Descriptions 4.24 0.92 0.68 0.60 0.56 0.62 0.65 0.71 0.75 (0.81)    
9 Safety Audit 3.97 1.07 0.65 0.59 0.60 0.66 0.60 0.62 0.70 0.66 (0.91)   
10 Safety Campaign 4.08 1.08 0.63 0.52 0.55 0.58 0.55 0.59 0.71 0.62 0.73 (0.92)  
11 Safety Equipment Maintenance 4.15 0.97 0.64 0.52 0.53 0.60 0.55 0.60 0.68 0.64 0.77 0.73 (0.90) 
Note: All correlation coefficient values are significant at p < 0.01 (2-tailed). Subscales reliability estimates (α)  
are presented in parentheses on the diagonal, N = 303; Cronbach alpha of the whole scale is 0.97 
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3.7.3. Discussion 
Study 2 of this thesis aimed to achieve three main objectives. First, to examine the factor 
structure of the 41 items that constituted the HPWS for safety scale. Second, to assess the 
factor structure of the eleven dimensions that comprised the HPWS for safety scale. Third, to 
examine the content validity of the scale in terms of reliability coefficients (Cronbach, 1951) 
and construct reliability (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). 
 
Results of the EFA indicated three components demonstrating seven domains loading 
strongly on Component 1; three domains loading strongly on Component 2, and one domain 
loading strongly on Component 3. The three components are consistent with the AMO 
framework, with human resource management items (domains: safety rewards, internal 
opportunity for promotion, safety involvement and participation, performance appraisals, self-
managed team, safety information sharing, and clear job descriptions) loading strongly on 
Component 1 (Motivation), organization management items (domains: safety audit, safety 
campaign, and safety equipment maintenance) loading strongly on Component 2 
(Opportunity), and skills items (domain: safety training) loading strongly on Component 3 
(Ability). 
 
The findings reveal that the eleven HPWS for safety domains: safety training, safety rewards, 
internal opportunity for promotion, safety involvement and participation, performance 
appraisals, self-managed team, safety information sharing, clear job descriptions, safety 
audit, safety campaign, and safety equipment maintenance reflect a single underlying 
construct- the HPWS for safety. This is consistent with the result presented in Table 3.12 
where the dimensions or practices are found to be highly intercorrelated, suggesting that a 
configuration (Delery & Doty, 1996)) or bundle (Pil & MacDuffie, 1996; MacDuffie, 1995) of 
practices are synergistically used together. In the next section, I described the evaluation of 
the new scale. 
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3.8. Study 3: Evaluation of the New Scale 
The next step is to assess the construct validation of the new scale in terms of convergent 
validity, discriminant validity, and criterion-related validity. Hinkin (1998) and Nunnally (1978) 
describe convergent validity as the extent to which a construct relates to other measures of 
similar construct while discriminant validity is defined as the extent to which a construct has 
low or null relationships with dissimilar measures. According to them, criterion-related validity 
refers to the relationship that exists between a particular measure (in this case HPWS for 
safety scale) and another theoretically independent measure of related constructs. 
 
3.8.1. Convergent, Discriminant, and Criterion-Related Validity Assessment 
The aim of Study 3 was to examine the convergent, discriminant, as well as the criterion-
related validity of the newly developed HPWS for safety scale. Specifically, Study 3 aimed to 
examine: (i) the extent to which HPWS for safety scale is related to othermeasures designed 
to assess similar constructs; (ii) the extent to which HPWS for safety scale is related to 
measures designed to capture theoretically dissimilar constructs; and (iii) the extent to which 
there is a nomological network of relationships between HPWS for safety scale and other 
theoretically independent measures with which it was expected to correlate. 
 
3.8.1.1. Convergent Validity Assessment 
In order to adequately capture or establish the convergent validity of the new HPWS for 
safety scale, this study relied considerably on the theoretical relationships between the newly 
developed HPWS for safety, (i) Zacharatos and colleagues’ (2005) HPWS scale, and (ii) 
safety-specific transformational leadership scale (Barling, Loughlin, & Kelloway, 2002). 
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3.8.1.1.1. HPWS for safety scale and HPWS scale (Zacharatos & colleagues, 2005) 
HPWS scale (Zacharatos & colleagues, 2005) consists of ten HRM domains including 
employment security, selective hiring, training, team and decentralized decision-making, 
reduced status distinctions, information sharing, contingent compensation, transformational 
leadership, job quality, and measurement. These ten domains of HPWS configuration were 
designed to enhance employees’ safety performance. In other words, the extent to which 
organizations adopted these HRM practices determines the extent to which they experience 
greater workplace safety measured in terms of fewer lost time injuries (Zacharatos & 
colleagues, 2005).  
 
The new HPWS for safety scale consists of eleven dimensions including: safety training, 
safety rewards, internal opportunity for promotion, safety involvement and participation, 
performance appraisals, self-managed team, safety information sharing, clear job 
descriptions, safety audit, safety campaign, and safety equipment maintenance. The new 
HPWS for safety was predicated on the assumption that employees’ safety work attitudes 
and safety behaviours, and consequently, safety outcomes are fostered by a system of HRM 
practices that provide employees with the ability to perform safely, motivation to perform 
safely, and the opportunity to perform safely (AMO). While the two scales are similar in terms 
of synergistically constituting a configuration or a bundle of HRM practices, they, however, 
differ in the sense that Zacharatos and colleagues’ (2005) HPWS scale was not safety-
specific as opposed to the present scale (HPWS for safety scale) under consideration. 
 
 Zacharatos (2001) contends that it is more likely that a measure of non-safety-specific 
management practices would be highly correlated with its safety-specific translation or 
counterpart. This is consistent with previous studies (e.g. Department of Workplace Relations 
and Small Business, 1997) which reported the provision of general training to significantly 
relate to the provision of occupational health and safety training. Thus, this study proposes 
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that both scales (i.e. HPWS for safety scale & HPWS) do converge on the basis that they 
have a positive impact on employee safety behaviours and safety outcomes. 
 
Hypothesis A1: The new HPWS for safety scale positively relates to Zacharatos and 
colleagues’ (2005) HPWS measure. 
 
3.8.1.1.2. HPWS for safety scale and Safety-Specific Transformational Leadership 
 Scale 
Research (e.g. Conchie & Donald, 2009) indicates that supervisor’s actions influence 
subordinates’ safety behaviours. For example, it has been shown that subordinates’ 
engagement in safety behaviours is enhanced when supervisors who are committed to 
safety (i.e. safety-specific transformational leaders) encourage them to be involved, for 
example, in safety-related activities (Hofmann & Mongeson, 1999; Mearns, Flin, Gordon, & 
Fleming, 1998). Thus, research evidence indicates that safety-specific transformational 
leadership makes an incremental contribution to the prediction of safety outcomes above the 
general transformational leadership style (Mullen & Kelloway, 2006). Barling and colleagues 
(2002) investigated the effects of safety-specific transformational leadership (using their 
safety-specific transformational leadership scale) on young workers’ perceptions of safety 
climate, safety-related events, and occupational injuries. They found that respondents whose 
supervisors utilized safety-specific transformational leadership exhibited more positive 
perceptions of safety climate and consequently, engaged less in unsafe behaviours. 
 
As earlier indicated, HPWS for safety is built on the assumption that employees’ work safety 
attitudes, safety behaviours and safety outcomes are enhanced by a system of HRM 
practices that provides employees with the ability to perform safely, motivation to perform 
safely, and the opportunity to perform safely (AMO). Thus, because employee behaviours 
that underpin Barling and colleagues’ (2002) study (i.e. safety-related behaviours) and those 
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of the present study (i.e. safety behaviours) may be said to be conceptually similar, it was 
expected that the new scale (HPWS for safety scale) would be positively related to safety-
specific transformational leadership scale. 
  
Hypothesis A2: The new HPWS for safety scale positively relates to Barling and 
 colleagues’  (2002) safety-specific transformational leadership scale. 
 
3.8.1.2. Discriminant Validity Assessment 
To establish the discriminant validity of the new scale, I examined the degree to which the 
present construct (i.e. HPWS for safety) is dissimilar to (or diverges from) another construct 
that it theoretically should not be similar to. To test the discriminant validity of the new HPWS 
for safety scale therefore, this study used a measure of social desirability (Stöber, 2001). 
 
3.8.1.2.1. HPWS for safety scale and Social Desirability Scale (SDS-17) 
Social desirability describes the tendency to make biased, distorted, and overly positive 
descriptions that portray oneself in a manner that can make exaggerated and favourable 
impressions on others (Paulhus, 2002). Individuals who present themselves in a socially 
desirable manner attempt to appear excessively morally good by denying undesirable but 
frequent behaviours or characters and exaggerating desirable but infrequent traits (Stöber, 
2001). 
 
Social desirability scale is a standard measure used to control whether responses to a 
questionnaire are biased by desirable responding (Stöber, 2001). According to Stöber 
(2001), this is done by showing that the questionnaire(s) under consideration do not correlate 
with social desirability measures or that a correlation exists but the correlation is not 
significant. 
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The new HPWS for safety was designed in order to enhance employees’ work safety 
behaviours and safety outcomes by providing them with the ability to perform safely, 
motivation to perform safely, and the opportunity to perform safely (AMO). Thus, it was 
expected that the new HPWS for safety scale will be either unrelated to or exhibit non-
significant relationship with Stöber’s (2001) social desirability scale (SDS-17). 
  
Hypothesis A3: There is no significant relationship between the new HPWS for safety 
scale and social desirability scale 
 
3.8.1.3. Criterion-Related Validity Assessment 
In addition to establishing the convergent and discriminant validity of the new scale, the study 
also determined the extent to which the new measure explains criterion variance(s) with 
other measures (Kinicki & colleagues, 2013) which are thought to be theoretically 
independent. Thus, in order to capture criterion-related validity, I investigated the 
relationships between the new HPWS for safety scale, safety compliance scale, safety 
participation scale, safety initiative scale, and organization-based self-esteem scale from 
multiple perspectives: the unit (supervisory employees level) and employee (frontline 
employees level) perspectives. These variables were selected because they were clearly 
within a nomological network of the new HPWS for safety. 
 
3.8.1.3.1. HPWS for safety scale and Safety Compliance Scale, Safety Participation 
 Scale, Safety Initiative Scale, and Organization-Based Self-Esteem Scale   
Griffin and Neal (2000) refer to safety compliance and safety participation as components of 
safety performance. Safety compliance reflects major safety activities that individual 
employees are expected to carry out in order to maintain workplace safety. These safety 
activities include an adherence to rules and procedures such as wearing the prescribed 
personal protective equipment (Griffin & Neal, 2000). Safety participation, on the other hand, 
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involves the act of assisting co-workers, promoting the safety programme within the 
workplace, demonstrating initiative, and making efforts to improve safety in the workplace 
(Neal & colleagues, 2000). Similarly, safety initiative describes employee behaviours that go 
beyond simply working within safety standards, but acts proactively to improve safety 
activities in the workplace (Kark & colleagues, 2015; Zacharatos, 2001). An employee is said 
to have exhibited safety initiative behaviour when, for example, he initiates steps that help to 
improve work procedures or often tries out new approaches that help to improve workplace 
safety (Kark & colleagues, 2015). Safety compliance, safety participation, and safety initiative 
together constitute safety behaviours in the current study. 
 
Researchers have directed efforts to determine the factors that can enhance employee 
safety behaviours (e.g. Katz-Navon, Naveh, & Stern, 2005). It has been argued that 
organizational factors act as distal antecedents that cause variability in employee behaviours 
and performance (Griffin & Neal, 2000). For example, leadership has been found to enhance 
safety in organizations (e.g. Clarke, 2013; Inness, Turner, Barling, & Stride, 2010; Christian & 
colleagues, 2009). However, Zohar (2002) suggests that having done behavioural safety 
research for more than 20 years, the time has come to attempt better integrations with other 
domains of management research. The current study argues that HPWS for safety 
constitutes an essential domain of management research. This study therefore posits that 
since the new scale (i.e. HPWS for safety scale) was built on the premise that it enhances 
safety-related behaviours and outcomes, and safety compliance, safety participation, and 
safety initiative represent employee safety behaviours, there should exist positive 
relationship between the new scale (HPWS for safety scale) and safety compliance scale, 
safety participation scale, and safety initiative scale. 
 
Organization-based self-esteem (OBSE) describes the self-perceived value that an individual 
employee has of himself or herself as a member of the organization. It represents the extent 
to which an employee believes he or she is an important, meaningful, valuable, worthwhile, 
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and effective member of the organization (Pierce, Gardner, Cummings, & Dunham, 1989). 
According to Pierce and colleagues (1989), the experience an employee gains within an 
organization shapes his or her OBSE, and this, in turn, influences his or her organization-
related behaviours and attitudes. For example, if an organization believes its members or 
employees are valuable and treats them as such by, for example, allowing them to 
participate actively in making safety-related decisions that concern them, this is likely to 
enhance their OBSE. Research has found participatory management, co-worker support, 
organizational tenure (Lee, 2003), job complexity, and organizational structure (Lee, 2003; 
Tan, Wei, & Kong, 1997) to be antecedents of OBSE. In addition, while HPWS for safety is a 
distal antecedent of organization-based behaviours (specifically safety behaviours), OBSE is 
a proximal antecedents of organization-based behaviours. Thus, both of them are designed 
to shape employee behaviours. This study therefore, argues that since both HPWS for safety 
and OBSE are designed to shape employee workplace-related behaviours (or organization-
based behaviours), it is expected that the new HPWS for safety scale would be positively 
related to the OBSE scale. Following the foregoing discussions, the research posits as 
follows: 
 
Hypothesis A4: The new HPWS for safety scale will relate positively to employees’ 
 safety compliance scale, safety participation scale, safety initiative scale, and 
 organization-based self-esteem scale 
 
3.8.2. Method 
3.8.2.1. Sample and Procedure 
Two categories of healthcare workers (supervisors and frontline employees) randomly drawn 
from general hospitals in the Niger State of Nigeria responded to the questionnaires. The 
samples were selected from hospitals because they (hospitals) are safety-sensitive and 
therefore considered a comparable ground for testing the construct validity of the newly 
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developed HPWS for safety scale. I distributed questionnaires to a sample of one hundred 
(100) supervisory employees and two hundred (200) frontline employees. 
 
Ninety-one (representing 91%) questionnaires out of the 100 questionnaires given to the 
supervisory employees were returned and 90 (representing 90%) of them were usable for the 
purpose of the analysis. Similarly, 182 (representing 91%) of the 200 questionnaires given to 
the frontline employees were returned and 178 (representing 89%) were usable for the 
purpose of the research analysis. Because the t-test conducted earlier in Study 2 indicated 
that there was no significant difference in mean scores for supervisory and frontline 
employees, I combined the responses of both the frontline and supervisory employees for 
the purpose of this analysis. Therefore, a total of 268 (representing 89.33%) usable 
questionnaires were utilized for this purpose (See Table 3.13).  
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Table 3.13: Demographic Characteristics of Sample Responses in Study 3 
VARIABLES NUMBER OF 
RESPONSE 
PERCENTAGE 
RESPONSES 
SEX   
Male 104 38.8 
Female 164 61.2 
   
AGE   
20 – 30 Years 51 19.03 
31 – 40 Years 72 26.87 
41 – 50 Years 106 39.55 
51 – 60 Years 39 14.55 
   
EMPLOYMENT STATUS   
Full-Time 250 93.28 
Part-Time 13 4.85 
Contract 5 1.87 
   
JOB TYPE   
Doctors 5 1.87 
Pharmacists/Pharmacy Technicians 27 10.07 
Midwife/Nurses 166 61.94 
Lab Technologists/Technicians 31 11.57 
Others (Health Information Officers, Medical 
Scientist/Community Health Workers, etc.) 
39 14.55 
   
QUALIFICATIONS   
Below First Degree 91 33.96 
First Degree or Equivalence 161 60.07 
Postgraduate Degree 16 5.97 
   
JOB TENURE   
Below 3 Years 41 15.30 
3 – 6 Years 41 15.30 
7 – 10 Years 36 13.43 
Over 10 Years 150 55.97 
 
 
3.8.2.2. Measures 
3.8.2.2.1. HPWS for safety scale 
The 29-item scale initially validated in Study 2 was used to measure this construct. The scale 
comprises eleven HPWS for safety practices: safety training (4 items), safety rewards (2 
items), internal opportunity for promotion (2 items), safety involvement and participation (3 
items), performance appraisals (3 items), self-managed team (2 items), safety information 
sharing (2 items), clear job descriptions (2 items), safety audit (3 items), safety campaign (3 
items), and safety equipment maintenance (3 items). An example of the items is “This 
hospital gives priority to safety-related experience of internal candidates in terms of job 
openings”. Response options ranged from (1) = strongly disagree to (5) = strongly agree. 
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As in Study 2, an additive approach was used to create a unitary index. Table 3.14 presents 
the descriptive statistics, intercorrelations, reliability estimates, and factor loadings of the 11 
practices.  
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Table 3.14 : Descriptive Statistics, Intercorrelation Coefficients, and Factor Loadings for  the 11 Domains of  
 HPWS for Safety in Study 3 
 
 Variables M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Factor  
Loadings 
1 Safety Training 3.55 .93            .74 
2 Safety Rewards 3.37 1.08 .67**           .74 
3 Internal Opportunity for 
Promotion  
3.74 .85 .56** .63**          .77 
4 Safety Involvement and 
Participation 
3.74 .92 .61** .66** .66**         .79 
5 Performance Appraisals 3.74 .90 .56** .48** .59** .65**        .84 
6 Self-Managed Team 3.72 .96 .52** .49** .52** .62** .70**       .79 
7 Safety Information 
Sharing 
3.96 .83 .42** .40** .46** .50** .63** .66**      .74 
8 Safety Audit 3.64 .93 .52** .54** .57** .55** .66** .60** .60**     .82 
9 Safety Campaign 3.84 .88 .55** .51** .58** .56** .66** .57** .56** .68**    .81 
10 Safety Equipment  
Maintenance 
3.92 .90 .48** .48** .50** .50** .56** .48** .44** .61** .56**   .72 
11 Clear Job Description 3.95 .73 .42** .44** .52** .44** .65** .54** .61** .63** .61** .52**  .75 
 **p < 0.01, Cronbach’s alpha of the whole scale is 0.95 
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The CFA was conducted using Mplus software Version 7.3 (Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2014). 
The result supports the summed scale scores of the 11 domains. In other words, the 
conceptualized one-factor model was a significantly better fit to the data than the null model, 
∆𝜒2 (∆𝑑𝑓 = 11, N = 268) = 1718.88, P < 0.001 (Zacharatos & colleagues, 2005; Bagozzi & 
Yi, 1988). The factor loadings were all significant and ranged from 0.72 to 0.84. Although 
RMSEA demonstrates a poor fit (Dilalla, 2000; Browne & Cudeck, 1993), The SRMR, CFI, 
and TLI   demonstrate acceptable fits (𝜒2 = 218.33, df = 44; RMSEA = 0.12; SRMR = 0.05; 
CFI = 0.91; TLI = 0.88) (Browne & Cudeck, 1993; Browne & Mels, 1990; Bentler, 1990; 
Steiger, 1989). Bentler (1990) comments that these values should not be written in stone. 
Accordingly, the 11 domains were combined to form a single scale reflecting a HPWS for 
safety for next use. The scale’s reliability alpha (α) was 0.95.  
3.8.2.2.2. HPWS Scale 
An abridged 20-item scale consisting of statements about HRM practices was adapted from 
the 51-item HPWS scale reported by Zacharatos and Colleagues (2005). Some of the items 
were adapted to suit the purpose of the present research. For example, item number 2 of job 
quality: “I have lots of opportunity to decide how to do my work” was revised to read: 
“Employees of this hospital are given lots of opportunity to decide how to do their work”.  The 
items were rated using a five-point Likert-type scale ranging from (1) = ‘strongly disagree’ to 
(5) = ‘strongly agree.’ The scale’s alpha reliability was 0.93. 
3.8.2.2.3. Safety-Specific Transformational Leadership Scale 
Safety-specific transformational leadership was measured using a 10-item scale reported by 
Barling and colleagues (2002) but adapted from Bass and Avolio’s (1990) Multifactor 
Leadership Questionnaire (MLQ). The scale measures the four components of 
transformational leadership including idealized influence, inspirational motivation, intellectual 
stimulation, and individualized consideration. Response options ranged from (1) “not at all” to 
(5) “frequently or always.” An example item is “My supervisor expresses satisfaction when I 
perform my job safely.” The scale’s alpha reliability in this study was 0.91. 
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3.8.2.2.4. Social Desirability Scale 
A 17-item scale (SDS-17) developed by Stöber (2001) was used to measure social 
desirability. Stöber (1999) constructed SDS-17 as a new and alternative scale to the 
Marlowe-Crowne’s social desirability scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960). Response options 
ranged from (0) = “No” to (1) = “Yes.” An example item is “I always admit my mistakes openly 
and face the potential negative consequences.” The current study reported an alpha 
reliabilityof 0.50.   
3.8.2.2.5. Safety Compliance 
A 4-item scale by Neal and colleagues (2000) was used to measure safety compliance. 
Response options ranged from (1) = ‘strongly disagree’ to (5) = ‘strongly agree.’ An example 
of the statements is “I carry out my work in a safe manner.”  The scale’s alpha reliability was 
0.82. 
3.8.2.2.6. Safety Participation 
I used a 4-item scale by Neal and colleagues (2000) to measure safety participation. 
Responses ranged from (1) = ‘strongly disagree’ to (5) = ‘strongly agree.’ An example item is 
“I promote the safety programme within the organization’’. The scale’s alpha reliability was 
0.81. 
3.8.2.2.7. Safety Initiative 
I used an 8-item scale adopted from Turner and Parker (2004) to measure safety initiative. 
Response options ranged from (1) = ‘strongly disagree’ to (5) = ‘strongly agree.’ Sample 
items are: “if I think it will make work safer, I initiate steps to improve work procedures” and “I 
often try to solve problems in ways that reduce risk”. The scale’s alpha reliability was 0.85. 
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3.8.2.2.8. OBSE 
OBSE was measured with a 10-item scale validated by Pierce and colleagues (1989). 
Response options ranged from (1) = ‘strongly disagree’ to (5) = ‘strongly agree.’ Sample 
items are: “I am taken seriously in my workplace” and “there is faith in me in my workplace.” 
The scale’s alpha reliability in this study was0.91. 
3.8.2.3. Data Analysis 
To assess the convergent, discriminant, and criterion-related validity of the new scale (i.e. 
HPWS for safety scale), I used IBM SPSS version 21 to conduct Pearson product-moment 
correlation coefficient. I also used Cohen’s (1988) guideline to interpret the values in order to 
judge the magnitude of the strength of the correlations obtained. The next section presents 
the results of these analyses.   
3.8.2.4. Results 
3.8.2.4.1. Result of Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient of HPWS for 
 Safety Scale 
Table 3.15 indicates that using Cohen’s (1988) guideline or criteria in the interpretation of 
small (r = .10 to .29), medium (r = .30 to .49), and large (r = .50 to 1.0) values to judge the 
magnitude of the strength of the correlations (or relationships), a strong and positive 
correlation was found between the new scale (i.e. HPWS for safety scale) and Zacharatos 
and colleagues’ (2005) HPWS scale (r = 0.72, n = 268, p < 0.01). This finding provides 
supports for Hypothesis A1 and the convergent validity of the new scale. 
A strong and positive correlation was also found between the new scale and Barling and 
colleagues’ (2002) safety-specific transformational leadership scale (r = 0.52, n = 268, p < 
0.01), suggesting support for Hypothesis A2 as well the convergent validity of the new scale. 
The findings further revealed moderate and positive correlations between the new scale and 
safety compliance scale (r = 0.47, n = 268, p < 0.01), safety participation scale (r = 0.47, n = 
268, p < 0.01), safety initiative scale (r = 0.44, n = 268, p < 0.01), and a small but positive 
correlation between the new scale and the OBSE (r = 0.25, n = 268, p < 0.01). Thus, these 
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findings provide support for Hypothesis A4 that HPWS for safety scale would relate positively 
to employees’ safety compliance scale, safety participation scale, safety initiative scale, and 
OBSE scale. The findings also confirm the criterion-related validity of the new scale. 
However, a non-significant but positive correlation was found between the new scale and 
Stöber’s (1999) social desirability scale (r = 0.05, n = 268), indicating support for Hypothesis 
A3 that states that there is no significant relationship between the new HPWS for safety 
scale and social desirability scale. This finding also supports the discriminant validity of the 
new scale. 
.  
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Table 3.15: Means, Standard Deviations, and Pearson product moment correlation  coefficients of HPWS for Safety and other 
Measures  for Study 3 
 
Serial Number Scale M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 High Performance Work System for Safety Scale 3.73 0.70 (.95)        
2 High Performance Work System Scale 3.60 0.72 0.72** (.93)       
3 Safety-Specific Transformational Leadership Scale 3.92 0.77 0.52** 0.68 (.91)      
4 Social Desirability Scale 0.59 0.11 0.05 0.07 0.12 (.50)     
5 Safety Compliance Scale 4.38 0.61 0.47** 0.35 0.33 -.05 (.82)    
6 Safety Participation Scale 4.27 0.67 0.47** 0.45 0.48 0.00 0.66 (.81)   
7 Safety Initiative Scale 4.14 0.57 0.44** 0.41 0.47 0.05 0.64 0.71 (.85)  
8 Organization-Based Self-Esteem Scale 4.53 0.49 0.25** 0.30 0.26 -.03 0.47 0.49 0.44 (.91) 
** p < 0.01 level (2-tailed); Cronbach’ coefficient alphas (α) are in parentheses; N = 268  
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3.8.2.4.2. Result of Shared Variances of HPWS for Safety Scale with other Scales 
The results in Table 3.15 show that the new scale demonstrated shared variances with 
HPWS scale (51.8%), safety-specific transformational leadership scale (27%), safety 
compliance scale (22.1%), safety participation scale (22.1%), safety initiative scale (19.4%), 
and OBSE scale (6.3%). The results also demonstrate 0.25% shared variance between 
HPWS for safety scale and social desirability scale. The preceding results further provide 
support for convergent, discriminant, and criterion-related validities of the new scale 
 
3.8.2.4.3. Result of Fisher’s z-test  
To find out if the new HPWS for safety scale is more strongly related to safety behaviour 
variables than the general HPWS measure, I compared the correlations between the 
abridged general HPWS measure (Zacharatos & colleagues, 2005) and these safety 
behaviour variables and the correlations between the new HPWS for safety and the safety 
behaviour variables using Fisher’s Z test. 
 
 I compared the correlations between the new scale (HPWS for safety scale) and safety 
compliance (r = 0.474, p < 0.01) and the correlations between the abridged general HPWS 
measure and safety compliance (r = 0.347, p < 0.01). The result shows that, although the 
coefficients for the new scale (HPWS for safety) is higher than that of the general measure 
(HPWS: Zacharatos & colleagues, 2005), this difference is not statistically significant (z-obs = 
1.80 < 1.96). Following the same procedure, I also compared the correlations between the 
HPWS for safety scale and safety participation (r = 0.474, p < 0.01) and the correlations 
between the abridged general HPWS measure and safety participation (r = 0.446, p < 0.01). 
The result also indicates that there is difference in the coefficients with the new scale slightly 
higher than the general measure but this difference is not significant (z-obs = 0.44 < 1.96). 
Furthermore, I followed the same procedure to compare the correlations between the new 
HPWS for safety scale and safety initiative (r = 0.443, p < 0.01) and the correlations between 
148 
 
the abridged general HPWS measure (Zacharatos & colleagues, 2005) and safety initiative (r 
= 0.413, p < 0.01). The result indicates that the coefficient of the new scale is slightly higher 
than that of the general measure but this difference is not statistically significant (z-obs = 
0.41 < 1.96). 
 
3.8.2.4.4 Correlation of HPWS for Safety Scale with other Scales Should be Less than 
 Perfect 
To further assess the discriminant validity of the new scale, I examined whether the HPWS 
for safety scale is less than perfectly correlated with conceptually similar constructs 
(Anderson & Gerbing, 1988). Again, Fornell and Larcker (1981) suggest a method to assess 
the discriminant validity of two or more factors. In this case, a researcher compares the 
average variance explained (AVE) of the construct under investigation with the shared 
variance (i.e. square of the correlation) between it and other constructs. If the AVE for the 
construct is greater than its shared variance with any other construct, discriminant validity is 
supported (Farrel & Rudd, 2009). Following Fornell and Larcker (1981) and Farrel and Rudd 
(2009), this study examined whether the average variance explained (AVE) in the indicators 
by the underlying latent construct is greater than the squared correlation or shared variance 
between the latent construct (i.e. HPWS for safety scale) and similar (Fornell & Larcker, 
1981) or any other (Farrel & Rudd, 2009) construct. Fornell and Larcker’s (1981) formula was 
used to calculate AVE as follows: 
AVE =   
∑ 𝜆2
∑ 𝜆2+∑ 𝜀
 
Where  ∑ 𝜆2 = 𝑆𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠, 𝑎𝑛𝑑                                                      
∑ 𝜀
= 𝑠𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 .                                                                                                                                                                                             
∑ 𝜆2  =  0.842 + 0.822 + 0.812 +  0.792 +  0.792 +  0.772 +  0.752 +  0.742 + 0.742  + 0.742
+  0.722 = 6.63 
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∑ 𝜀 = 0.57 + 0.48 + 0.48 + 0.66 + 0.47 + 0.50 + 0.49 + 0.46 + 0.41 + 0.36 + 0.35 = 5.23 
AVE = 
6.63
6.63 +5.23
 = 
6.63
11.86
 = 0.56 
 
Table 3.16 presents the comparison between the AVE of HPWS for Safety Scale and its 
shared variances with other constructs. The results indicate that (i) the HPWS for safety 
scale is less than perfectly correlated with Zacharatos and colleagues’ (2005) HPWS scale (r 
= 0.72 < 1) and Barling and Colleagues’ (2002) safety-specific transformational leadership 
scale (r = 0.52 < 1); (ii) the average variance explained (AVE) in the indicators by the 
underlying latent construct (i.e. HPWS for safety)  is greater than the squared correlations or 
the shared variances between the latent construct (i.e. HPWS for safety scale) and similar 
(Fornell & Larcker, 1981) or any other (Farrel & Rudd, 2009) constructs. The HPWS 
(Zacharatos & colleagues, 2005) and safety-specific transformational leadership were 
theorized to be conceptually similar to the present construct whereas safety compliance, 
safety participation, safety initiative and organization-based self-esteem were theorized to be 
within the nomological network of the construct. The results therefore demonstrate support 
for the scale’s discriminant validity. 
 
Table 3.16: Comparison between the AVE of HPWS for Safety Scale and Its Shared 
 Variances with other Constructs 
 
  High Performance 
Work System for 
Safety Scale 
  
 Other Constructs Correlation 
Coefficient 
Shared Variance (or 
Squared Correlation) 
AVE 
1 HPWS Scale (Zacharatos & 
colleagues, 2005) 
0.72 0.52 0.56  
2 Safety-Specific Transformational 
Leadership 
0.52 0.27 0.56 
3 Safety Compliance 0.47 0.22 0.56 
4 Safety Participation 0.47 0.22 0.56 
5 Safety Initiative 0.44 0.19 0.56 
6 Organization-Based Self-Esteem 0.25 0.06 0.56 
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3.8.3. Discussions 
The main objective of Study 3 was to investigate the construct validity (i.e. the convergent 
validity, discriminant validity and criterion-related validity) of the new scale. The results 
revealed positive correlations between the new scale (i.e. HPWS for safety scale) and 
Zacharatos and colleagues’ (2005) HPWS scale and between the new scale and Barling and 
colleagues’ (2002) safety-specific transformational leadership scale, whereas a moderate 
and positive correlations were found between the new scale and safety compliance scale, 
safety participation scale, safety initiative, and a small but positive correlation between the 
new scale and the organization-based self-esteem scale was found. But a non-significant but 
positive correlation was found between the new scale and Stöber’s (1999) social desirability 
scale. These findings are consistent with Cohen’s (1988) guideline or criteria in the 
interpretation of small (r = .10 to .29), medium (r = .30 to .49), and large (r = .50 to 1.0) 
values to judge the magnitude of the strength of the correlations (or relationships). Therefore, 
the new scale was found to demonstrate convergent validity, discriminant validity, and 
criterion-related validity. 
 
3.9. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I described the procedures I followed to develop and validate the reported 
HPWS for safety scale. The initial pool of items and content domains for the new scale were 
deductively isolated from measures that had been used in previous HPWS research.  I then 
conducted three studies to validate the newly developed scale. Study 1 focused on item 
development utilizing an inductive approach with a focus group. Study 2 used a sample of 
303 randomly selected from oil and gas companies, the proposed population of the main 
study. Study 2 which focused principally on the scale development and construction, utilized 
the data obtained from supervisory employees and front-line employees (trainees) drawn 
from oil and gas companies and Petroleum Training Institute respectively in Nigeria to 
conduct an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and reliability assessment of the new scale.  In 
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Study 3, I used an independent sample of 268 randomly selected from hospitals in Niger 
state of Nigeria to validate the scale. The EFA results indicated the presence of three 
components representing the theorized AMO framework in terms of ability, motivation, and 
opportunity. The results again indicated the presence of one factor component that now 
constituted the HPWS for safety scale. The results supported the construct validity of the 
new scale. Furthermore, the results suggested that the HPWS for safety scale indicated an 
acceptable level of internal consistency and construct reliability, meaning that the new scale 
is reliable. In the next chapter, the methodology of the main study, the context of the study, 
and the analytic technique used to analyze the data are discussed. 
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4.0. CHAPTER 4:   METHODOLOGY 
4.1. Introduction 
The focus of this study was to examine the intermediate mechanisms through which the use 
of HPWS for safety affects unit and individual level safety outcomes. To achieve this, data 
were collected from multiple sources including line managers (e.g. HR and, Health and 
Safety) and frontline employees from a number of oil and gas companies in Nigeria. This 
chapter describes the methodology used to test the hypotheses derived from the proposed 
model in Figure 2.1 (See chapter 2). First, I discuss the ethical issues core to this research 
(Study 4) and clearly acknowledge how these issues were handled. Second, I discussed the 
sample and the procedure for collecting data as well as the measures of the study variables. 
Finally, I explained the data analytic technique used to test the hypotheses postulated in the 
study.  
 
4.2. Ethics-2 
I drafted the research proposal to be used to conduct the Study 4 (i.e. Main Study) in 
accordance with the Aston University’s ethical guidelines for research and this was 
subsequently approved by the Aston University Research and Ethics Committee. It should be 
noted, however, that the proposals for Studies 1, 2, 3, and 4 were approved at the same 
time. Once I received the ethical approval, I personally visited the corporate office of Nigeria 
National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), the head office of Department of Petroleum 
Resources (DPR) as well as the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of the organizations of 
interest to solicit participation in the study. During these visits, I was advised to put in writing 
the request, the nature of study, and the extent of their participation. Following the outcome 
of these visits, a letter was written. In the letter, I clarified the ethical stance of the research 
and assured the organizations regarding the issues of informed consent, confidentiality, and 
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anonymity of the information that would be collected from both management and individual 
employees. The letter also stated that the potential respondents’ express consent was 
required before they participated in the study. As a follow-up of the letters, I visited the NNPC 
corporate head office in Abuja and the head office of DPR in Lagos. In response, both the 
DPR Director (HR) and the NNPC Group Managing Director (HR), through a letter (See 
Appendices C & D), directed all the zonal offices of DPR and nine (9) of the eleven (11) 
NNPC subsidiaries (See Table 4.1), respectively, to participate in the research. As soon as 
this intention to participate (i.e. the letters) in the research was received from the corporate 
head offices of the organizations, I arranged for personal visit to the organizations, during 
which an engaged relationship was established with the organizations by arranging for a 
meeting with either the chief executive officers (CEOs) or their representatives. The primary 
objective of this meeting was to re-emphasize the ethical stance of the research and to 
reassure the organizations regarding the issues of informed consent, confidentiality and 
anonymity procedures involved in this study, and for the CEO to introduce me to the Human 
Resource Managers and Health and Safety Managers who would, in turn, introduce me to 
the heads of the various Departments or Units. As I earlier noted, the issue of informed 
consent was my primary ethical concern.  To consider this issue, I made the prospective 
participants to be aware of the purpose and nature of the study, the nature and extent of their 
participation, and the potential risk and benefits involved. I ensured that they understood the 
information they were given concerning their participation. To address the issue of 
confidentiality, I assured the participants that all information provided would be protected and 
that it would not be linked to them as individuals or as a group. The prospective participants 
were also informed as well that they could withdraw from the research process at any time if 
they so wished. However, they were advised that once they start filling the questionnaires 
after they have read this message, it would show their informed consent to participate. 
 
It is worthy to note how the Nigerian context and expectations put ethical challenges in the 
path of the researcher. For example, several prospective participants usually raised the issue 
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of obligations to research participants informally. In other words, they were concerned with 
what happens within the relationship between the researcher and the research participants at 
the conclusion of the study. My response was that individual participants in a study seldom 
receives direct benefits. However, I assured them that they would benefit in the form of 
training that would be organized by the researcher for the employees of the organizations on 
successful completion of the study. I gave the survey coordinators my personal contact 
details in case any of the participants needed to get in touch with me. The obtained data 
were stored in a secure folder and these would be destroyed after the dissemination of the 
research findings. 
 
4.3. Sample and Procedure 
Data were collected from seven (7) oil and gas companies comprising of six (6) Nigeria 
National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) subsidiaries and the Department of Petroleum 
Resources (DPR) drawn from the oil and gas industry in Nigeria. The NNPC is the Nigeria’s 
national oil company and it has over 9,000 employees. As a Federal Government agency, it 
has about 11 subsidiaries that serve as the commercial and business ventures as shown in 
Table 4.1 
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Table 4.1: NNPC Subsidiaries and Their Functions 
 SUBSIDIARIES OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL 
AND YEAR ESTABLISHED 
FUNCTIONS 
1 Duke Oil Company 
Incorporated 
NNPC, Established in 1989 with 
office in London and Abuja  
Engages in direct trading activities in sport 
market 
 
2 Hyson (Nig.) Limited Joint Venture between NNPC 
and Vitol S.A., a Swiss 
Company. Head office is in 
Lagos 
It is responsible for marketing Nigeria’s 
excess petroleum products in the West and 
Central African sub-region and elsewhere, 
and to import various petroleum products in 
collaboration with Calson Bermuda Ltd, a 
sister company 
 
3 Integrated Data 
Services Limited 
(IDSL) 
NNPC, Established in 1988. 
Head office is in Benin 
To provide hydrocarbon exploration services 
in the local and international oil and gas 
industry 
 
4 Kaduna Refinery and 
Petrochemical 
Company (KRPC) 
NNPC, Lubes Plant established 
in 1983 while the petrochemical 
plant was commissioned in 1988 
To refine crude oil into high value petroleum 
and petrochemical products and to 
manufacture packaging products 
 
5 National Engineering 
and Technical 
Company Limited 
(NETCO) 
Jointly established by NNPC and 
American Benchtel Incorporation 
in 1989, but now wholly owned 
by NNPC in 1997  
To provide basic and detailed engineering 
services in procurement, construction 
supervision, project management, quality 
assessment and quality control, 
environmental consulting and training 
 
6 Nigerian Gas 
Company Limited 
(NGC) 
NNPC, established in 1988. Its 
head office is in Warri 
To develop an efficient gas industry and to 
export natural gas and its derivatives to the 
West African sub-region 
 
7 Nigeria Petroleum 
Development 
Company Limited  
(NPDC) 
 
NNPE, established in 1988. 
Head office is in Benin 
To carry out activities in petroleum exploration 
and production 
8 National Petroleum 
Investment 
Management Services 
(NAPIMS) 
NNPC. Located in Ikoyi, Lagos An upstream arm of NNPC to oversee the 
Federation’s investment in the Joint Venture 
Companies (JVCs), Production Sharing 
Companies (PSCs) and Services Contract 
Companies (SCs). 
 
9 Port-Harcourt Refinery 
Company Limited 
(PHRC) 
NNPC. Made up of two 
refineries: Old one 
commissioned in 1965 and the 
new one commissioned in 1988 
 
To optimally process hydrocarbon into 
petroleum products  
10 Pipeline and Products 
Marketing Company 
Limited (PPMC) 
NNPC Established as the strategic and business unit 
of NNPC. To ensure that there is security in 
the supply of petroleum products to domestic 
markets at low operating costs 
 
11 Warri Refinery and 
Petrochemical 
Company Limited 
(WRPC) 
NNPC. Incorporated in 1988 with 
a merger of the then Warri 
Refinery (commissioned in 1978) 
and the Ekpan Petrochemical 
Plants 
To process crude oil into petroleum products 
and to manufacture and market petrochemical 
products. 
 
The NNPC group health, safety and environment (HSE) policy statement provides that 
“NNPC is committed to conducting its activities in a manner that promotes the Health and 
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Safety of her Employees, Assets and the Public as well as the protection of the Environment” 
(Yakubu, 2012, p. 1). To this end, it continues, the NNPC shall: 
1. Focus on HSE to safeguard our people and assets. Adopt Health, Safety and 
Environmental best practices in the design, construction and operations of her facilities; 
2. Comply with National and applicable International standards and laws on Health, Safety 
and Environment in the conduct of her operations; 
3. Demonstrate social and ethical responsibility by working together with all relevant 
stakeholders to promote harmonious HSE compliant relationships; 
4. Engage and consult with employees and others on health, Safety and Environmental 
conditions and provide Occupational Health Services; 
5. Maintain emergency response capability to minimize the impact of unfavourable 
negative incidents related to her operations; 
6. Liaise closely with relevant government agencies in the formulation of Health, Safety 
and Environmental protection, legislations, regulations and policies that may 
significantly impact the Group business returns to shareholders; 
7. Publicly report on her HSE performance; 
8. Ensure all staff have the right and duty to intervene and stop any unsafe acts and 
conditions or when activities are not in compliance with HSE policy and commitment; 
 
“As the Group General Director of the Corporation, I accept full responsibility for the 
implementation of the Group HSE Policy. I accept HSE-Management as key responsibility for 
all line managers and I will regularly review this Policy towards improved effectiveness and 
ensure these goals are achieved at all times” (Yakubu, 2012, p. 1). 
 
This policy statement on HSE covers all the NNPC subsidiaries which have designed their 
own methods to achieve the NNPC HSE Policy Objectives which states that “NNPC shall be 
committed to continual improvement in her operations to eliminate personal and industrial 
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accidents as we pursue the goal of no-harm to people and no-harm to environment in all our 
operations and facilities” (Yakubu, 2012, p. 1). 
 
Although the DPR was initially established as a unit under the NNPC, both NNPC and DPR 
have since 1988 been operating separately under the Ministry of Petroleum Resources. DPR 
is charged with the responsibility to allocate oil blocks, collect royalties, enforce the sector’s 
regulations about workplace health, safety, environment, gas flaring, and so on, as well as to 
carry out other technical oversight tasks (Gillies, 2009). In other words, its main responsibility 
is to oversee or supervise the activities of all the companies that are licensed to operate in 
the oil and gas industry, including the NNPC (Iledare & Suberu, 2010). Thus, according to 
Iledare and Suberu (2010), the duties of DPR are to process all the applications for licenses 
and leases in the industry, ensure that all the industry operators comply with the applicable 
national regulations and good oil producing practices. It is also expected to enforce health, 
safety, and environmental standards, keep and update records on petroleum industry 
operations, ensure timely and adequate payments of all rents and royalties to the 
government, promote and monitor progress towards the indigenization or enhancement of 
local content in the oil and gas industry, and provide appropriate technical advice on oil and 
gas issues to the government. 
 
These seven companies (See Table 4.2) represent about ten per cent (10%) of the 
organizations in oil and gas industry in Nigeria. All the units of these companies were 
purposefully used for collecting data for the multilevel study. Within each unit, a range of 
sampling techniques was used, dependent on the data being collected. To ensure 
representativeness across the occupational levels, participants at the individual employee 
level were surveyed using cluster and stratified random sampling approach to selection 
(Jensen & colleagues, 2013). According to Sarantakos (1998), this method is useful when: (i) 
it is difficult or costly to develop a complete list of the population members, or the population 
elements are widely dispersed in terms of geographical locations; (ii) cluster criteria are 
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important for the study. In order to select the clusters and the subjects from the clusters, a 
simple random sampling technique was adopted (See Sarantakos, 1998). 
 
Table 4.2: Frequency Distribution of Responses According to Branches  
Serial 
Numb
er 
Companies (Branches) Number of 
Employees 
Percentage 
(%) 
Number of 
Units 
1 Company One (A Branch: IDSL-PH) 9 1.58 3 
2 Company Two: Branch One (PPMC-PH) 21 3.69 9 
3 Company Two: Branch Two (PPMC-PH Depot) 14 2.46 5 
4 Company Two: Branch Three (PPMC-Warri) 24 4.22 7 
5 Company Two: Branch Four (PPMC-Warri 
Depot) 
17 2.99 7 
6 Company Two: Branch Five (PPMC-Kaduna)  23 4.04 9 
7 Company Two: Branch Six (PPMC-Kaduna 
Depot) 
19 3.34 5 
8 Company Two: Branch Seven (PPMC-Minna 
Depot) 
14 2.46 6 
9 Company Two: Branch Eight (PPMC-Suleja 
Depot) 
17 2.99 5 
10 Company Three (Head Office: NGC-Warri) 15 3.34 6 
11 Company Three: Branch One (NGC-PH) 19 2.64 7 
12 Company Four (PHRC) 76 13.36 23 
13 Company Five (WRPC) 112 19.68 29 
14 Company Six (KRPC) 142 24.96 31 
15 Company Seven: Branch One (DPR-PH) 21 3.69 8 
16 Company Seven; Branch Two (DPR-Warri) 26 4.57 8 
 Total 569 100 168 
 
In stratified random sampling, the population to be surveyed is separated into mutually 
exclusive sets or strata, and within these defined strata, simple random selection of samples 
takes place (Chisnall, 1997). A stratified random sampling technique is more useful than 
simple random sampling when there is need to represent all strata of the target population in 
the sample and when the researcher has a special interest in certain strata (Sarantakos, 
1998). This sampling technique was considered very appropriate because of the need to 
represent and reflect the various work areas and hierarchical positions in each unit such that 
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those who perform a particular job, for example, administration, technical (e.g. drilling, 
refilling, processing) and, in particular, hierarchical positions were represented. 
 
As earlier pointed out, access to participating organizations was through personal contacts. 
First, the researcher personally visited the corporate office of NNPC, the head office of DPR 
as well as the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of the organizations of interest to solicit 
participation in the study. During these visits, the researcher was advised to put in writing the 
request, the nature of study, and the extent of their participation. Following the outcome of 
these visits, a letter was written. In the letter, the researcher clarified the ethical stance of the 
research and assured the organizations regarding the use and confidentiality of the 
information that would be collected from both management and individual employees (See 
ethics 1 and ethics 2). The letter also stated that there would be need for the potential 
respondents to express their consent before they participate in the study. As a follow-up of 
the letters, the researcher again visited the NNPC corporate head office in Abuja and the 
head office of DPR in Lagos. In response, both the DPR Director (HR) and the NNPC Group 
Managing Director (HR), through a letter (See Appendices C & D), directed all the zonal 
offices of DPR and nine (9) of the eleven (11) NNPC subsidiaries (See Table 4.1), 
respectively, to participate in the research. As soon as this intention to participate (i.e. the 
letters) in the research was received from the corporate head offices of the organizations, the 
researcher arranged for personal visit to the organizations, during which I arranged for a 
meeting with either the chief executive officers (CEOs) or their representatives. The primary 
objective of this meeting was to re-emphasize the ethical stance of the research and to 
reassure the organizations regarding the use and confidentiality of the data that would be 
collected, and for the CEO to introduce the researcher to the Human Resource Managers 
and Health and Safety Managers who would, in turn, introduce the researcher to the heads 
of the various Departments or Units. 
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During the researcher’s meeting with the HR managers of each of the participating 
organizations, similar discussions on the research ethics took place along with consideration 
of:  
i. identifying the primary objectives of the survey and their role as both respondents and 
facilitators;  
ii. the importance of soliciting their cooperation;  
iii. Selection criteria of participants (employees and line managers); 
iv. Timeline; and 
v. The appointment and selection of survey coordinators. 
 
The HR Manager in each organization appointed a survey coordinator who was the main 
contact person within the organization. Because of the complexity involved in data collection 
procedure, and to increase participation rate, the researcher, assisted by the coordinator in 
some cases, personally distributed the survey packages to each participating unit. Each 
survey package contained two separate questionnaires that were administered to the line 
managers and frontline employees. A cover letter that explained the objectives of the survey 
and reassured the respondents of the confidentiality of their responses and the voluntary 
nature of participating in the survey was attached (See Appendices G & H) to each 
questionnaire. Before the questionnaires were distributed to either the line managers or the 
frontline employees, a code was written at the top right hand corner of each questionnaire. 
This was done in order to ensure that there was a match between the line managers’ 
provisions of information on issues relating to the units and those of their participating 
frontline employees. Only the researcher knew the code that was attached to each frontline 
employee’s questionnaire and that of the corresponding line manager. The researcher 
provided an envelope for each questionnaire in which the respondents were requested to 
enclose the completed questionnaire and drop in a locked drop box that was provided and 
positioned in the HR manager’s office. However, some participants gave their questionnaires 
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directly to the researcher. Table 4.3 presents the sources of data obtained for the purpose of 
this study. 
 
Table 4.3: Sources of data 
SOURCE OF DATA INFORMATION PROVIDED 
Line Manager Use of HPWS for Safety 
Frontline Employees Experienced HPWS for Safety 
Safety Knowledge 
Safety Motivation 
Safety Initiative 
Safety Compliance 
Safety-Specific Events 
Workplace Injuries 
Safety Climate 
Safety-Specific Transformational Leadership 
Bottom-Line Orientation 
 
Of the 77 questionnaires distributed to the line managers, 64 responses (representing 
83.12%) were obtained and found to be usable. These 64 line managers oversee 168 units 
(i.e. each manager in charge of about 3 units on average). Table 4.4 presents the 
demographic characteristics of the line managers. 
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Table 4.4: Demographic Characteristics of the Line Managers 
VARIABLES NUMBER OF 
RESPONSES 
PERCENTAGE 
RESPONSES 
SEX   
Male 58 90.62 
Female 6 9.38 
   
AGE   
Under 30 Years 0 0 
30-39 Years 3 4.69 
40-49 Years 2 3.13 
50-60 Years 59 92.18 
   
QUALIFICATION   
Below First Degree 0 0 
First Degree or Equivalence 26 40.63 
Postgraduate Degree 38 59.37 
   
MANAGERIAL EXPERIENCE   
Under 3 Years 0 0 
3-6 Years 0 0 
7-10 Years 3 4.69 
Over 10 Years 61 95.31 
   
TENURE IN INDUSTRY   
Under 3 Years 0 0 
3-6 Years 0 0 
7-10 Years 0 0 
Over 10 Years 64 100 
 
Of the 696 questionnaires distributed to the frontline employees in 193 units, 569 (81.75%) 
responses were correctly linked to the corresponding line managers in 168 units (average 
unit size of 3.39). Table 4.5 presents the demographic variables of the front-line employees. 
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Table 4.5: Demographic Characteristics of the Front-Line Employees 
VARIABLES NUMBER OF RESPONSES PERCENTAGE 
RESPONSES 
SEX   
Male 478 84 
Female 91 16 
   
AGE   
Under 30 Years 44 7.7 
30-39 Years 181 31.8 
40-49 Years 206 36.2 
50-60 Years 138 24.3 
   
QUALIFICATION   
Below First Degree 114 20 
First Degree or Equivalence 366 64.3 
Postgraduate Degree 89 15.6 
   
JOB TENUE   
Under 3 Years 62 10.9 
3-6 Years 63 11.1 
7-10 Years 108 19 
Over 10 Years 336 59.1 
   
TENUE IN INDUSTRY   
Under 3 Years 63 11.1 
3-6 Years 54 9.5 
7-10 Years 108 19 
Over 10 Years 344 60.5 
   
EMPLOYMENT STATUS   
Full-time 522 91.7 
Part-time 5 0.9 
Contract 42 7.4 
 
It is important to note that the part-time employees represent the former employees of the 
companies who had retired from service but were given the opportunity to return as part-time 
workers because of the importance of their experiences. The contract workers, on the other 
hand, were those graduates that were employed by virtue of the agitations of the indigenes 
of the oil producing areas who protested, inter alia, that their children were denied 
employment in the oil and gas industry. This category of employees enjoys the same 
employment benefits as the full-time employees but they are so called (contract employees) 
because the companies claimed not to have been authorized to award permanent 
employment. 
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4.4. Measures 
The questionnaires were administered in English as it is the official language of 
communication, business and commerce in Nigeria, and the respondents were deemed to be 
proficient in that language. In order to control for unreliability which previous research has 
identified (See Edgar & Geare, 2009; Boselie & colleagues, 2005; Bowen & Ostroff, 2004; 
West, Borill, Dawson, Scully, Carter, Aneley, Patterson, & Waring, 2002; Osterman, 1994), 
this current study collected data not only from two levels of analysis: unit and individual levels 
of analysis, but also from line managers and multiple employees within each unit (Takeuchi, 
Chen, & Lepak, 2009; Takeuchi & colleagues, 2007)  
 
4.4.1. Measures of Unit-Level Variables 
4.4.1.1. Use of High Performance Work Systems for Safety 
The HPWS for safety scale reported in the previous chapter was used to measure HPWS for 
safety. This scale consists of 11 dimensions or practices with the number of items as follows: 
safety training (4 items), safety rewards (2 items), internal opportunity for promotion (3 
items), safety involvement and participation (2 items), performance appraisals (3 items), self-
managed team (2 items), safety information sharing (2 items), clear job descriptions (2 
items), safety audit (3 items), safety campaign (3 items), and safety equipment maintenance 
(3 items) (See Appendix I). This 29-item instrument, which was validated in Study 1, Study 2, 
and Study 3 (See Chapter 3, Tables 3.7, 3.10, 3.14), was used to collect data on the unit’s 
use of HPWS for safety and frontline employees’ experiences of the use of HPWS for safety 
in this Study 4. However, because of the relatively low factor loadings of the two items that 
constitute the clear job description (DES) subscale, 27 items and 10 dimensions or domains 
were retained for study 4 data analyses. 
 
This 27-item questionnaire requested the line managers to indicate the extent of their unit’s 
implementation of each of the dimensions of HPWS for safety. Response options ranged 
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from (1) = ‘strongly disagree’ to (5) = ‘strongly agree.’ Table 4.6 presents the descriptive 
statistics, internal consistency reliability estimates, intercorrelations of the 10 dimensions or 
practices, and the EFA results of the measure. As was demonstrated in Studies 2 and 3, 
EFA was conducted on the summed subscale scores of the 10 dimensions or practices of 
the focal measure in order to replicate the results obtained in Studies 2 and 3. As Table 4.6 
indicates, the one-factor model obtained replicates the results obtained in Studies 2 and 3. 
All the factor loadings are significant, ranging from 0.65 to 0.84. The scale’s reliability alpha 
was 0.95. 
 
4.4.1.2. Unit-Level Safety Climate 
A 16-item Safety Climate Scale developed by Zohar and Luria (2005) was used to measure 
safety climate with response options ranging from (1) = ‘strongly disagree’ to (5) = ‘strongly 
agree.’ Sample items are ‘My supervisor makes sure we receive all the equipment needed to 
do the job safely’ and ‘My supervisor is strict about working safely when we are tired or 
stressed’ (See Appendix I). The internal reliability coefficient (i.e. ∝ ) of the scale was 0.96. 
However, as earlier stated, the data for the unit’s safety climate were collected at the 
individual-level but aggregated to the unit-level to capture the unit measures of safety 
climate. The aggregation statistics that justify treating safety climate as a unit-level construct 
has been provided in the construct aggregation section of this chapter. 
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Table 4.6: Descriptive Statistics, Reliability Estimates, Factor Loadings, and Intercorrelations between  
  Measures of the Ten (10) Dimensions of the Use of HPWS for Safety (Study 4)  
 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Factor Loadings 
Safety Training 4.42 0.70 (0.90)          0.65 
Safety Rewards 3.94 0.71 0.55** (0.72)         0.69 
Internal Opportunity for Promotion 3.80 0.76 0.46** 0.73** (0.80)        0.65 
Safety Involvement and Participation 3.96 0.77 0.41** 0.47** 0.64** (0.70)       0.73 
Performance Appraisals 3.92 0.80 0.64** 0.56** 0.51** 0.66** (0.83)      0.76 
Self-Managed Team 4.09 0.65 0.40** 0.38** 0.40** 0.53** 0.66** (0.68)     0.69 
Safety Information Sharing 4.40 0.65 0.43** 0.53** 0.49** 0.45** 0.38** 0.54** (0.90)    0.74 
Safety Audit 4.25 0.69 0.42** 0.50** 0.41**  0.57** 0.58** 0.61** 0.71** (0.85)   0.84 
Safety Campaign 4.51 0.55 0.48** 0.39** 0.29** 0.41** 0.42** 0.44** 0.68** 0.79** (0.88)  0.71 
Safety Equipment Maintenance 4.29 0.61 0.52** 0.49** 0.42** 0.61** 0.57** 0.53** 0.60** 0.77** 0.69** (0.83) 0.81 
** p < 0.01 (2 - tailed); Cronbach coefficient alphas are in parenthesis; N = 64; Alpha of the whole scale = 0.95 
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4.4.1.3. Safety-Specific Transformational Leadership 
I used the same scale reported in the previous chapter to measure this construct (See 
Appendix I). The internal reliability ∝ of the scale was .93. This individual-level variable was 
aggregated to the unit level and used as a control variable. The aggregation was justified and 
the details of this are provided in the construct aggregation section of this chapter. 
 
4.4.1.4. Bottom-Line Orientation 
A 4-item scale developed by Greenbaum, Mawritz, and Eissa (2012) was used to measure 
the organization’s bottom-line orientation. Response options ranged from (1) = ‘strongly 
disagree’ to (5) = ‘strongly agree.’ Sample statements are: ‘In my work unit, we are solely 
concerned with meeting the bottom-line’ and ‘Colleagues in my work unit care more about 
profits than employee well-being’ (See Appendix I) The Cronbach’s alpha reliability (𝛼) was 
0.85. Although the data for this variable were provided at the individual employee level, it 
was aggregated to the unit-level and used as control variable. The aggregation statistics that 
justified this aggregation has been provided in the construct aggregation section of this 
chapter. 
 
4.4.2. Measures of Individual-level Variables 
 
4.4.2.1. Experienced HPWS for Safety 
A version of the 27-item scale used to measure use of HPWS for safety was used to 
measure respondents’ experience of HPWS for safety. Response options ranged from (1) = 
‘strongly disagree’ to (5) = ‘strongly agree’ (See Appendix I). Table 4.7 presents the 
descriptive statistics, internal consistency reliability estimates, and intercorrelation 
coefficients of the 10 dimensions or practices. EFA was also conducted on the summed 
subscale scores of the 10 dimensions or practices of the focal measure using the frontline 
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employees’ data. As shown in Table 4.7, the one-factor model obtained replicates the results 
obtained in Study 2 and Study 3 in chapter 3. All the factor loadings are significant, and they 
ranged from 0.72 to 0.80. The scale’s alpha reliability was 0.92. 
 
4.4.2.2. Safety Knowledge 
 A 4-item scale adopted from Neal and colleagues (2000) was used to assess the extent to 
which employees felt they had knowledge about the safety-related issues around their job. 
Response options ranged from (1) = ‘strongly disagree’ to (5) = ‘strongly agree.’ Sample 
items are ‘I know how to perform my job in a safe manner’ and ‘I know how to reduce the 
risks of accidents and incidents in the workplace’ (See Appendix I). The scale’s alpha 
reliability was 0.85. 
 
4.4.2.3. Safety Motivation 
A 4-item scale developed by Neal and colleagues (2000) was used to measure safety 
motivation. Response options ranged from (1) = ‘strongly disagree’ to (5) = ‘strongly agree.’ 
Sample items include ‘I believe that it is important to reduce the risk of accidents and 
incidents in the workplace’ and ‘I feel that it is important to maintain safety at all times’ (See 
Appendix I). The scale’s alpha reliability was 0.80. 
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Table 4.7: Descriptive Statistics, Reliability Estimates, Factor Loadings, and Intercorrelations between  
 Measures of the Ten (10) Dimensions of Employee Experienced HPWS for Safety (Study 4) 
 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Factor Loadings 
Safety Training 4.08 0.08 (0.87)          0.72 
Safety Rewards 3.43 1.0 0.58** (0.81)         0.77 
Internal Opportunity for Promotion 3.56 0.88 0.53** 0.68** (0.80)        0.78 
Safety Involvement and Participation 3.69 0.78 0.47** 0.56** 0.59** (0.60)       0.77 
Performance Appraisals 3.74 0.84 0.48** 0.58** 0.60** 0.61** (0.79)      0.80 
Self-Managed Team 3.78 0.81 0.42** 0.52** 0.59** 0.61** 0.63 (0.70)     0.77 
Safety Information Sharing 4.15 0.70 0.52** 0.48** 0.51** 0.55** 0.51** 0.57** (0.76)    0.75 
Safety Audit 3.94 0.76 0.49** 0.54** 0.52** 0.53** 0.58** 0.55** 0.49** (0.80)   0.77 
Safety Campaign 4.29 0.59 0.49** 0.44** 0.45** 0.48** 0.51** 0.48** 0.58** 0.61** (.76)  0.73 
Safety Equipment Maintenance 4.07 0.81 0.52** 0.49** 0.48** 0.50** 0.54** 0.46** 0.52** 0.57** 0.56** (0.88) 0.74 
** All correlations are significant at the p < 0.01 (2-tailed); Cronbach’s alpha coefficients are in parentheses. Alpha of the whole scale 
 is 0.92 
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4.4.2.4. Safety Compliance 
A 4-item safety compliance scale by Neal and colleagues (2000) was used to measure safety 
compliance. Response options ranged from (1) = ‘strongly disagree’ to (5) = ‘strongly agree.’ 
Sample items include ‘I carry out my work in a safe manner’ and ‘I ensure the highest levels 
of safety when I carry out my job’ (See Appendix I). The alpha reliability coefficient (α) of the 
scale was 0.88. 
 
4.4.2.5. Safety Initiative 
An 8-item scale adopted from Turner and Parker (2000) was used to measure safety 
initiative. Response options ranged from (1) = ‘strongly disagree’ to (5) = ‘strongly agree.’ 
Sample items are ‘I am involved in improving safety policy and practices’ and ‘I often make 
suggestions to improve how safety is handled around here.’ (See Appendix I). The reliability 
coefficient alpha of the scale was 0.88. 
 
4.4.2.6. Workplace Injuries 
Drawing on Mearns, Whitaker, and Flin (2001), this study relied on employees’ self-reported 
measure of workplace injuries. Thus, respondents were asked to indicate the frequency with 
which they have experienced a number of work-related incidents or injuries for which they 
required first aid over the past six months. Eight (8) of the thirteen (13) injury categories used 
were adopted from Zacharatos (2001). However, the researcher consulted safety experts in 
the oil and gas industry in Nigeria to confirm the eight (8) adopted injury categories and to 
generate four (4) additional injury categories. This was necessary in order to ensure that the 
scale is consistent with the commonly reported injuries in the oil and gas industry. The injury 
categories adopted from Zacharatos (2001) include: (i) Fractures, (ii) Dislocations, Sprains 
and Strains, (iii) Bruising and Crushing, (iv) Scratches abrasions (superficial wounds), (v) 
Cuts, laceration and punctures (Open wounds), (vi) Burns and Scalds, (vii) Eye injury, (viii) 
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Concussions and head injuries. The additional injury categories generated by the researcher 
include: (ix) Gassing, (x) Hernia, (xi) Different types of shocks, (xii) Multiple injuries, and (xiii) 
others (See Appendix I). Veazie, Landen, Bender, and Amandus (1994) argued for a 
maximum of six (6) months over which employees can recall and report with accuracy the 
injuries they sustained. The reliability coefficient alpha estimate was 0.93. 
 
4.4.2.7. Safety-Related Events 
Safety-related events were measured using an 8-item scale adapted from Barling and 
colleagues (2002) based on extensive consultation by the researcher with safety experts in 
Nigeria’s oil and gas industry. Respondents were requested to indicate the frequency (i.e. 
from 1 = never to 5 = frequently) with which each of the safety events listed had occurred to 
them over the past one (1) year. Sample items are “I was exposed to some dangerous 
chemicals (e.g. hydro-sulphuric acid, hydro-fluoric acid, etc.)” and “I slipped on liquid 
substances (e.g. liquid gas) or other objects on the floor” (See Appendix I). The scale’s 
reliability coefficient alpha was 0.85. 
 
4.5. Control Variables 
Because of the multilevel nature of this study, controls were used at both the unit and 
individual levels of analyses. At the unit-level, the study controlled for safety-specific 
transformational leadership and bottom-line orientation. These controls were necessary 
because of the potential relationships between the variables of interest (i.e. HPWS and 
safety climate) and safety-specific transformational leadership (Zacharatos & colleagues, 
2005; Barling & colleagues, 2002) on one hand, and bottom-line orientation (Becker & 
Huselid, 1998) on the other. For example, prior studies (e.g. Barling & colleagues, 2002) 
found safety-specific transformational leadership to associate with safety climate. Because 
bottom-line has been linked to management practices (Tornow & Wiley, 1991) and HPWS 
(e.g. Becker & Huselid, 1998), this study assumes that there should be an association 
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between bottom-line orientation and HPWS for safety. Consequently, this study controlled for 
safety-specific transformational leadership and bottom-line orientation at the unit level of 
analysis. 
 
At the individual level of analysis, I controlled for employees’ age, sex, level of education and 
tenure.  The choice of these control variables was guided by previous studies (e.g. Jensen & 
colleagues, 2013; Lepak & colleagues, 2007; Takeuchi & colleagues, 2007; Datta, Guthrie, & 
Wright, 2005; Zacharatos & colleagues, 2005; Guest, 1999; Huselid, 1995; Fox, Dwyer, & 
Ganster, 1993). For example, Nishii and colleagues (2008) suggest that long-tenured 
employees are less likely to have positive view of the HR system than their short-tenured 
counterparts are. Previous work also demonstrates that the participants’ age and gender 
(Liao & colleagues, 2009; Collins & Smith, 2006; Liao & Chuang, 2004; Guthrie, 2001) are 
associated with the adoption of high performance human resource practices. Research (e.g. 
Takeuchi & colleagues, 2007; Judge, Thoreson, Bono, & Patton, 2001; Mathieu & Zajac, 
1990) further suggests that age and gender are related to job attitudes and behaviours. 
 
4.6. Construct Aggregation 
As previous noted, data on safety climate, safety-specific transformational leadership (control 
variable), and bottom-line orientation (control variable) were obtained at the individual level 
but aggregated to the unit-level. Consequently, there was a need to establish the statistical 
justification (Kozlowski & Klein, 2000) indicating that groups share common variances with 
regard to variables and that these variances can be used successfully to differentiate 
between groups.  
 
Bliese (2000) recommends assessing reliability by means of either intraclass correlation 
coefficient 1 (ICC 1) or intraclass correlation coefficient 2 (ICC 2) or both as they constitute 
the two major forms of the intraclass correlation coefficient (James, 1982; Bartko, 1976). ICC 
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(1) takes into consideration individual-level ratings and provides an estimate of the extent to 
which individual-level variability on a given measure is explained by higher-level units (Kreft 
& DeLeeeuw, 1998; Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992).  In contrast, ICC (2) provides an estimate of 
the reliability of the group means (James, 1982; Shrout & Fleiss, 1979; Bartko, 1976). Both 
ICC (1) and ICC (2) are closely related in the sense that they are a function of group size 
(Glick, 1985; Shrout & Fleiss, 1979). ICC (2) is usually estimated with the use of means 
squares from a one-way random-effect analysis of variance (ANOVA).  
 
ICC (1) values for the variables were 0.19 (safety climate), 0.07 (safety-specific 
transformational leadership), and 0.47 (bottom-line orientation). The ICC (2) results for the 
same variables were 0.95 (safety climate), 0.41 (safety-specific transformational leadership), 
and 0.73 (bottom-line orientation). All the findings exceeded the values commonly 
considered as the lowest acceptable, 0.05 (ICC 1: Bliese, 2000) and 0.70 (ICC 2: Klein & 
Kozlowski, 2000) except the ICC (2) result of safety-specific transformational leadership (i.e. 
0.41). Thus, these values justified the aggregation of these variables to the unit-level of 
analysis. Moreover, because the safety-specific transformational leadership was just used as 
a control variable, it was aggregated. 
 
4.7. Data Analytic Technique 
 
4.7.1. Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) 
Researchers have predominantly focused on individual-level effects which biases the 
precision of findings (Gerdes, 2011; Geldof, 2010). Thus, it has been observed that the 
traditional statistical techniques such as analysis of variance (ANOVA), multivariate analysis 
of variance (MANOVA), and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis may ignore 
organizational-level or unit-level influences on individual level outcomes (Mitchell, Lunt, & 
Shaw, 2010). All of these analytical techniques are only able to test individual-level 
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relationships (i.e. micro studies) rather than testing the organizational-level or unit-level 
effects on individual-level outcomes (i.e. macro studies) (Shek & Lee, 2007). For example, 
traditionally, multilevel analysis using HLM has been able to test mediation models only when 
the outcome variable is at individual-level of analysis (Jensen& colleagues, 2013). It is 
essential to model variables as well as their effects and interactions at different levels of 
analysis (Geiser, 2013). This is because, in many studies, for example, variables at the unit-
level as well as the variables at the individual level of analysis are important in predicting an 
outcome variable. To address these disadvantages, multilevel modelling (MLM) and 
structural equation modelling (SEM) techniques have been found to be very useful (Luke, 
2004). MLM is capable of modelling, for example, unit-level effects (including effects from an 
aggregated higher level) on individual-level outcomes (Luke, 2004). However, MLM cannot 
deal with multiple mediators and outcomes simultaneously. SEM, on the other hand, can link 
a set of predictors to a number of outcomes in a structural way. Thus, SEM can model 
multiple predictors, mediators, and outcome variables simultaneously (Hoyle, 2011). 
However, SEM cannot model, for example, the organizational-level or unit-level effects on 
individual-level outcomes.  
 
Preacher, Zyphur, and Zhang (2010) and Nezlek (2011) proposed the use of multilevel 
structural equation models (MSEM) in order to overcome the limitations of traditional 
statistical techniques in predicting mediation effects through multiple models. Nezlek (2011) 
suggests that multilevel structural equation modelling (MSEM) can be versatile in dealing 
with multiple predictors, mediators, and outcomes from different levels of analyses in a single 
inquiry. 
 
It has been observed that, although MSEM have been used recently for confirmatory factor 
analytic models (e.g. Preacher, Zhang, & Zyphur, 2011; Preacher, Zyphur, & Zhang, 2010), 
their true implementation as complete structural equation models (SEM) has been rare 
(Jensen & colleagues, 2013). This study utilized Mplus software package version 7.3 
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(Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2014) to estimate the multilevel models (including mediated path 
analysis models) using Structural Equation Modelling technique.  
 
Hoyle (1995) describes SEM as a comprehensive statistical perspective to testing 
hypotheses about relations among observed and latent variables. According to Kaplan 
(2000), SEM is a class of methodologies that seek to represent hypotheses about the 
means, variances, and covariances of observed data in terms of a smaller number of 
structural parameters defined by a hypothesized underlying model.  
 
In order to fully understand the fundamentals of traditional SEM, it is essential to grasp two 
important concepts: measurement models and structural models. The measurement model 
describes the relationships between observed variables (instruments or items or indicators) 
and the construct or constructs that those variables are hypothesized to measure (Weston & 
Gore, 2006). In other words, it establishes the relationships between latent (unobserved) 
variables and multiple observable items (Holbert & Stephenson, 2002). Holbert and 
Stephenson (2002) describe latent variables as the underlying constructs that are not directly 
tapped by any one set of measures, but are hypothesized to influence (or be influenced by 
certain observable items in the model. According to Duncan (1975, cf: Hentler, 1980), latent 
variables are what a researcher ultimately desires to capture, but which cannot be directly 
assessed through any form of observation.  
 
Weston and Gore (2006) suggest that the measurement model of SEM allows the researcher 
to evaluate how well his or her observed variables (i.e. instruments or items) combine to 
identify underlying hypothesized constructs (i.e. latent variables). The hypothesized 
constructs or factors are known as latent variables and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) is 
utilized to test the measurement model. The measures or items that are selected by the 
researcher help to define the latent variables in the measurement model. According to 
Weston and Gore (2006), a latent variable is defined more correctly to the extent that the 
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measures (or items) that define it are strongly related to one another. For example, a 
construct will be poorly defined if one item is weakly correlated with other items of the 
measure of the same construct. This is referred to as model misspecification or 
misjudgement in the hypothesized relationships among variables. Bollen (1989) indicates 
that researchers should be discouraged from testing models that include constructs with 
single indicators. This is because each of the indicators or items represents a separate 
measure of the hypothesized latent variable in question, which, when combined, represent 
the underlying construct (Weston & Gore, 2006). However, items that are reliable and have 
less error are likely to be better indicators of their respective latent variable and hence the 
items with the highest factor loadings in a factor analysis will most accurately represent their 
underlying construct.  
 
The structural model, which is based on path analysis, tests a set of hypothesized 
associations among two or more latent variables (Holbert & Stephenson, 2002). In other 
words, it specifies the hypothesized relationships among latent variables (Weston & Gore, 
2006). Relationships among latent variables can be described as covariances, direct effects, 
or indirect (or mediated) effects. Weston and Gore describe covariances as analogous to 
correlations in the sense that they are defined as non-directional relationships among 
independent latent variables. A direct effect represents a directional relation between two 
variables and it forms the building block of SEM (Hoyle, 1995). It is the effect of an 
independent (exogenous) variable on a dependent (endogenous) variable (Schreiber, Nora, 
Stage, Barlow, & King, 2006). However, a dependent variable in one direct effect can be the 
independent variable in another. For example, this study hypothesizes experienced HPWS 
for safety as having direct effects on employees’ safety knowledge and safety motivation 
while safety knowledge and safety motivation are hypothesized to have direct effects on 
safety compliance and safety initiative. In the first hypothesized relationship, experienced 
HPWS for safety is an independent variable while safety knowledge and safety motivation 
are dependent variables. However, in the second hypothesized relationship, safety 
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knowledge and safety motivation have become independent variables while safety 
compliance and safety initiative are dependent variables. Weston and Gore (2006) also 
describe direct effects as the relationships among measured (or indicators or items) and 
latent (unobserved) variables (similar to those found in analysis of variance (ANOVA) and 
multiple regression).  
 
An indirect effect represents the effect of an independent variable on a dependent variable 
through one or more intervening or mediating variables (Baron & Kenny, 1986). In other 
words, it suggests the relationship between an independent latent variable and a dependent 
latent variable that is mediated by one or more latent variables. For example, and as earlier 
noted, the current study hypothesizes experienced HPWS for safety to have an indirect effect 
on safety behaviours in terms of safety compliance and safety initiative via the mediating 
effects of safety knowledge and safety motivation.  
 
Hoyle (1995) opines that the application of SEM technique starts with the specification or 
building of a model to be estimated. He describes a model as a statistical statement that is 
expressed with equations or a diagram about the hypothesized relationships among 
variables based on theory and research. Specification is described as the exercise of 
formally stating a model and this varies in form across different analytic approaches (Hoyle, 
1995). Specification takes place when a researcher specifies which relationships are 
hypothesized to exist or not to exist among observed and latent variables (Weston & Gore, 
2006). Hoyle (1995) notes that the exercise of model specification is vital in the SEM 
approach such that analysis cannot take place until the researcher has specified a model of 
the relations among the variables to be analysed. In SEM, model specification involves the 
formulation of statement that reflects the relationships among variables (known as 
parameters or paths) and they are either (i) set to a nonzero value and not estimated, (ii) set 
to zero and not estimated, or (iii) left free to be estimated (Weston & Gore, 2006; Hoyle, 
1995).  
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MSEM was used in this study for a number of reasons. First, it is possible to test all related 
paths (for example, mediation analysis) in the model simultaneously rather than going 
through a series of multiple regression analyses. In addition, the effects on the model of the 
absence or presence of sets of direct paths from predictor variable to outcome variable can 
be tested when competing models are compared (Stride, 2014).  
 
Second, it is possible to calculate indirect effects and test them for significance using Mplus. 
In addition, the use of Mplus has helped to overcome one potential problem of estimating the 
standard error of the product of regression coefficients that is a major disadvantage of 
Sobel’s Test. This it does by the process of bootstrapping (Stride, 2014). However, 
bootstrapping cannot be applied in multilevel mediation analysis (Muthén & Muthén, 1998 - 
2014). 
 
Third, there is need to conduct several confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) for the unit-level 
and individual-level data in order to ensure model fit (See next chapter). At the unit-level, for 
example, the study will test the hypothesized four factor model including unit-level HPWS, 
unit-level safety climate, aggregated safety-specific transformational leadership (control 
variable), and aggregated bottom-line orientations (control variable). However, at the 
individual-level of analysis, the study will test the hypothesized seven factor model including 
experienced HPWS for safety, safety knowledge, safety motivation, safety compliance, 
safety initiative, safety-related events, and workplace injuries.  
 
Fourth, it was considered appropriate for testing the direct and indirect (or mediated) 
relationships (hypothesized) at the individual-level of analysis using multilevel path analysis. 
This is consistent with prior research (e.g. Jensen & colleagues, 2013) who have utilized 
MSEM to test models that specify the direct and indirect (i.e. mediational) effects of 
hypothesized independent variables on dependent variables of interest.  
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Thus, this technique is suitable for this study because the model includes two levels of 
analysis (unit-level and individual-level), the data of which will be hierarchically structured. 
Hence, consistent with Kline (2005), Preacher and colleagues (2010), Jensen and 
colleagues (2013), both the unit-level and individual-level relationships will be tested using 
MSEM technique. 
 
4.7.2. Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) 
Several fit indices can be used to determine how well assigned structures fit the observed 
data. The most popular and basic among these fit indices is chi-square goodness-of-fit 
statistic that is used to test whether the actual data departs from what is expected under the 
proposed measurement model. A significant chi-square statistic indicates that the 
relationships between the variables in the measurement model are significantly different from 
what we would have expected if the measurement model was a true representation. 
Research (e.g. Hu & Bentler, 1999) however, reports that, in a large or moderately large 
sample, the difference between the observed and expected covariance matrix that is even 
small enough to be regarded as insignificant can cause very significant chi-square statistic. 
Therefore, other fit indices can be used to assess the fit of the model. However, a significant 
Chi-square is said to be acceptable when the sample size is large (Kline, 1998, although 
“large” is ill-defined).  
 
Other fit indices have been used to supplement the chi-square goodness of fit. These fit 
indices have been classified into two different types: (i) absolute, and (ii) incremental fit 
indices (Hu & Bentler, 1995; Tanaka, 1993; Gerbing & Anderson, 1993; Bollen, 1989; Marsh, 
Balla, & McDonald, 1988). An absolute fit index examines how well an a priori model 
reproduces the sample data (Hu & Bentler, 1999) and it is derived from the fit of the 
observed and expected covariance matrices and the maximum likelihood (ML) minimization 
180 
 
function. Examples of absolute fit indices are Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) and the Adjusted 
Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI: Tanaka & Huba, 1985; Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1984; Bentler, 
1983), Hoelter’s (1983) Critical N (CN), a Standardized version of Jöreskog & Sörbom’s 
(1981) Root Mean Squared Residual (SRMR: Bentler, 1995), and the Root Mean Square 
Error of Approximation (RMSEA: Steiger & Lind, 1980).  
 
Incremental fit indices identify the proportionate improvement in fit by comparing the chi-
square for the model tested with the chi-square from the baseline or null model. Examples of 
incremental fit indices are Normed chi-square (χ2⁄df < 3) (Wheaton, Muthén, Alwin, & 
Summers, 1977), Normed Fit Index (NFI: Bentler & Bonett, 1980), the Tucker-Lewis Index 
(TLI: 1973), Nonnormed Fit Index (NNFI: Bentler & Bonett, 1980), the Comparative Fit Index 
(CFI: Bentler, 1990), the Goodness of Fit Index (GFI: Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1989; Tanaka & 
Huba, 1984), and the Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI: Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1989).  
 
In addition to the Chi-Square Goodness of Fit statistic, the study utilized the following fit 
indices: Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) with values less than 0.08 
indicating a good fit with the data; Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) with 
values less than 0.05 indicating a close fit (Browne & Cudeck, 1993; Browne & Mels, 1990; 
Steiger, 1989), values above 0.05 and as high as 0.08 indicating an adequate fit (Browne & 
Cudeck, 1993), values above 0.08 and less than .10 indicating a mediocre fit (MacCallum, 
Browne, & Sugawara, 1996), and values above .10 indicating a poor fit (Dilalla, 2000; 
Browne & Cudeck, 1993). The study also used Comparative Fit Index (CFI) and Tucker-
Lewis Index (TLI) with values between 0.90 and 0.95 being considered a good fit while 
values of 0.95 and above are considered an excellent fit (Bentler, 1990).  
 
Examining the various cut-offs for many of these fit indices under various conditions such as 
varying sample sizes, model complexity, and others, Hu and Bentler (1999) contend that, to 
minimize Type 1 error (i.e. the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true) and 
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Type 2 error (i.e. the probability of accepting the null hypothesis when it is false), there is 
need for a combination of one incremental fit index, usually the CFI, with one of the SRMR 
and RMSEA. 
 
Before testing for significant relationships in the structural model, Fornell and Larcker (1981) 
recommends that it is necessary to first demonstrate that the measurement model has a 
satisfactory level of validity and reliability. Although some evidence of construct validity and 
internal consistency reliability (Cronbach (1951) and construct reliability (Fornell & Larcker, 
1981) had earlier been established in Study 2 and Study 3, it was considered appropriate to 
undertake, in this section, further statistical analyses using the data from Study 4 in order to 
confirm and provide further support for the validity and reliability of the new scale.  Consistent 
with Anderson and Gerbing’s (1988) two-stage approach, the fit of the measurement model 
(i.e. CFA) was established before the structural relations (i.e. hypotheses testing) were 
assessed. 
 
4.8. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I described the sample and the data collection procedure. I also described in 
details the analytic techniques used to analyze the data starting with MLM and SEM. The 
advantages and disadvantages of each of them were discussed and the two were combined 
as a MSEM to be used to simultaneously analyze the unit-level, individual- and cross-level 
hypotheses. The advantages of MSEM over traditional regression and multilevel analytic 
techniques as well as each of MLM and SEM in isolation were highlighted. Finally, I 
discussed the issues of confirmatory factor analysis. In the next chapter, I present the results 
of the MSEM analyses used to test the study hypotheses.  
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5.0. CHAPTER 5: RESULTS 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter aims to achieve two main objectives. The first is to further assess the validity of 
the newly developed HPWS for safety scale. The second is to present results of the 
multilevel testing of the model initially presented in chapter 2 regarding the impact of HPWS 
for safety on safety outcomes. Chapter 3 described the development of the HPWS for safety 
scale. From that process, a 29-item measure was developed, which yielded a unique three-
factor solution that accounted for 65.97% of the variance. These three components were 
consistent with AMO model, which is the study’s underpinning conceptualization of the 
HPWS for safety scale. The human resource components (component 1) items which are 
assumed to be motivation-enhancing factors are safety rewards, internal opportunity for 
promotion, safety involvement and participation, performance appraisals, self-managed 
team, safety information sharing, and clear job descriptions. The organization management 
component (component 2) items that are assumed to be opportunity-enhancing factors are 
safety audit, safety campaign, and safety equipment maintenance. Then the skills 
component that is assumed to be ability-enhancing factor is the safety training. Chapter 4 
described the methodology by which this measure was implemented to test the theoretical 
model developed in chapter 2, outlining also the analytical approach to be used to test the 
model. Given the multilevel structure of the data, Multilevel Structural Equation Modelling 
(MSEM) technique is used with Mplus software package version 7.3 (Muthén & Muthén, 
1998 - 2014) to test the hypotheses proposed in Chapter 2. This chapter presents the results 
of that analysis. 
 
5.2. Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) of the New HPWS for Safety Scale 
In this section, a further exploratory factor analysis is reported which was conducted in order 
to verify that the factor structure of the new scale is consistent with that obtained from the 
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initial first data set (Study 2). The data used for this verification were those collected for the 
main study (Study 4) and reported in chapter 4. It should however be recalled that the two 
items measuring clear job descriptions (DES) seemed to exhibit poor performance in the 
data reported in chapter 4, therefore, they were excluded from the analysis. Thus, an EFA 
was performed on the remaining 27-item HPWS for safety scale using the data from Study 4. 
 
Although the principal axis factoring (PAF) extraction with direct Oblimin rotation revealed the 
presence of five components with eigenvalues exceeding 1, a closer look at the screeplot 
(See Figure 5) indicated a clear break after the third component. Therefore, using Catell’s 
(1966) scree test, three components were retained for further investigation. Watkins’ (2000) 
Monte Carlo PCA for parallel analysis was again used and the results indicate only three 
components with eigenvalues exceeding the corresponding criterion values for a randomly 
generated data matrix of the same size (27 x 569) (See Tables 5.1 & 5.2). 
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Figure 5.1: Scree plot Test 
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Table 5.1: Output from Parallel Analysis 
Number of Variables: 27  
Number of subjects: 569  
Number of replications: 100  
Eigenvalue Random Eigenvalue Standard Dev 
1 1.4259 .0354 
2 1.3582 .0253 
3 1.3149 .0219 
4 1.2752 .0221 
5 1.2406 .0178 
6 1.2073 .0189 
7 1.1752 .0173 
8 1.1451 .0163 
9 1.1154 .0144 
10 1.0909 .0155 
11 1.0616 .0127 
12 1.0358 .0132 
13 1.0133 .0131 
14 0.9881 .0133 
15 0.9611 .0129 
16 0.9374 .0122 
17 0.9134 .0134 
18 0.8899 .0110 
19 0.8660 .0150 
20 0.8414 .0132 
21 0.8159 .0149 
22 0.7912 .0162 
23 0.7668 .0158 
24 0.7403 .0166 
25 0.7118 .0155 
26 0.6787 .0194 
27 0.6391 .0197 
 
 
Table 5.2: Comparison of Eigenvalues from PAF and Criterion Values from Parallel 
 Analysis 
 
Component 
Number 
Actual Eigenvalue from 
PCA 
Criterion Value from Parallel 
Analysis 
Decision 
1 11.611 1.4259 Accept 
2 1.670 1.3582 Accept 
3 1.627 1.3149 Accept 
4 1.108 1.2752 Reject 
5 1.027 1.2406 Reject 
6 0.876 1.2073 Reject 
 
Thus, the decision to retain three-factor components was supported. Following these 
analyses, a three-factor solution was then forced (See Table 5.3).  
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Table 5.3: Factor Loadings of 27-Item HPWS for Safety in Study 4 
 Domains/Items Opportunity-
Enhancing 
Factors 
Motivation-
Enhancing Factors 
Ability-
Enhancing 
Factors 
  F1 F2 F3 
1 Safety Campaign    
 CAM22 0.59   
 CAM 0.77   
 CAM 0.80   
2 Safety Equipment 
Maintenance 
   
 MAI25 0.70   
 MAI26 
MAI27 
0.65 
0.65 
  
3 Safety Audit    
 AUD19 0.53   
 AUD20 
AUD21 
0.51 
0.55 
  
4 Safety Information Sharing    
 SHA17 0.54   
 SHA18 0.45   
5 Self-Managed Team    
 TEA15  0.78  
 TEA16  0.46  
6 Internal Opportunity for 
Promotion 
   
 PRO7  0.71  
 PRO8  0.76  
 PRO9  0.69  
7 Performance Appraisals    
 APP13  0.63  
 APP14  0.66  
8 Safety Rewards    
 REW5  0.57  
 REW6  0.66  
9 Safety Involvement and 
Participation 
   
 PAR10  0.44  
 PAR11  0.59  
10 Safety Training    
 TRA1   0.77 
 TRA2   0.80 
 TRA3   0.73 
 TRA4   0.64 
 Eigenvalues    
 SHA1   0.49 
 SHA2   0.42 
 Average of Factor Loadings 0.58 0.70 0.57 
 
The three-factor solution of this EFA result indicates that 55.2% of the variance is accounted 
for, with opportunity-enhancing factors (or component 1: organization management) 
contributing 43%, motivation-enhancing factors (or component 2: human resource 
management) contributing 6.19%, and ability-enhancing factors (or component 3: skills) 
contributing 6.02% (See Table 5.4). 
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The interpretation of the three-factor components is consistent with that of Study 2. The only 
difference between the EFA results in this study and those reported in Study 2 is that safety 
information sharing (SHA) no longer loads on the motivation-enhancing component but 
rather the opportunity-enhancing component (See Table 5:3). This is consistent with prior 
work (e.g. Jiang, & colleagues, 2012; Bailey & colleagues, 2001; Blumberg & Pringle, 1982) 
which describes information sharing as one of the opportunity-enhancing HR practices that 
are designed to empower employees to utilize their skills and motivation to achieve 
organizational goals. Thus, although safety information sharing was initially conceptualized 
as part of the motivation-enhancing practices, the present EFA result, supported by prior 
research, has made the researcher to reconsider that it might be better positioned as an 
opportunity-enhancing HPWS for safety practice. Given the larger sample size of Study 4 
and therefore, higher consistency, this would appear to be a more accurate 
conceptualization. 
 
Table 5.4: Configuration of HPWS for safety Dimensions in Relation to AMO 
  (Study 4)  
 
HRM Subsystem AMO Theory HPWS for Safety Dimensions 
Skills Ability Safety Training 
Human Resource management Motivation Safety Rewards 
Internal opportunity for promotion 
Safety involvement and participation 
Performance appraisals 
Self-managed team 
 
Organization management 
 
Opportunity 
 
Safety audit 
Safety campaign 
Safety equipment and maintenance 
Safety information sharing 
 
 
The results presented in Table 5.5 compare the patterns of relationships in the data obtained 
from Study 2 and Study 4. This shows a strong and positive correlation between the ability-
enhancing and motivation-enhancing factors (r = 0.61, p < 0.01, n = 569), ability-enhancing 
and opportunity-enhancing factors (r = 0.61, p < 0.01, n = 569), and between motivation-
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enhancing and opportunity-enhancing factors (r = 0.75, p = 0.01, n = 569) just as we had in 
the Study 2 which also indicated a strong and positive correlation coefficients of r = 0.74, p < 
0.01, n = 303; r = 0.74, p < 0.01, n = 303; and r = 0.80, p < 0.01, n = 303 respectively. It also 
indicates Cronbach’s alpha coefficients ranging from 0.87 to 0.95, suggesting very good 
internal consistency reliability for the three components of the HPWS for safety scale for both 
samples. It should be noted that the corrected item-total correlations as shown in this 
analysis indicate the degree to which the items in each component correlate with the total 
score (Pallant, 2013; Hayes, 1994). Thus, the results of this analysis support the use of the 
ability-enhancing items, the motivation-enhancing items and the opportunity-enhancing items 
as a single HPWS for safety scale. 
 
Table 5.5: Cronbach’s Reliability (Alpha) Coefficients and Correlations  
 (Corrected Item-Total Correlation) Among the Three Factors 
 
 Sample 2 (n = 303)      
Serial No Factor M SD 1 2 3 
1 Ability-Enhancing Factors  3.94 0.93 (0.88)   
2 Motivation-Enhancing Factors 3.78 0.85 0.74 (0.95)  
3 Opportunity-Enhancing Factors 4.08 0.92 0.74 0.80 (0.95) 
 Sample 4 (n = 569)      
Serial No Factor M SD 1 2 3 
1 Ability-Enhancing Factors 4.08 0.80 (0.87)   
2 Motivation-Enhancing Factors 3.64 0.71 0.61 (0.91)  
3 Opportunity-Enhancing Factors 4.11 0.59 0.61 0.75 (0.90) 
Note: All correlations are significant at the p < 0.01 (2-tailed);  
          Cronbach’s alpha coefficients are in parentheses. 
 
5.3. Results of Confirmatory Factor Analyses 
For this assessment, Mplus version 7.3 (Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2014) was used to conduct 
confirmatory factor analysis in which the fit statistics for the proposed one-factor HPWS for 
safety model (included ten dimensions as indicators of the construct) was compared to the fit 
statistics for three alternative models: two-factor model 1 (included the opportunity-enhancing 
factors and a combined ability-enhancing and motivation-enhancing factors: O, AM), two-
factor model 2 (included motivation-enhancing factors and a combined ability-enhancing and 
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opportunity-enhancing factors: M, AO), and two-factor model 3 (included ability-enhancing 
factors and a combined motivation-enhancing and opportunity-enhancing factors: A, MO) 
HPWS for safety models. As indicated in Table 5.6, the Chi-Square Goodness-of-Fit statistic 
was statistically significant for all the measurement models, suggesting that none of them 
adequately fit the data. However, because of the limitations of the use of Chi-Square 
Goodness-of-Fit statistic, among which is its sensitivity to sample size (Byrne, 2011; Hu & 
Bentler, 1999; Jöreskog & Yang, 1996; Fornell & Larcker, 1981; Jöreskog, 1969), it is rarely 
used as a sole index of model fit. 
 
As shown in Table 5.6, the CFAs of the second-order one-factor measurement model that 
used the ten dimensions as indicators of the construct (i.e. HPWS for safety) demonstrated 
the following fits:  𝜒2 = 243.24, df = 35, p < 0.01; SRMR = 0.04; RMSEA = 0.10; CFI = 0.93; 
TLI = 0.91. Although the CFA results demonstrated a mediocre fit (Browne & Cudeck, 1993) 
for RMSEA (MacCallum, Browne, & Sugawara, 1996), the fit indices were considered 
acceptable because other fit indicators are not only within the acceptable ranges (Browne & 
Cudeck, 1993; Browne & Mels, 1990; Bentler, 1990), but also much better fit than the 
alternative models: (i) two-factor model 1 (𝑂, 𝐴𝑀: 𝜒2 = 2276.96, df = 323, p < 0.01; SRMR 
0.06; RMSEA = 0.10; CFI = 0.88; TLI = 0.86) which included the opportunity-enhancing 
factors (safety information sharing, safety audit, safety campaign, and safety equipment) and 
a combined ability-enhancing and motivation-enhancing factors (training, safety rewards, 
internal opportunity for promotion, safety involvement and participation, performance 
appraisals, & self-managed team); (ii) two-factor model 2 (M, AO: 𝜒2 = 2191.94, DF = 311, P 
< 0.01; SRMR = 0.06; RMSEA = 0.10; CFI = 0.78; TLI = 0.76) that included the motivation-
enhancing factors (safety rewards, internal opportunity for promotion, safety involvement and 
participation, performance appraisals, & self-managed team) and a combined ability-
enhancing and opportunity-enhancing factors (training, safety information sharing, safety 
audit, safety campaign, and safety equipment); and (iii) two-factor model 3 (A,MO: 𝜒2 = 
2022.72, DF = 323, P < 0.01; SRMR = 0.06; RMSEA = 0.09; CFI = 0.81; TLI = 0.79) that 
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included the ability-enhancing factors (training) and a combined motivation-enhancing and 
opportunity-enhancing factors (safety rewards, internal opportunity for promotion, safety 
involvement and participation, performance appraisals, & self-managed team, safety 
information sharing, safety audit, safety campaign, and safety equipment). 
 
Table 5.6: Results of Confirmatory Factor Analyses and Discriminant Validity  
  Assessment of One-Factor Model of HPWS for Safety Scale 
 
Model 𝜒2 df p SRMR RMSEA CFI TLI 
One-Factor Model (included 10 practices 
of HPWS for Safety) (AMO) 
243.24 35 0.000 0.04 0.10 0.93 0.91 
Two-Factor Model 1 (O, AM) 2276.96 323 0.000 0.06 0.10 0.88 0.86 
Two-Factor Model 2 (M, AO) 2191.94 311 0.000 0.06 0.10 0.78 0.76 
Two-Factor Model 3 (A, MO) 2022.72 323 0.000 0.06 0.09 0.81 0.79 
 
Table 5.7 displays the CFA and the discriminant validity of the three-factor model of HPWS 
for safety comprising ability-enhancing factors (A), motivation-enhancing factors (M), and 
opportunity-enhancing factors (O). The results indicate that the proposed three-factor 
measurement model (AMO) that included the indicators or items of the ability (training), 
motivation (rewards, internal opportunity for promotion, safety involvement and participation, 
performance appraisals, and self-managed team), and opportunity (safety information 
sharing, safety audit, safety campaign, and safety equipment maintenance) fit the data (χ2= 
1651.34, df = 321, p < 0.01; SRMR = 0.05; RMSEA = 0.06; CFI = 0.95; TLI = 0.93). 
However, the three-factor (2nd-order) model 1 (χ2 = 218.37, df = 62, p < 0.01; SRMR = 0.04; 
RMSEA = 0.07; CFI = 0.96; TLI = 0.96) where the dimensions constituting the ability, 
motivation, and opportunity were used as indicators or items of the construct (i.e. HPWS for 
safety) with safety information sharing included in motivation-enhancing factors, and three-
factor (2nd order) model 2 (χ2 = 235.12, df = 62, p < 0.01; SRMR = 0.04; RMSEA = 0.07; CFI 
= 0.96; TLI = 0.95) where the dimensions constituting the ability, motivation, and opportunity 
were used as indicators or items of the construct (i.e. HPWS for safety) but with safety 
information sharing included in opportunity enhancing factors, fit the data better than the 
hypothesized first-order three-factor model. These are within the acceptable ranges of the fit 
indices (Dilalla, 2000; Browne & Cudeck, 1993; Browne & Mels, 1990; Bentler, 1990). The 
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result further indicates that both second-order three-factor models 1 and 2 with safety 
information sharing fit the data very well.  
 
The results also show that the motivation-enhancing factor model 1 (χ2 = 377.86, df = 54, p < 
0.01; SRMR = 0.05; RMSEA = 0.10; CFI = 0.90; TLI = 0.88) that included the indicators or 
items of the dimensions that constitute motivation without safety information sharing fit the 
data significantly better than the motivation-enhancing factor model 2 (χ2 = 580.75, df = 77, p 
< 0.01; SRMR = 0.05; RMSEA = 0.11; CFI = 0.87; TLI = 0.85)  that included the indicators or 
items of the dimensions that constitute motivation with safety information sharing (the chi −
square difference = ∆𝜒2 = 202.89, ∆𝑑𝑓 = 23, p < 0.001). Likewise, the second-order 
motivation-enhancing factor model 1 (χ2 = 44.94, df = 5, p < 0.01; SRMR = 0.03; RMSEA = 
0.12; CFI = 0.97; TLI = 0.94) that used the dimensions of the construct as indicators of 
motivation-enhancing factors without safety information sharing fit the data as well as 
second-order motivation-enhancing factor model 2 (χ2 = 58.23, df = 9, p < 0.01; SRMR = 
0.03; RMSEA = 0.10; CFI = 0.97; TLI = 0.95) that used the dimensions that constitute the 
motivation-enhancing factors as indicators with safety information sharing included.  
 
In the same vein, the opportunity-enhancing factor model 1 (χ2 = 602.75, df = 27, p < 0.01; 
SRMR = 0.08; RMSEA = 0.19; CFI = 0.78; TLI = 0.71) that used the indicators or items of the 
dimensions that constitute opportunity without items or indicators that comprise safety 
information sharing did not fit the data well and so also the opportunity-enhancing factor 
model 2 (χ2 = 746.03, df = 44, p < 0.01; SRMR = 0.07; RMSEA = 0.17; CFI = 0.78; TLI = 
0.73) that used the indicators or items of the dimensions that constitute opportunity with 
items or indicators that comprise safety information sharing. However, the second-order 
opportunity-enhancing factor model 1 (χ2 = 0.000, df = 0; SRMR = 0.00; RMSEA = 0.00; CFI 
= 1.00; TLI = 1.00) that included the dimensions as indicators of opportunity without safety 
information sharing fit the data worse off than the second-order opportunity-enhancing factor 
model 2  (χ2 = 9.47, df = 2; p < 0.01; SRMR = 0.02; RMSEA = 0.08; CFI = 0.99; TLI = 0.97) 
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that included the dimensions of the construct as indicators of opportunity with safety 
information sharing.  
 
The result further demonstrates that the second-order opportunity-enhancing factor model 2 
(χ2 = 0.9.47, df = 2; p < 0.01; SRMR = 0.02; RMSEA = 0.08; CFI = 0.99; TLI = 0.0.97) that 
included the dimensions of the construct as indicators of opportunity with safety information 
sharing fit the data significantly better than the second-order motivation-enhancing factor 
model 2 (χ2 = 58.23, df = 9, p < 0.01; SRMR = 0.03; RMSEA = 0.10; CFI = 0.97; TLI = 0.95) 
that used the dimensions of the construct as indicators of motivation with safety information 
sharing included (the Chi-square difference = ∆𝜒2 = 48.76, ∆𝑑𝑓 = 7, p < 0.001). Thus, this 
pattern of findings reinforce the EFA results whereby safety information sharing items no 
longer loaded on the motivation-enhancing practices, as they did in Study 2, but rather on the 
opportunity-enhancing practices in Study 4.  
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Table 5.7: Results of Confirmatory Factor Analyses and Discriminant Validity 
 Assessment of Three-Factor Model of HPWS for Safety Scale 
 
Model 𝝌𝟐 df p SRMR RMSEA CFI TLI 
Hypothesized 3-Factor (First-Order) Model (i.e. used 
indicators or items of AMO factors) 
 
1651.31 321 0.000 0.05 0.06 0.95 0.93 
3-Factor (2nd-Order) Model -1 (used dimensions of 
AMO as indicators + safety information sharing 
included in motivation-enhancing factors) 
 
218.37 62 0.000 0.04 0.07 0.96 0.96 
3-Factor (2nd-Order) Model-2 ((used dimensions of 
AMO as indicators + safety information sharing 
included in opportunity-enhancing factors)) 
 
235.12 62 0.000 0.04 0.07 0.96 0.95 
Ability-Enhancing Factors Model (used items of 
ability-enhancing factor) 
1.07 2 0.58 0.01 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Motivation-Enhancing Factor Model-1 (used items of 
motivation-enhancing factors without safety 
information sharing) 
 
377.86 54 0.000 0.05 0.10 0.90 0.88 
Motivation-Enhancing Factor Model-2 (used items of 
motivation-enhancing factors with safety information 
sharing) 
 
580.75 77 0.000 0.05 0.11 0.87 0.85 
Motivation-Enhancing Factors (2nd-Order) Model-1 
(used the dimensions of motivation-enhancing factors 
without safety information sharing) 
 
44.94 5 0.000 0.03 0.12 0.97 0.94 
Motivation-Enhancing Factors (2nd-Order) Model-2 
(used the dimensions of motivation-enhancing factors 
with safety information sharing) 
 
58.23 9 0.000 0.03 0.10 0.97 0.95 
Opportunity-Enhancing Factors Model-1 (used items 
of opportunity-enhancing factors without safety 
information sharing) 
 
602.75 27 0.000 0.08 0.19 0.78 0.71 
Opportunity-Enhancing Factors Model-2 (used items 
of opportunity-enhancing factors with safety 
information sharing) 
 
746.03 44 0.000 0.07 0.17 0.78 0.73 
Opportunity-Enhancing Factors (2nd-Order) Model-1 
(used the dimensions of opportunity-enhancing 
factors without safety information sharing) 
 
0.000 0 0.000 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Opportunity-Enhancing Factors (2nd-Order) Model-2 
(used the dimensions of opportunity-enhancing 
factors with safety information sharing)  
9.47 2 0.009 0.02 0.08 0.99 0.97 
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5.4. Convergent and Discriminant Validity 
In order to further assess the construct validity of the new scale, some additional 
psychometric analyses were conducted on the HPWS for safety scale. First, because the 
reliability of construct measurement does not measure ‘the amount of variance that is 
captured by the construct in relation to the amount of variance due to measurement error’ 
(Fornell & Larcker, 1981, p. 45), the AVE which provides information for this (Fornell and 
Larcker, 1981) was used to examine the construct validity of the new scale. It is expected 
that the AVE should be greater than 0.50 (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). Fornell and Larcker 
(1981) contend that the validity of the individual indicators as well as the construct itself will 
be questionable if the AVE is less than 0.50, signifying that the variance due to measurement 
error is larger than the variance captured by the construct.  
 
The formula as shown below is the sum of squared factor loadings of the HPWS for safety 
dimensions (numerator) divided by the sum of squared factor loadings of the HPWS for 
safety dimensions plus the sum of residual variances of the factor loadings (forming the 
denominator). 
AVE =   
∑ 𝜆2
∑ 𝜆2+∑ 𝜀
 
∑ 𝜆2 = Sum of squared factor loadings  
 
∑ 𝜀= Sum of residual variances of factor loadings 
 
∑ 𝜆2  =  0.722 +  0.772 +  0.782 + 0.752 + 0.742 +  0.772 +  0.802 + 0.772 + 0.772 +  0.732
= 5.77 
 
∑ 𝜀= 0.31 + 0.43 + 0.47 + 0.46 + 0.49 + 0.41 + 0.24 + 0.33 + 0.24 + 0.23 = 3.61 
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AVE =  
5.77
5.77+3.61
 = 
5.77
9.38
= 0.62. 
The result indicates that the AVE obtained is 0.62 and is greater than 0.50 (Fornell & 
Larcker, 1981), suggesting support for the construct validity of the new scale. 
 
Because this study also assumed that each indicator or item is associated with only one 
factor, MacKenzie and colleagues (2011) recommend that the validity of each of the ten 
dimensions of HPWS for safety scale should be tested by examining whether it is 
significantly related, for example, to the system of HPWS for safety scale (Bollen & Lennox, 
1991; Bollen, 1989). The norm is that an indicator or item should be highly correlated with its 
own construct but have low correlations with other constructs in order to establish 
discriminant validity at the item level (Henseler, Ringle & Sarstedt, 2015). The results in 
Table 5.8 demonstrate that, using Cohen’s (1988) criteria of small (r = .10 to .29), medium (r 
= .30 to .49), and large (r = .50 to 1.0) values to interpret the magnitude of the strength of the 
relationships between the ten dimensions of the HPWS for safety and the construct, it was 
found (See table 5.8) that the new scale (i.e. High Performance Work System for Safety 
scale) was significantly related to safety training (r = 0.75, p < 0.01), safety rewards (r = 0.77, 
p < 0.01), internal opportunity for promotion (r = 0.79, p < 0.01), safety involvement and 
participation (r = 0.74, p < 0.01), performance appraisals (r = 0.79, p < 0.01), self-managed 
team (r = 0.74, p < 0.01), safety information sharing (r = 0.72, p < 0.01), safety audit (r = 
0.77, p < 0.01), safety campaign (r = 0.71, p < 0.01), and safety equipment maintenance (r = 
0.75, p < 0.01). In all, the results reported above revealed a strong support for the 
convergent and discriminant validity of the new scale. 
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Table 5.8: Relationships between the Ten Dimensions of HPWS for Safety Scale and   the HPWS for Safety Scale  
 Variables M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 Experienced HPWS 3.9 .61 (0.92)           
2 Safety Training 4.1 .80 .75** (0.87)          
3 Safety Rewards 3.4 1.0 .77** .58** (0.81)         
4 Internal Opportunity for Promotion 3.6 .88 .79** .53** .68** (0.80)        
5 Safety Involvement and 
Participation 
3.7 .78 .74** .47** .56** .59** (0.60)       
6 Performance Appraisals 3.7 .84 .79** .48** .58** .60** .61** (0.79)      
7 Self-Managed Team 3.8 .81 .74** .42** .52** .59** .61** .63** (0.70)     
8 Safety Information and Sharing 4.2 .70 .72** .52** .48** .51** .55** .51** .57** (0.76)    
9 Safety Audit 3.9 .76 .77** .49** .54** .52** .53** .58** .55** .49** (0.80)   
10 Safety Campaign 4.3 .59 .71** .49** .44** .45** .48** .51** .48** .58** .61** (0.76)  
11 Safety Equipment Maintenance 4.1 .81 .75** .52** .49** .48** .50** .54** .46** .53** .57** .56** (0.88) 
** All correlations are significant at the p < 0.01 (2-tailed); Cronbach’s alpha coefficients are in parentheses
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5.5. Further Evaluation of the Measurement Models 
Before the hypotheses postulated for a study (or structural models) are tested, Anderson and 
Gerbing (1988) advise to conduct series of CFA in order to examine the level of 
distinctiveness of the variables measured at each level of analysis. Thus, in consonant with 
Anderson and Gerbing (1988), this study conducted a series of CFAs at both unit-and 
individual-levels of analysis. To start with, the study conducted a series of CFAs to determine 
whether the unit-level use of HPWS for safety, safety climate, safety-specific transformational 
leadership, and bottom-line orientation are distinct variables. Next, a series of CFAs were 
conducted in order to examine the distinctiveness of the individual-level variables of 
employees’ experienced HPWS for safety, safety knowledge, safety motivation, safety 
compliance, safety initiative, safety-related events, and workplace injuries. Because the use 
of HPWS for safety and the experienced HPWS for safety scales are multi-item scales with 
ten dimensions each, the items within each dimension were averaged and treated as an 
indicator of either the use of HPWS for safety scale or the employee experienced HPWS for 
safety scale (Zacharatos & colleagues, 2005). 
 
To conduct the series of CFAs on the unit-level variables, a hypothesized four-factor model 
(comprising of the use of HPWS for safety, safety climate, safety-specific transformational 
leadership, and bottom-line orientation) was compared with other alternative models such as 
(i) Three-factor model (i.e. use of HPWS for safety, safety climate, and a combination of 
safety-specific transformational leadership and bottom-line orientation), (ii) Two-factor model 
1 (combining the use of HPWS for safety and safety climate), (iii) Two-factor model 2 (use of 
HPWS for safety and the combination of safety climate, safety-specific transformational 
leadership, and bottom-line orientation), (iv) Two-factor model 3 (safety climate and  the 
combination of the use of HPWS for safety, safety-specific transformational leadership, and 
bottom-line orientation), and one-factor model (all variables combined to form one factor). 
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The Chi-Square Goodness-of-Fit statistic, Standardized Root Mean Square Residual 
(SRMR), Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), Comparative Fit Index (CFI), 
and Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) were used to assess the model fit. The results of the analyses 
(See Table 5.9) indicate that the hypothesized four-factor model reached acceptable cut-off 
points for all the fit indices (See Dilalla, 2000; Browne & Cudeck, 1993; Browne & Mels, 
1990; Bentler, 1990 ) ( except chi-square goodness of fit) 𝜒2 = 2931.31, df = 734; SRMR = 
0.06; RMSEA = 0.07; CFI = 0.86; TLI = 0.85), and not only that it fits the data well, it also fits 
the data better than the three-factor model (𝜒2 = 3991.33, df = 737; SRMR = 0.07; RMSEA = 
0.09; CFI = 0.79; TLI = 0.78),  the two-factor model 1 (𝜒2 = 2077.00, df = 298; SRMR = 0.07; 
RMSEA = 0.10; CFI = 0.83; TLI = 0.81), two-factor model 2 ( 𝜒2 = 5292.43, df = 739; SRMR 
= 0.08; RMSEA = 0.11; CFI = 0.71; TLI = 0.70), two-factor model 3 (𝜒2 = 6343.15, df = 739; 
SRMR = 0.12; RMSEA = 0.13; CFI = 0.56; TLI = 0.54), and the one-factor model (𝜒2 = 
7628.47, df = 740; SRMR = 0.13; RMSEA = 0.12; CFI = 0.65; TLI = 0.63) . As shown in 
Table 5.9, the Chi-Square difference also demonstrates that the four-factor model fit the data 
significantly better than the three-factor model (∆𝜒2 = 1060.02, ∆𝑑𝑓 = 3, p < 0.001), two-
factor model 1 (∆𝜒2 = -909.31, ∆𝑑𝑓 = -436, p < 0.001), two-factor model 2 (∆𝜒2 = 2361.12, 
∆𝑑𝑓 = 5, p < 0.001), two-factor model 3 (∆𝜒2 = 3411.84, ∆𝑑𝑓 = 5, p < 0.001), and the one-
factor model (∆𝜒2 = , ∆𝑑𝑓 = , p < 0.001). These results further support the discriminant 
validity of these variables at the unit-level of analysis. 
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Table 5.9: Results of Confirmatory Factor Analysis of the Distinctiveness of Unit-Level 
 Variables  
Model 𝝌𝟐 df p ∆𝝌𝟐(∆𝒅𝒇) 
 
SRMR RMSEA CFI TLI 
Hypothesized Four-Factor Model 
(i.e. use of HPWS for safety, safety 
climate, safety-specific 
transformational leadership, & 
bottom-line orientation) 
2931.31 734 0.000  0.05 0.07 0.86 0.85 
Three-Factor Model (i.e. use of 
HPWS for safety, safety climate, & a 
combination of safety-specific 
transformational leadership and 
bottom-line orientation) 
3991.33 737 0.000 1060.02(3)*** 0.07 0.09 0.79 0.78 
Two-Factor Model 1 (i.e. combining 
the use of HPWS for safety and 
safety climate)  
2077.0 298 0.000 -909.31 (-
436)*** 
0.07 0.10 0.83 0.81 
Two-Factor Model 2 (i.e. use of 
HPWS for safety, and a combination 
of safety climate, safety-specific 
transformational leadership, & 
bottom-line orientation) 
5292.43 739 0.000 2361.12 
(5)*** 
0.08 0.11 0.71 0.70 
Two-Factor Model 3 (i.e. safety 
climate and a combination of the use 
of HPWS for safety, safety-specific 
transformational leadership, & 
bottom-line orientation) 
6343.15 739 0.000 3411.84 
(5)*** 
0.12 0.12 0.65 0.63 
One-Factor Model (i.e. all the four 
variables combined to form a factor) 
7628.47 740 0.000 4697(6)*** 0.13 0.13 0.56 54 
∗∗∗ 𝝌𝟐difference test is significant at p < 0.001 
 
Table 5.10 presents the results of the confirmatory factor analysis of the distinctiveness of 
the individual-level variables. The hypothesized seven-factor model (experienced HPWS for 
safety, safety knowledge, safety motivation, safety compliance, safety initiative, safety-
related events, and workplace injuries) was compared with other alternative models. These 
alternative models include: (i) ten-factor model (experienced HPWS for safety, safety 
knowledge, safety motivation, safety compliance, safety initiative, safety-related events, 
workplace injuries, safety climate, safety-specific transformational leadership, and bottom-
line orientation), (ii) eight-factor model (experienced HPWS for safety, safety climate, safety 
knowledge, safety motivation, safety compliance, safety initiative, safety events, and 
workplace injuries), (iii) six-factor model (experienced HPWS for safety, combination of 
safety knowledge and safety motivation, combination of safety compliance and safety 
initiative; safety climate, safety-related events, and workplace injuries), (iv) five-factor model 
(experienced HPWS for safety, safety climate, combination of safety knowledge and safety 
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motivation, combination of safety compliance and safety initiative, combination of safety-
related events and workplace injuries), (v) four-factor model (experienced HPWS for safety, 
combination of safety knowledge and safety motivation, combination of safety compliance 
and safety initiative, combination of safety events and workplace injuries), (vi) three-factor 
model (experienced HPWS for safety, combination of safety knowledge, safety motivation, 
safety compliance, and safety initiative, combination of safety-related events and workplace 
injuries), and (vii) one-factor model (combination of experienced HPWS for safety, safety 
knowledge, safety motivation, safety compliance, safety initiative, safety-related events, and 
workplace injuries).  
 
The results in Table 5.10 indicate that the hypothesized seven-factor model did not only 
produce an acceptable fit (χ2 = 3355.62, df = 1203, SRMR = 0.05; RMSEA = 0.06; CFI = 
0.87; TLI = 0.86) (See Dilalla, 2000; Browne & Cudeck, 1993; Browne & Mels, 1990; Bentler, 
1990) but also fit the data better than the alternative models: (i) ten-factor model (χ2 = 
27956.08, df = 99171, SRMR = 0.11; RMSEA = 0.08; CFI = 0.86; TLI = 0.85), (ii) eight-factor 
model (χ2 = 9664.65, df = 3541, SRMR = 0.05; RMSEA = 0.06; CFI = 0.80; TLI = 0.80), (iii) 
six-factor model (χ2 = 6533.71, df = 2129, SRMR = 0.06; RMSEA = 0.06; CFI = 0.82; TLI = 
0.81), (iv) five-factor model (χ2 = 11595.72, df = 3559, SRMR = 0.06; RMSEA = 0.06; CFI = 
0.74; TLI = 0.73), (v) four-factor model (χ2 = 5280.17, df = 1218, SRMR = 0.07; RMSEA = 
0.08; CFI = 0.75; TLI = 0.74), (vi) three-factor model (χ2 = 5743.40, df = 1221, SRMR = 0.07; 
RMSEA = 0.08; CFI = 0.72; TLI = 0.71), and (vii) one-factor model (χ2 = 12200.6, df = 1224, 
SRMR = 0.17; RMSEA = 0.13; CFI = 0.33; TLI = 0.30).  
 
The results further reveal the Chi-Square difference test indicates that the hypothesized 
seven-factor model fit the data significantly better than the ten-factor model (∆𝜒2 = 24600.46, 
∆𝑑𝑓 = 7968, p < 0.001), the eight-factor model (∆𝜒2 = 6309.03, ∆𝑑𝑓 = 2338, p < 0.001), six-
factor model (∆𝜒2 = 3178.09, ∆𝑑𝑓 = 926, p < 0.001), five-factor model (∆𝜒2 = 8240.10, ∆𝑑𝑓 = 
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2356, p < 0.001), four-factor model  (∆𝜒2 = 1924.55, ∆𝑑𝑓 = 15, p < 0.001), three-factor model  
(∆𝜒2 = 2387.7, ∆𝑑𝑓 = 18, p < 0.001), and one-factor model  (∆𝜒2 = 8844.98, ∆𝑑𝑓 = 21, p < 
0.001). These results also demonstrate support for the discriminant validity of the variables at 
the individual-level of analysis. 
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Table 5.10: Results of Confirmatory Factor Analysis of the Distinctiveness of the Individual-Level Variables 
Model 𝝌𝟐 df p ∆𝝌𝟐(∆𝒅𝒇) 
 
𝝌𝟐
𝐝𝐟
⁄  
SRMR RMSEA CFI TLI 
Hypothesized Seven-Factor Model (experienced HPWS for safety, safety 
knowledge, safety motivation, safety compliance, safety initiative, safety-related 
events, and workplace injuries) 
3355.62 1203 0.000  2.8 0.05 0.06 0.87 0.86 
Ten-Factor Model (experienced HPWS for safety, safety knowledge, safety 
motivation, safety compliance, safety initiative, safety-related events, safety-
specific transformational leadership, bottom-line orientation and workplace injuries)  
27956.08 9171 0.000 24600.46(7968)*** 3.0 0.11 0.08 0.86 0.85 
Eight-Factor Model (experienced HPWS for safety, safety knowledge, safety 
motivation, safety compliance, safety initiative, safety-related events, safety climate 
and workplace injuries) 
9664.65 3541 0.000 6309.03(2338)*** 3.0 0.05 0.06 0.80 0.80 
Six-Factor Model (experienced HPWS for safety, combination of safety knowledge 
and safety motivation, combination of safety compliance and safety initiative, 
safety-related events, safety climate and workplace injuries) 
6533.71 2129 0.000 3178.09(926)*** 3.1 0.06 0.06 0.82 0.81 
Five-Factor Model (experienced HPWS for safety, combination of safety 
knowledge and safety motivation, combination of safety compliance and safety 
initiative, combination of safety-related events and workplace injuries, and safety 
climate) 
11595.72 3559 0.000 8240.10(2356)*** 3.3 0.06 0.06 0.74 0.73 
Four-Factor Model (experienced HPWS for safety, combination of safety 
knowledge and safety motivation, combination of safety compliance and safety 
initiative, combination of safety-related events and workplace injuries)  
5280.17 1218 0.000 1924.55(15)*** 4.3 0.07 0.08 0.75 0.74 
Three-Factor Model (experienced HPWS for safety, combination of safety 
knowledge, safety motivation, safety compliance and safety initiative, and 
combination of   safety-related events and workplace injuries)  
5743.40 1221 0.000 2387.7(18)*** 4.7 0.07 0.08 0.72 0.71 
One-Factor Model (combination of experienced HPWS for safety, safety 
knowledge, safety motivation, safety compliance, safety initiative, safety-related 
events, and workplace injuries) 
12200.60 1224 0.000 8844.98(21)*** 10.0 0.17 0.13 0.33 0.30 
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5.6. Descriptive Statistics and Zero-Order Correlations 
Having established the appropriateness of the measurement model being used, this analysis 
now turns to the testing of the overall structural model. Table 5.11 presents the means, 
standard deviations, zero-order correlations, and internal consistency reliability estimates of 
the study variables. The findings reveal significant positive relationships between 
experienced HPWS for safety and safety knowledge (r = 0.45, n = 569, p = < 0.01), safety 
motivation (r = 0.15, n = 569, p < 0.01), safety compliance (r = 0.50, p < 0.01), and safety 
initiative (r = 0.45, n = 569, p < 0.01). The findings also indicate that the experienced HPWS 
for safety has significant but negative relationship with safety-related events (r = -0.10, n = 
569, p < 0.05) and non-significant but negative relationship with workplace safety (r = -0. 01, 
n = 569, p > 0.05).  
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Table 5.11: Descriptive Statistics, Reliability Estimates, and Zero-Order Correlations among Variables in Study 4  
 (Main Study) 
 
Variables M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Unit-Level Variables              
Use of HPWS for Safety 4.18 0.53 (0.95)           
Unit-Level Safety Climate 3.92 0.72 0.09* (0.96)          
Safety-Specific Transformational Leadership 3.96  0.77 0.03 0.72** (0.93)         
Bottom-Line Orientation 2.99 1.07 -0.01 -0.14** -0.07 (0.85)        
              
              
Individual-Level Variables              
Sex 0.16 0.37            
Age 2.77 0.90 -0.03           
Level of Education 1.96 0.60 0.06 -0.11*          
Job Tenure 3.26 1.03 -0.03 0.71** -0.06         
Experienced HPWS for Safety 3.92 0.61 0.09* 0.13** -0.06 0.15** (0.92)       
Safety Knowledge 4.39 0.53 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.07 0.45** (0.85)      
Safety Motivation 4.72 0.39 0.06 -0.04 0.09* -0.07 0.15** 0.43** (0.80)     
Safety Compliance 4.37 0.62 0.06 0.14** -0.00 0.11* 0.50** 0.60** 0.36** (0.88)    
Safety Initiative 4.05 0.59 0.12** 0.13** 0.01 0.12** 0.45** 0.50** 0.32** 0.58** (0.88)   
Safety-Related Events 1.68 0.67 -0.11** -0.01 -0.02 0.07 -0.10* -0.12** -0.08 -.16** -0.06 (0.85)  
Workplace Injuries 1.21 0.46 -0.10* 0.02 -0.01 0.09* -0.01 -0.16** -0.18** -16** -0.03 0.56** 0.93 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed), ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
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5.7. Tests of Hypotheses 
Some of the hypotheses postulated for this study were multilevel in nature. This is because 
they involved testing relationships between unit-level variables (level 2) and individual-level 
variables (level 1). To model this appropriately, therefore, I utilized multilevel path analysis 
with Mplus version 7.3 (Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2014) following Preacher and colleagues 
(2010) recommendation on how to model multilevel mediation. Preacher and colleagues’ 
(2010) approach to multilevel mediation in the context of path analysis is most appropriate for 
the current study because it allows estimation of covariances for level 1 random effects and 
indirect effects, and the multiple paths that are components of these indirect effects without 
conflating the individual-level and unit-level relationships (Wallace, Butts, Johnson, Stevens, 
& Smith, 2016). It allows the simultaneous estimation of testing indirect effects in mediation 
instead of relying on step-wise procedures to test mediation (i.e. Baron & Kenny, 1986) or 
piecemeal estimation techniques such as hierarchical linear modelling that is likely to bias 
results because they do not allow for simultaneous estimation of all parameters (Wallace & 
colleagues, 2016). To test the hypothesized moderation and moderated mediation effect of 
unit safety climate, I adapted Bauer, Preacher, and Gil’s (2006) simultaneous multilevel 
regression procedure and applied it within Preacher and colleagues’ (2010) approach to 
examine the indirect effect of safety knowledge/safety motivation on safety outcomes of 
safety-related events and workplace injuries via safety behaviours of safety compliance and 
safety initiative at different levels of the effects of unit safety climate (i.e. conditional effects). 
It was necessary to combine Preacher and colleagues’ (2010) and Bauer and colleagues’ 
(2006) approaches in testing the current model because Preacher and colleagues’ (2010) 
approach does not address the issue of moderated mediation using path analysis whereas 
Bauer and colleagues’ (2006) approach only addresses moderated mediation in the context 
of hierarchical linear modelling and not path analysis (Wallace & colleagues, 2016). Thus, 
utilizing these two approaches together (not in a single run) in testing the current model 
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allowed me to employ the most statistically robust and appropriate framework to test the 
study’s hypothesized relationships. 
 
5.7.1. Unit-Level Analysis 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that the use of HPWS for safety would be related to unit-level safety 
climate. As shown in Table 5.12, HPWS for safety significantly related to unit-level safety 
climate (𝛽 = 0.65, p < 0.01), controlling for safety-specific transformational leadership (𝛽 = 
0.029, p > 0.05 n.s.) and bottom-line orientation (𝛽 = 0.146, p > 0.05 n.s.). This result 
indicates a support for hypothesis 1. 
 
5.7.2. Cross-Level Analyses 
Hypothesis 2 states that the use of HPWS for safety would relate positively to experienced 
HPWS for safety. As shown in Table 5.12, the use of HPWS for safety significantly relates to 
employees’ experiences of HPWS for safety (𝛽 = 0.11, p < 0.05), thus providing a support for 
Hypothesis 2. 
 
5.7.3. Individual-Level Analyses 
 
5.7.3.1. Results of Analyses of the Influence of Experienced HPWS for Safety on Safety 
 knowledge/safety motivation (H3 – H4) 
The study posited that experienced HPWS for safety would positively relate to employees’ 
Safety knowledge (Hypothesis 3) and safety motivation (Hypothesis 4). The results in Table 
5.12 reveal that experienced HPWS for safety significantly related to employees’ safety 
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knowledge (𝛽 = 0.39, p < 0.01) and safety motivation (𝛽 = 0.11, p < 0.01), thereby providing 
support for Hypotheses 3 and 4.  
 
 
Table 5.12: Multilevel Path Analysis Results (Hypotheses 1- 4)   
Hypothesized Relationships Betas SE t-Value p Sig 
Use of HPWS for Safety → Safety Climate (H1) 0.65 0.05 13.55 0.00 S*** 
Safety-Specific Transformational Leadership (Control 
Variable) 
0.03 0.34 0.08 0.93 n.s. 
Bottom-Line Orientation (Control Variable) 0.15 0.56 0.26 0.79 n.s. 
Use of HPWS for Safety → Experienced HPWS for 
Safety (H2) 
0.11 0.05 2.04 0.04 S** 
      
Experienced HPWS for Safety → Safety Knowledge (H 3) 0.39 0.04 9.38 0.000 S*** 
Experienced HPWS for Safety → Safety Motivation (H4)  0.11 0.03 3.83 0.000 S*** 
Note: *** Significant at p < 0.01 (2-tailed), * significant at p < 0.05 (1-tailed) or P < 0.10 
(2-tailed). 
 
5.7.3.2. Results of Analyses of the Mediating Roles of Safety knowledge/safety 
 motivation on the Relationship between Experienced HPWS for Safety and 
 Safety Behaviours (H4a – H8b) 
 
It was hypothesized that HPWS for safety positively relates to safety compliance (Hypothesis 
4a) and safety initiative (Hypothesis 4b). As shown in Table 5.13, the findings show that 
HPWS for safety positively related to safety compliance (𝛽 = 0.29, p < 0.01) and safety 
initiative (𝛽 = 0.27, p < 0.01), thereby suggesting support for Hypotheses 4a and 4b.  
 
Hypothesis 5 posited that the relationship between safety knowledge and safety compliance 
will be stronger than the relationship between safety knowledge and safety initiative. As 
shown in Table 5.13, the findings indicate that the relationship between safety knowledge 
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and safety compliance (𝛽 = 0.47, p < 0.01) is stronger than the relationship between safety 
knowledge and safety initiative (𝛽 = 0.34, p < 0.01), suggesting support for Hypothesis 5. It 
was also predicted that safety knowledge positively relates to safety compliance (Hypothesis 
5a) and safety initiative (Hypothesis 5b). The findings suggest that safety knowledge 
significantly related to safety compliance (𝛽 = 0.47, p < 0.01) and safety initiative (𝛽 = 0.34, p 
< 0.01) indicating a support for Hypotheses 5a and 5b (See Table 5.13). 
 
 It was further hypothesized that the relationship between safety motivation and safety 
initiative will be stronger than the relationship between safety motivation and safety 
compliance (Hypothesis 6). The findings in Table 5.13 show that the relationship between 
safety motivation and safety initiative (𝛽 = 0.22, p < 0.01) is weaker than the relationship 
between safety motivation and safety compliance (𝛽 = 0.24, p < 0.01), indicating no support 
for Hypothesis 6. It was again hypothesized that safety motivation positively relates to safety 
compliance (Hypothesis 6a) and safety initiative (Hypothesis 6b). The results in Table 5.13 
reveal that safety motivation significantly related to safety compliance (𝛽 = o.24, p < 0.01) 
and safety initiative (𝛽 = 0.22, p < 0.01) thereby suggesting support for Hypotheses 6a and 
6b. 
 
The study posited that employees’ safety knowledge would mediate the positive relationship 
between experienced HPWS for safety and safety compliance (Hypothesis 7a) on one hand, 
and safety initiative (hypothesis 7b) on the other. In order to examine these hypotheses (i.e. 
7a & 7b), I tested a model of the indirect effects of experienced HPWS for safety on safety 
compliance and safety initiative via safety knowledge. The results of the model tested reveal 
that experienced HPWS for safety significantly influence safety compliance (𝛽 = 0.18, p < 
0.01) and safety initiative (𝛽 = 0.13, p < .0.01) via safety knowledge, suggesting support for 
the hypothesized mediating influence of safety knowledge on the relationship between 
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experienced HPWS for safety and the safety behaviours of safety compliance and safety 
initiative.  
 
It was further proposed that safety motivation would mediate the positive relationship 
between experienced HPWS for safety and employees’ safety compliance (Hypothesis 8a) 
on one hand and employees’ safety initiative (Hypothesis 8b) on the other. To assess these 
hypotheses, a model of the indirect influence of experienced HPWS for safety on safety 
compliance on one hand and on safety initiative on the other, via safety motivation was 
tested. As shown in Table 5.13, experienced HPWS for safety has statistically significant 
effects on safety compliance (𝛽 = 0.03, p < 0.01) and safety initiative (𝛽 = 0.02, p < 0.01) via 
safety motivation, providing a support for the prediction that safety motivation mediates the 
influence of experienced HPWS for safety on safety compliance and safety initiative. 
 
Table 5.13: Multilevel Path Analysis Results (Hypotheses 4a-8b) 
Hypothesized Relationships Betas SE t-Value p Sig 
HPWS for Safety → Safety Compliance (H4a) 0.29 0.04 6.72 0.000 S*** 
HPWS for Safety →Safety Initiative (H4b) 0.27 0.05 5.89 0.000 S*** 
Safety Knowledge → Safety Compliance (H5a) 0.47 0.06 7.73 0.000 S*** 
Safety Knowledge → Safety Initiative (H5b) 0.34 0.06 5.39 0.000 S*** 
Safety Motivation → Safety Compliance (H6a) 0.24 0.06 4.07 0.000 S*** 
Safety Motivation → Safety Initiative (H6b) 0.22 0.06 3.65 0.000 S*** 
      
Experienced HPWS for Safety → Safety knowledge → 
Safety Compliance (H7a)  
0.18 0.03 6.21 0.000 S*** 
Experienced HPWS for Safety → Safety knowledge → 
Safety Initiative (H7b)  
0.13 0.03 5.22 0.000 S*** 
Experienced HPWS for Safety → Safety Motivation → 
Safety Compliance (H8a)  
0.03 0.01 2.85 0.000 S*** 
Experienced HPWS for Safety → Safety Motivation → 
Safety Initiative (H8b)  
0.02 0.01 2.82 0.01 S*** 
Note: *** Significant at p < 0.01 (2-tailed) 
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5.7.3.3. Results of Analyses of the Relationship between Safety Behaviours and Safety 
 Outcomes (H9a – H10b) 
The study also predicted that safety compliance would negatively relate to safety-related 
events (Hypothesis 9a) and workplace injuries (Hypothesis 9b). As shown in Table 5.14, 
safety compliance has a significant negative relationship with safety-related events (𝛽 = -
0.16, p < 0.01) and workplace injuries (𝛽 = -0.13, p < 0.05), thus, providing support for 
Hypotheses 9a and 9b. It was further hypothesized that safety initiative would negatively 
predict safety-related events (Hypothesis 10a) and workplace injuries (Hypothesis 10b). The 
findings in Table 5.14 show that, whereas, safety initiative negatively and significantly relates 
to workplace injuries (𝛽 = -0.11, p > 0.05), it was not so with safety-related events (𝛽 = -0.09, 
p > 0.05). Thus, although safety initiative negatively relates to safety-related events, this 
relationship is not significant. Therefore, while Hypotheses 10a did not receive support, 
hypothesis 10b was supported.   
 
Table 5.14: Multilevel Path Analysis Results (Hypotheses 9a – 10b)  
Hypothesized Relationships Betas SE t-Value p Sig 
Safety Compliance → Safety-Related Events (H9a) -0.16 0.05 -3.02 0.00 S*** 
Safety Compliance → Workplace Injuries (H9b) -0.13 0.03 -3.80 0.03 S** 
Safety Initiative → Safety-Related Events (H10a)   -0.09 0.06 -1.40 0.16 n.s. 
Safety Initiative → Workplace Injuries (H10b) -0.11 0.04 -2.76 0.00 S** 
Note: *** Significant at p < 0.01 (2-tailed), ** Significant at p < 0.02 (2-tailed) 
 
5.7.3.4. Results of the Mediating Influence of Safety knowledge/Safety motivation and 
 Safety Behaviours on the Relationship between Experienced HPWS for Safety 
 and Safety Outcomes (H11 – H18) 
 
Hypotheses 11 and 12 predict that safety knowledge and safety compliance would mediate 
the negative relationship between experienced HPWS for safety and safety-related events 
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(Hypothesis 11) on one hand, and workplace injuries (Hypothesis 12) on the other. To 
assess these hypotheses, a model of the indirect effects of experienced HPWS for safety on 
safety-related events and workplace injuries through safety knowledge and safety 
compliance was tested. The results indicate that the model tested show that experienced 
HPWS for safety has a significant negative influence on safety-related events (𝛽 = -0.03, p < 
0.01) and workplace injuries (𝛽 = -0.02, p < 0.01) through safety knowledge and safety 
compliance, suggesting support for the Hypotheses 11 and 12. 
 
The study also hypothesized that safety knowledge and safety initiative would mediate the 
negative influences of experienced HPWS for safety on safety-related events (Hypothesis 
13) and workplace injuries (Hypothesis 14). As previously done, a model of the indirect 
influence of experienced HPWS for safety on safety-related events and workplace injuries via 
safety knowledge and safety initiative was tested. The results of the model tested indicate 
that, although experienced HPWS for safety negatively influences safety-related events (𝛽 = 
-0.01, p > 0.05) through safety knowledge and safety initiative, this relationship is not 
significant and therefore does not seem to have been mediated through safety knowledge 
and safety initiative (See Table 5.15). Thus, Hypothesis 13 did not receive support. With 
regard to the relationship between experienced HPWS for safety and workplace injuries 
through safety knowledge and safety initiative, the results of the model tested indicate that 
experienced HPWS for safety significantly influences workplace injuries (𝛽 = -0.01, p < 0.01), 
suggesting support for the hypothesis (Hypothesis 14) that safety knowledge and safety 
initiative mediate the relationship between experienced HPWS for safety and workplace 
injuries.  
 
To examine hypotheses 15 and 16 which suggest that the negative influences of 
experienced HPWS for safety on safety-related events (Hypothesis 15) and workplace 
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injuries (Hypothesis 16) would be mediated by both safety motivation and safety compliance, 
I tested a model of the indirect effects of experienced HPWS for safety on safety-related 
events and workplace injuries through safety motivation and safety compliance. The results 
of the model tested demonstrate that experienced HPWS for safety has a significant negative 
influence on both safety-related events (𝛽 = -0.00, p < 0.05) and workplace injuries (𝛽 = -
0.00, p < 0.05) through safety motivation and safety compliance, indicating support for the 
hypotheses that safety motivation and safety compliance jointly mediate the relationship 
between experienced HPWS for safety and both safety-related events (Hypothesis 15) and 
workplace injuries (Hypothesis 16). 
 
Hypotheses 17 and 18 posit that safety motivation and safety initiative would jointly mediate 
the negative relationship between experienced HPWS for safety and safety-related events 
(Hypothesis 17) on one hand, and workplace injuries (Hypothesis 18) on the other. As was 
the case with the previous analyses, a model of the indirect effects of experienced HPWS for 
safety on safety-related events and workplace injuries through safety motivation and safety 
initiative was tested. The result of the model tested indicates that, whereas experienced 
HPWS for safety negatively affects safety-related events (𝛽 = -0.00, p > 0.05), this 
relationship is not significant and therefore does not appear to have been mediated through 
safety motivation and safety initiative. In the same vein, the findings demonstrate that, 
although experienced HPWS for safety negatively affect workplace injuries (𝛽 = -0.00, p > 
0.05), this relationship is not significant, thus, suggesting lack of mediation by safety 
motivation and safety initiative. The results of the foregoing analyses indicate no support for 
Hypotheses 17and 18 (See Table 5.15). 
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Table 5.15: Multilevel Path Analysis Results (Hypotheses 11 - 18) 
Hypothesized Relationships Betas SE t-Value p Sig 
Experienced HPWS for Safety → Safety Knowledge → 
Safety Compliance→ Safety-Related Events (H11)    
-0.03 0.01 -2.64 0.01 S*** 
      
Experienced HPWS for Safety → Safety Knowledge → 
Safety Compliance→ Workplace Injuries (H12)    
-0.02 0.00 -3.71 0.00 S*** 
      
Experienced HPWS for Safety → Safety Knowledge → 
Safety Initiative→ Safety-Related Events (H13) 
-0.01 0.00 -1.37 0.17 n.s. 
      
Experienced HPWS for Safety → Safety Knowledge → 
Safety Initiative→ workplace injuries (H14) 
-0.01 0.01 -2.36 0.02 S** 
      
Experienced HPWS for Safety → Safety Motivation → 
Safety Compliance→ Safety-Related Events (H15)      
-0.00 0.00 -1.97 0.05 S** 
      
Experienced HPWS for Safety → Safety Motivation → 
Safety Compliance→ Workplace Injuries (H16)        
-0.00 0.00 -2.20 0.03 S** 
      
Experienced HPWS for Safety → Safety Motivation → 
Safety Initiative → Safety-Related Events (H17) 
-0.00 0.00 -1.30 0.20 n.s. 
      
Experienced HPWS for Safety → Safety Motivation → 
Safety Initiative → Workplace Injuries (H18) 
-0.00 0.00 -1.91 0.06 n.s. 
*** Significant at 𝒑 < 0.01 (2 − 𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑑) 
 
5.7.4. Moderated Analyses (H19a– H20b) 
I now turn to the moderation hypotheses. Unit-level safety climate was hypothesized to 
moderate the effects of safety knowledge on safety compliance (Hypothesis 19a) and safety 
initiative (Hypothesis 19b). The results in Table 5.16 show that safety climate significantly 
moderated the effects of safety knowledge on safety compliance (t = -2.321, P < 0.05) but 
not safety initiative (t = 0.501, p > 0.05). Thus, Hypothesis 19a is supported while Hypothesis 
19b is not supported. 
 
Unit-level safety climate was also hypothesized to moderate the influence of safety 
motivation on safety compliance (Hypothesis 20a) and safety initiative (Hypothesis 20b). The 
results in Table 5.16 reveal that, while the cross-level interaction effect between unit-level 
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safety climate and safety motivation on safety compliance was partially significant (t = -1.743, 
p < 0.10), thecross-level interaction effect between unit-level safety climate and safety 
motivation on safety initiative was not significant (t = 1.352, p > 0.10), indicating partial 
support for Hypothesis 20a and no support for Hypotheses 20b.  Figures 5.3, displays the 
interaction plot for this result. This figure indicates that employees who expressed greater 
safety knowledge of their jobs and who are high in safety climate shared perceptions 
demonstrate higher levels of compliance with safety rules and procedures. Conversely, 
employees who are low in safety climate shared perceptions demonstrate less compliance 
with rules and procedures  
 
 
Figure 5.2: Moderation Effects of Safety Knowledge x Unit-Level Safety Climate → 
 Safety Compliance 
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Table 5.16:  Cross-Level Interaction Effect 
Hypothesized Path Betas SE t-Value p Sig 
Safety Knowledge × Safety Climate → Safety Compliance 
(H19a) 
-0.228 0.098 -2.321** 0.020 S** 
Safety Knowledge × Safety Climate → Safety Initiative 
(H19b) 
0.053 0.106 0.501 0.617 N.S. 
Safety Motivation × Safety Climate → Safety Compliance 
(H20a) 
-0.254 0.146 -1.743 0.081 S* 
Safety Motivation × Safety Climate → Safety Initiative 
(H20b) 
0.213 0.157 1.352 0.176 N.S. 
**𝒑 < 0.05 (𝟐 − 𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅); *𝒑 < 0.10 (𝟐 − 𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒅) 
 
5.7.5. Moderated Mediation Analysis 
The next is the moderated mediation hypotheses. The unit-level safety climate was 
hypothesized to interact with safety knowledge to affect both safety-related events 
(Hypothesis 21a) and workplace injuries (Hypothesis 21b) via safety compliance. I also 
hypothesized that unit-level safety climate interact with safety knowledge to affect both 
safety-related events (Hypothesis 21c) and workplace injuries (Hypothesis 21d) via safety 
initiative. In addition, it was hypothesized that unit-level safety climate interact with safety 
motivation to affect safety-related events (Hypothesis 22a) and workplace injuries 
(Hypothesis 22b) via safety compliance. Furthermore, I hypothesized that unit-level safety 
climate interact with safety motivation to affect both safety-related events (Hypothesis 22c) 
and workplace injuries (Hypothesis 22d) via safety initiative. The results of these analyses 
(See Table 5.17) suggest that safety compliance and safety initiative did not mediate the 
relationship between the interaction of safety knowledge/safety motivation and unit-level 
safety climate on safety outcomes of safety-related events and workplace injuries. Therefore, 
Hypotheses 21a to 22d are not supported. 
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Table 5.17: Moderated Mediation Effect 
Safety knowledge x safety climate →safety compliance → safety-
related events (H21a) 
Betas SE t-Value P 
Safety Climate low (= 3.47; -1SD) -0.019 0.074 -0.252 0.801 
Safety climate high (= 4.46; +1SD) -0.015 0.069 -0.210 0.834 
Moderated Mediation 0.004 0.006 0.759 0.448 
Safety knowledge x safety climate → safety compliance → 
workplace injuries (H21b) 
Betas SE t-Value P 
Safety Climate low (= 3.47; -1SD) -0.007 0.017 -0.412 0.680 
Safety climate high (= 4.46; +1SD) -0.005 0.013 -0.382 0.702 
Moderated Mediation 0.002 0.004 0.493 0.622 
Safety knowledge x safety climate → safety initiative → safety-
related events (H21c) 
Betas SE t-Value P 
Safety climate low (= 3.47; -1SD) -0.011 0.007 -1.464 0.143 
Safety climate high (= 4.46; +1SD) -0.013 0.011 -1.253 0.210 
Moderated mediation -0.002 0.004 -0.596 0.551 
Safety knowledge x safety climate → safety initiative → workplace 
injuries (H21d) 
Betas SE t-Value P 
Safety climate low (= 3.47; -1SD) -0.007 0.004 -1.755 0.079 
Safety climate high (= 4.46; +1SD) -0.008 0.005 -1.598 0.110 
Moderated Mediation -0.001 0.002 -0.580 0.562 
Safety motivation x safety climate → safety compliance → safety-
related events (H22a) 
Betas SE t-Value P 
Safety climate low (= 3.47; -1SD) -0.009 0.007 -1.226 0.220 
Safety climate high (= 4.46; +1SD) -0.010 0.009 -1.135 0.256 
Moderated Mediation -0.001 0.002 -0.590 0.555 
Safety motivation x safety climate → safety compliance → 
workplace injuries (H22b) 
Betas SE t-Value P 
Safety climate low (= 3.47; -1SD) -0.004 0.088 -0.051 0.960 
Safety climate high (= 4.46; +1SD) -0.004 0.105 -0.040 0.968 
Moderated Mediation 0.000 0.017 0.017 0.986 
Safety motivation x safety climate → safety initiative → safety-
related events (H22c) 
Betas SE t-Value P 
Safety climate low (= 3.47; -1SD) -0.001 0.001 -0.902 0.367 
Safety climate high (= 4.46; +1SD) -0.002 0.003 -0.803 0.422 
Moderated Mediation -0.001 0.002 -0.690 0.490 
Safety motivation x safety climate → safety initiative → safety-
related events (H22d) 
Betas SE t-Value P 
Safety climate low (= 3.47; -1SD) -0.001 0.001 -1.174 0.241 
Safety climate high (= 4.46; +1SD) -0.001 0.001 -1.123 0.261 
Moderated Mediation -0.001 0.001 -0.910 0.363 
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5.8. Summary of Findings 
Table 5.18 presents the summary of findings of the test of unit- and individual level 
 hypotheses 
HYPOTHESIZED RELATIONSHIPS TYPE OF MEDIATION 
HYPOTHESIZED 
SUPPORTED/NOT 
SUPPORTED 
Use of HPWS for Safety → Safety Climate (H1 NA Supported 
Use of HPWS for Safety → Experienced HPWS for 
Safety (H2) 
NA Supported 
Experienced HPWS for Safety → Safety Knowledge (H 
3) 
NA Supported 
Experienced HPWS for Safety → Safety Motivation 
(H4) 
NA Supported 
   
Experienced HPWS for Safety → Safety Compliance 
(H4a) 
NA Supported 
Experienced HPWS for Safety → Safety Initiative 
(H4b) 
NA Supported 
   
Experienced HPWS for Safety → Safety Compliance 
(H4a) 
NA Supported 
Experienced HPWS for Safety → Safety Initiative 
(H4b) 
NA Supported 
   
Safety Knowledge → Safety Compliance (H5a) NA Supported 
Safety Knowledge → Safety Initiative (H5b) NA Supported 
   
Safety Motivation → Safety Compliance (H6a) NA Supported 
Safety Motivation → Safety Initiative (H6b) NA Supported 
   
Experienced HPWS for Safety → Safety knowledge → 
Safety Compliance (H7a) 
Mediation Supported 
Experienced HPWS for Safety → Safety knowledge → 
Safety Initiative (H7b) 
 Mediation Supported 
Experienced HPWS for Safety → Safety Motivation → 
Safety Compliance (H8a) 
Mediation Supported 
Experienced HPWS for Safety → Safety Motivation → 
Safety Initiative (H8b) 
Mediation Supported  
   
Safety Compliance → Safety-Related Events (H9a NA Supported 
Safety Compliance → Workplace Injuries (H9b NA Supported 
Safety Initiative → Safety-Related Events (H10a)   NA Not Supported 
Safety Initiative → Workplace Injuries (H10b) NA Supported 
   
Experienced HPWS for Safety → Safety Knowledge → 
Safety Compliance→ Safety-Related Events (H11)    
Mediation Supported 
Experienced HPWS for Safety → Safety Knowledge → 
Safety Compliance→ Workplace Injuries (H112)    
 Mediation Supported 
Experienced HPWS for Safety → Safety Knowledge → 
Safety Initiative→ Safety-Related Events (H13) 
Mediation Not Supported (No 
mediation) 
Experienced HPWS for Safety → Safety Knowledge → 
Safety Initiative→ workplace injuries (H14) 
Mediation Supported  
Experienced HPWS for Safety → Safety Motivation → 
Safety Compliance→ Safety-Related Events (H15)      
 Mediation Supported  
Experienced HPWS for Safety → Safety Motivation → 
Safety Compliance→ Workplace Injuries (H16)        
Mediation Supported 
Experienced HPWS for Safety → Safety Motivation → 
Safety Initiative → Safety-Related Events (H17) 
Mediation Not Supported (No 
mediation) 
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Experienced HPWS for Safety → Safety Motivation → 
Safety Initiative → Workplace Injuries (H18)  
Mediation Not Supported (No 
mediation) 
 
Table 5:19: Summary of Findings of the Test of Moderation Hypotheses 
HYPOTHESIZED RELATIONSHIPS MODERATION SUPPORTED/NOT 
SUPPORTED 
Safety Knowledge X Safety Climate → Safety Compliance 
(H19a) 
Moderation Supported 
Safety Knowledge x Safety Climate → Safety Initiative 
(H19b) 
Moderation Not Supported 
Safety Motivation X Safety Climate → Safety Compliance 
(H20a) 
Moderation Partially Supported 
Safety Motivation X Safety Climate → Safety Initiative 
(H20b) 
 
Moderation Not Supported 
 
 
Table 5:20: Summary of Findings of the Test of Moderated Mediation Hypotheses 
HYPOTHESIZED 
RELATIONSHIPS 
MODERATEDMEDIATION SUPPORTED/NOT SUPPORTED 
Safety Knowledge X Safety Climate 
→ Safety Compliance → Safety-
related Events (H21a) 
Mod-Med Not Supported 
Safety Knowledge X Safety Climate 
→ Safety Compliance → Workplace 
Injuries (H21b) 
Mod-Med Not Supported 
Safety Knowledge x Safety Climate 
→ Safety Initiative → Safety-related 
Events (H21c) 
Mod-Med Not Supported 
Safety Knowledge x Safety Climate 
→ Safety Initiative → Workplace 
Injuries (H21d) 
Mod-Med Not Supported 
Safety Motivation X Safety Climate 
→ Safety Compliance → Safety-
related Events (H22a) 
Mod-Med Not Supported 
Safety Motivation X Safety Climate 
→ Safety Compliance → Workplace 
Injuries (H22b) 
Mod-Med Not Supported 
Safety Motivation X Safety Climate 
→ Safety Initiative → Safety-related 
Events (H22c) 
Mod-Med Not Supported 
Safety Motivation X Safety Climate 
→ Safety Initiative → Workplace 
Injuries (H22d) 
Mod-Med Not Supported 
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Unit-Level 
 
 
Individual-Level 
Figure 5:3: Pattern of Hypothesized Relationships 
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5.9. Conclusion 
In chapter 5, I further validated the new HPWS for safety scale by conducting more 
exploratory factor analysis (EFA), reliability coefficient analysis, convergent and discriminant 
validity analysis, and series of confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) using another independent 
sample of 64 managers and 569 frontline employees. Finally, all the hypothesized models 
were tested using Mplus software and then the findings were accordingly summarized. In the 
next chapter, I present the summary of the key findings of the study, the implications of the 
findings, and directions for future research. 
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6.0. CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION 
6.1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate the research series presented in this study, starting 
with the process of scale development and validation that involves three separate studies, 
and the main study (Study 4). In doing so, I have made attempt to identify the salient findings 
of these studies and their theoretical as well as practical implications or contributions. I also 
highlighted, in this chapter, the methodological contributions or strengths as well as the 
limitations of the study, mapping out some possible future research directions. However, 
before then, I have here presented the summary of the thesis. 
 
6.2. Summary of the Thesis 
The purpose of this study is to build on the existing research to develop and validate a 
theoretically informed measure of HPWS for safety and to propose and test a multilevel 
model of the mechanisms through which the use of HPWS for safety influence employee 
safety outcomes. To achieve these objectives, I carried out four independent studies. Studies 
1 to 3 aimed to develop and validate a safety-specific HPWS scale while Study 4, though 
further used to validate the scale, primarily aimed to examine the multilevel model of the 
mechanisms through which HPWS for safety facilitates safety outcomes of safety-related 
events and workplace injuries. 
 
Drawing on AMO framework, I developed and validated a theoretically driven, internally 
coherent and integrative measure of a system of HR and safety practices (i.e. HPWS for 
safety). Safety outcomes such as injuries and accidents are variables that include individual, 
unit, and even organizational considerations as antecedents (e.g. Neal & Griffin, 2006; 
Probst, 2004; Simard & Marchand, 1994). Drawing on SET and SIP, I examined experienced 
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HPWS for safety and unit safety climate as distal antecedents of safety outcomes of safety-
related events and workplace injuries, with safety knowledge/safety motivation and safety 
behaviours of safety compliance and safety initiative operating as mediating mechanisms. By 
testing a multilevel mediation model at the individual-level of analysis, I found experienced 
HPWS for safety (an individual-level distal antecedent) to indirectly predict safety-related 
events and workplace injuries through safety knowledge and safety compliance. And 
although experienced HPWS for safety predicted workplace injuries through safety 
knowledge and safety initiative, it was not so for safety-related events. Furthermore, the 
individual-level antecedent (i.e. experienced HPWS for safety) was found to predict safety-
related events and workplace injuries via safety motivation and safety compliance (a chain 
mediation process), but not so via safety motivation and safety initiative. In addition, and in 
line with SIP and SET, safety knowledge and unit safety climate interacted to enhance safety 
compliance. The use of HPWS for safety was also found to significantly predict unit safety 
climate and employee experienced HPWS for safety. 
 
6.3. Summary of Key Findings 
6.3.1. Psychometric Properties of the HPWS for Safety Scale 
To develop and validate a HPWS for safety scale, this study utilized four separate samples 
from four studies. In Study 1, I conducted a qualitative interview with a number of HR and 
Safety professionals drawn from oil and gas companies in Nigeria. The interviews confirmed 
eight (8) a priori content practices (and forty items) of HRM consisting of safety training, 
safety rewards, internal opportunity for promotion, safety involvement and participation, 
performance appraisals, self-managed team, safety information sharing, and clear job 
descriptions. However, six (6) additional HRM practices (and 24 items) that are used to 
promote safety in the Nigerian oil and gas companies were identified. These include safety 
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audit, safety campaign, safety equipment maintenance, accident prevention, total loss control 
community, and safety initiative. These fourteen (14) HRM practices and sixty-four items 
were subjected to eleven doctoral researchers in Aston Business School for classification 
and subsequently, to interrater reliability assessment in order to refine the items for 
subsequent validation purposes. In Studies 2, 3, and 4, I validated the scale using EFA and 
CFA, and subsequently, through convergent, discriminant, and criterion-related validity in 
order to reduce the length and confirm the factor structure of the scale. In all, the scale 
emerged in a robust and reliable ten practices and 27-item HPWS for safety scale. 
Therefore, the findings provide evidence of good psychometric properties of the newly 
developed HPWS for safety scale. Specifically, the findings supported the reliability as well 
as the convergent, discriminant, and criterion-related validities of the new scale (See 
Appendix J). 
 
6.3.2. Unit-Level Findings 
Only one hypothesis was tested at this level. Specifically, I hypothesized that the use of 
HPWS for safety directly relates to unit-level safety climate. The result was found to be 
significant. This finding has further enhanced our understanding of the significant role of 
HPWS as a proximal antecedent of unit safety climate. It helps to enhance SHRM literature 
by establishing the mechanism by which HRM and unit safety climate interrelate (See Bowen 
& Ostroff, 2004).  
 
6.3.3. Cross- and Individual-Level Findings 
As earlier stated, to examine the relationships at the individual-level of analysis, I adapted 
Preacher and colleagues (2010) approach and tested a path model specifying indirect effects 
of experienced HPWS for safety on safety outcomes of safety-related events and workplace 
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injuries through safety knowledge/safety motivation and safety behaviours of safety 
compliance and safety initiative (x → m1 → m2 → y) while simultaneously taking into 
cognizance direct effects and the nesting of individuals within the units (i.e. the inclusion of 
random intercepts and slopes: Wallace & colleagues, 2016). In addition, I included sex, age, 
level of education, and tenure on the job as control variables. 
 
First, controlling for sex and education, the use of HPWS for safety showed a significant 
effect on experienced HPWS for safety. Second, experienced HPWS for safety significantly 
influenced employees’ safety knowledge and safety motivation. Third, experienced HPWS for 
safety significantly related to the safety behaviours of safety compliance and safety initiative. 
Fourth, the relationship between safety knowledge and safety compliance is stronger than 
the relationship between safety knowledge and safety initiative, whereas, the relationship 
between safety motivation and safety initiative is weaker than the relationship between safety 
motivation and safety compliance. Fifth, safety knowledge was found to mediate the 
influence of HPWS for safety on both safety compliance and safety initiative. Similarly, safety 
motivation was found to mediate the influence of HPWS for safety on safety compliance and 
safety initiative. Sixth, safety knowledge and safety compliance jointly (i.e. in a chain) 
mediated the relationship between experienced HPWS for safety and both safety-related 
events and workplace injuries. In the same vein, although there seems to be no significant 
relationship between safety initiative and workplace injuries, safety knowledge and safety 
initiative jointly (i.e. in a chain) mediated the relationship between experienced HPWS for 
safety and employees’ workplace injuries. This finding is contrary to “conventional wisdom” 
(Hayes, 2013, p. 88) where it was suggested that, for mediation to be established, x must be 
related to y, m1, and m2; m1 and m2 must be related; and m1 and m2 must be related to y 
(See x → m1 → m2 → y mediation chain) (Baron & Kenny, 1986). However, research has 
shown that “lack of correlation does not disprove causation” and “correlation is neither a 
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necessary nor a sufficient condition of causality” (Bollen, 1989, p. 52: cited in Hayes, 2013, p. 
88). Seventh, safety motivation and safety compliance jointly mediated the relationship 
between experienced HPWS for safety and both safety-related events and workplace injuries 
(See Table 5.17). Lastly, unit safety climate significantly moderated the effect of safety 
knowledge on safety compliance. 
 
6.4. Theoretical Implications/Contributions 
The findings of this study mostly supported my theoretical framework and offer several 
implications for SHRM and safety research. In this section, therefore, I provide a general 
overview of the five specific theoretical contributions of the study. 
 
6.4.1. Scale Development and Validation 
The first significant contribution made by this research is the development and validation of 
HPWS for safety scale. Whereas there is research examining individual HRM practices-
workplace safety relationships (e.g. Lauver, 2007; Harvey & colleagues, 2001), with the 
exception of Zacharatos and colleagues (2005), Evans and Davis (2015), there is a paucity 
of research that has examined how these practices synergistically combine to impact 
workplace safety either at the organizational, individual or both levels of analysis. Many 
studies have used HPWS scales that were neither validated (See Liao & colleagues, 2009; 
Zacharatos & colleagues, 2005 for exception) nor strategically focused (Bowen & Ostroff, 
2004). Consequently, this study fills this gap in SHRM and safety research by developing 
and validating a theoretically driven, internally coherent and integrative measure of a system 
of HR and safety practices (i.e. HPWS for safety). This measure which was informed by 
AMO framework (Boxall & Macky, 2009; Wood & Wall, 2007; Lepak & colleagues, 2006; 
Purcell, Kinnie, Hutchinson, Rayton, & Swart, 2003; Appelbaum & colleagues., 2000) covers 
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ten HR safety practices domain: safety training, safety rewards, internal opportunity for 
promotion, safety involvement and participation, self-managed team, performance 
appraisals, safety information sharing, safety audit, safety campaign, and safety equipment 
maintenance. It is expected that this will enhance theoretical approach in three ways: (i) 
speak to Delaney and Huselid’s (1996) concern that the SHRM literature “is distinguished by 
the fact that virtually no two studies measure HRM practices in the same way” (p. 967), (ii) 
address the absence of a theoretically informed measure of high performance human 
resource practices (Delery, 1998) in safety context, and (iii) achieving the need for a 
strategically-focused HPWS which is related to but goes beyond the motivation for Delaney 
and Huselid’s call. 
 
6.4.2. Multilevel Approach 
This study contributes to SHRM and safety research by adopting a multilevel perspective to 
account for the influence of HPWS on workplace safety. Multilevel research designs have the 
potential to bridge the gap between the previously and popularly known research tradition of 
SHRM that emphasizes organizational level analysis of the system of HRM and performance 
outcomes and micro level organizational behaviour that focuses on individuals’ attitudinal 
and behavioural responses (Snape & Redman, 2010). Again, since HRM practices are 
essentially unit-level management interventions that must transmit to organizational level or 
individual level outcomes through their effects on individuals’ attitudes and behaviours 
(Snape & Redman, 2010), multilevel research designs have the potentials to open the “black 
box” of HRM – performance relationships. In addition, research has recognized that 
organizations do not perform but rather that the performance of individual employees 
enables organizations to achieve their goals (Kozlowski & Klein, 2000), leading to a focus on 
individual-level performance implications of HPWS (Kehoe & Wright, 2013; Snape & 
Redman, 2010; Liao & colleagues, 2009). Drawing on the above, SHRM research (e.g. 
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Paauwe, 2009; Gerhart, 2005; Bowen & Ostroff, 2004) has called for more multilevel studies. 
For example, Bowen and Ostroff (2004) suggest that SHRM researchers should move closer 
to the individual level by emphasizing HRM’s influence on employee attributes. Although 
SHRM researchers have begun to address this issue (e.g. Aryee & colleagues, 2012; 
Takeuchi & colleagues; Wu & Chaturvedi, 2009), the extant literature has yielded only limited 
insights into the influence of the use of HPWS on employee performance outcomes in the 
safety context. In this study, I have examined simultaneously the impact and influence 
processes of unit safety-specific HPWS (i.e. use of HPWS for safety) on employee safety 
outcomes. I have demonstrated that unit-level HPWS for safety practices have an effect on 
employee safety outcomes of safety-related events and workplace injuries through employee 
experienced HPWS for safety, safety knowledge/safety motivation, and safety behaviours of 
safety compliance and safety initiative. Specifically, the findings of this study indicates that 
the use of HPWS for safety is significantly related to experienced HPWS for safety. 
Specifically, this study integrated safety knowledge and safety motivation perspectives to 
examine the mediating mechanism of the relationships between experienced HPWS for 
safety and safety behaviours of safety compliance and safety initiative. Although prior studies 
have separately examined the influence of human capital (knowledge) (e.g. Jiang & 
colleagues, 2015; Jiang & colleagues, 2012; Takeuchi & colleagues, 2007) and employee 
empowerment (motivation) (e.g. Aryee & colleagues, 2012), research integrating the two 
perspectives to examine their simultaneous influence on the relationship between 
experienced HPWS for safety and safety behaviours is scant. Because the two perspectives 
represent different elements of organizational success, I theoretically combined them to 
provide a more complete understanding of their role in mediating the impacts of experienced 
HPWS for safety on safety behaviours of safety compliance and safety initiative. In doing so, 
I have extended prior studies by demonstrating the simultaneous mediating roles of safety 
knowledge and safety motivation. This finding suggest that safety knowledge and safety 
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motivation are important proximal antecedents of safety behaviours of safety compliance and 
safety initiative and may contribute to organizational effectiveness in several aspects. The 
findings also indicate that experienced HPWS for safety has significant direct positive effect 
on safety knowledge and safety motivation. In addition, the findings show that experienced 
HPWS for safety is significantly and negatively related to both safety-related events and 
workplace injuries through the mediating role of safety knowledge and safety compliance. 
Furthermore, the findings indicate that safety knowledge and safety initiative significantly 
mediated the negative influence of experienced HPWS for safety on workplace injuries. 
Again, the results have shown that safety motivation and safety compliance significantly 
mediated the negative effects of experienced HPWS for safety on both safety-related events 
and workplace injuries. 
 
Although prior research, linking HPWS to workplace safety (e.g. Zacharatos & colleagues, 
2005), has shown experienced HPWS as a distal predictor of personal safety orientation 
(described in terms of safety knowledge, safety motivation, safety compliance, and safety 
initiative) through trust in management and safety climate, the cross-level influence of the 
use of HPWS for safety on Experienced HPWS for safety, the integration of safety 
knowledge/safety motivation as mediators between experienced HPWS for safety and safety 
behaviours, and positing safety behaviours as proximal antecedents of safety outcomes, 
using a multilevel perspective, is a fundamental extension of prior work to help explain the 
processes of how they operate in unism to facilitate safety outcomes. Thus, it can be argued 
that the present study is among the earliest to examine the potential mediating role of safety 
knowledge/safety motivation and safety behaviours in terms of safety compliance and safety 
initiative, in the relationship between HPWS (for safety) and employee safety outcomes (e.g. 
safety-related events and workplace injuries). The results demonstrate that when employees 
perceive that the unit recognizes their contributions toward the organization and demonstrate 
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concern for their safety and well-being through the implementation of HPWS for safety 
practices, SET demands that they will more likely reciprocate by engaging in positive safety 
attitudes and safety behaviours which, in turn, engender positive safety outcomes. These 
findings add to the growing literature on the specific mechanisms through which HPWS 
contribute to performance and further shed light on the specific process in the safety context. 
This study has also moved beyond the demonstration of the main effects of HRM practices to 
an examination of how (Datta & colleagues, 2005) and why high performance HR practices 
are related to organizational performance (Collins & Smith, 2006), in this case, in safety 
context. 
 
The findings further demonstrate how integration between micro and macro HRM can further 
our understanding of how SHRM constructs work and impact outcomes across different 
levels of analysis (Wright & Boswell 2002), thereby validating Gerhart’s (2005) and Bowen 
and Ostroff’s (2004) call that SHRM should move closer to the individual by emphasizing the 
impact of HR practices on employee attributes. 
 
These findings linking HPWS for safety and individual safety outcomes has significant 
implication for SHRM literature that has hitherto focused on productivity to the neglect of 
workplace safety. It shows that performance can be measured in a number of ways and that 
HPWS can have positive effects on a variety of outcomes including safety outcomes. This is 
consistent with Zacharatos and colleagues (2005) who argue that HPWS could be applied to 
improve workplace safety “just as well as firm economic performance” (p. 78). It also 
resonates with the argument that safety should be regarded as a performance variable just 
like production, profits, sales, customer services and quality control (Kivimaki, Kalimo, & 
Salminen, 1995; Griffiths, 1985), suggesting that many of the management practices that are 
 
 
  
 
230 
 
frequently applied to improve organizational performance may have equal or greater effects 
on workplace injuries (Kaminski, 2001). 
 
6.4.3. Direct Relationship between Use of HPWS for Safety and Unit Safety 
 Climate 
The findings of this study have further enhanced our understanding of the significant role of 
HPWS as a proximal antecedent of unit safety climate. Although the relationship between 
HRM and climate is well established in SHRM literature, the mechanisms by which they 
interrelate are poorly understood (Bowen & Ostroff, 2004). For instance, Boxall (1996) notes 
that knowledge of HRM practices is widespread, but knowledge of how to refine and 
implement them within a particular context (e.g. a particular strategic focus like workplace 
safety) may be lacking. Applying this to climate, Schneider (2000) observes that there is little 
research or understanding of how organizational climate actually develops. Similarly, the 
effects of HRM and safety-related policies and practices on safety climate have been 
documented as significant contributors to organization-level safety climate (Neal and Griffin, 
2004). Extant safety literature (e.g. Jiang & colleagues, 2010; Clarke, 2006; Zacharatos & 
colleagues, 2005; Zohar & Luria, 2003; Barling & colleagues, 2001; Neal & colleagues, 2000; 
Zohar, 2000) also demonstrates that safety climate is related to safety-related variables such 
as safety knowledge and safety motivation and safety behaviours such as safety compliance 
and safety initiative. However, what is not well known are the proximal organizational factors 
that create positive safety climate and the mechanisms by which those factors and climate 
for something interrelate. This is consistent with Bowen and Ostroff (2004) who opine that 
intuitive acceptance of an HRM-climate linkage far exceeds theory development of the 
mechanisms responsible. The finding of this study reveal that the use of HPWS for safety is 
significantly related to unit-level safety climate. This study extends the organizational climate 
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literature in general and the research of safety climate in particular by examining how safety-
specific HRM practices synergistically work together to influence safety climate. It adds to the 
limited research that has examined HRM practices as proximal antecedents of safety climate 
(Zacharatos & colleagues, 2005). Thus, finding the direct relationship between HPWS for 
safety and unit safety climate provides an important empirical support for the notion that 
climates are formed largely based on organizational practices and procedures, and 
accordingly adds and extends the research that redresses the dearth of research that 
examines antecedents of climate (Takeuchi & colleagues, 2009; Ostroff & colleagues, 2003). 
These findings are consistent with Zacharatos and colleagues (2005) who contend that many 
of the practices associated with HPWS are hypothesized to result in an individual’s positive 
perceptions of safety climate. For instance, when management is seen to offer extensive 
safety training or rewards contingent on safety performance because it is committed to 
employees’ safety, rather than simply complying with government regulations or pressure 
from the union, perceived safety climate is fostered. 
 
6.4.4. Joint Effects of Unit Safety Climate and Safety Knowledge/Safety 
 Motivation on Safety Behaviours/Safety Outcomes 
The current study is one of the first attempts to empirically indicate the joint effects of safety 
knowledge/safety motivation and unit safety climate on either safety behaviours or safety 
outcomes (i.e. safety-related events and workplace injuries) and to incorporate an 
explanatory mechanism for these effects. This study did not only adopt an integrative, 
multilevel approach with all its attendant advantages over prior studies (e.g. Zacharatos & 
colleagues, 2005), it also extends prior theory and research on SET (Blau, 1964) and SIP 
(Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978) by providing insights into how employees would respond positively 
within implied obligations to perceived employers’ priority for meeting their obligations, 
treating employees fairly, and providing valued services and benefits (SET). This study 
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contends that the mediating role of safety knowledge/safety motivation and safety behaviours 
in the relationship between HPWS for safety and both safety-related events and workplace 
injuries demonstrates a relational view of employment relationship, with employees 
reciprocating the favourable treatment received from the unit. This study also contends that 
the use of HPWS for safety serves as a signalling function by communicating messages to 
employees concerning a particular strategic focus (i.e. workplace safety). This explanation is 
based on SIP that suggests that individual employees who work in a shared social 
environment will receive similar social cues or normative expectations about appropriate 
safety behaviours. The results of this study support that workplace climate high in employee 
safety and well-being enhances employee safety knowledge to comply with safety policies 
and procedures (Neal & Griffin, 2006; Brown & Leigh, 1996). This facilitates safety 
behaviours. Thus, this study has provided a more comprehensive understanding of how 
employee safety knowledge interact with unit safety climate to foster employee safety 
behaviours. 
 
6.4.5. Further Conceptualization of Safety Behaviours and Safety Outcomes 
Because different authors have interchangeably used the terms safety behaviours and safety 
outcomes in research, I have, in this research, clarified the definitions and conceptualization 
of safety behaviours and safety outcomes. For example, safety performance has been used 
to refer to two different concepts. First, and as earlier noted, it has been defined as a metric 
for safety-related behaviours of individuals (e.g. Clarke, 2006; Zacharatos & colleagues, 
2005; Neal & Griffin, 2004; Burke & colleagues, 2002; Marchand & colleagues, 1998). It has 
also been described as an organizational metric for safety outcomes, such as number of 
injuries per year (e.g. Zacharatos & colleagues, 2005). Thus, it is essential to distinguish 
safety-related performance/behaviours from safety outcomes of those behaviours because, 
as Christian and colleagues (2009) observe, each of them might have differential pattern of 
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relationships with antecedents. Emphasizing on the need to differentiate between safety 
behaviours and safety outcomes, Christian and colleagues (2009) note that when safety 
performance is conceptualized as individual behaviours, it provides researchers with a 
measurable criterion that is more proximally related to psychological factors than safety 
outcomes such as accidents or injuries. In the same vein, Zohar (2000) argues that safety 
behaviours are better predicted than safety outcomes. Thus, to distinguish between the 
constructs in this study, I conceptualize safety behaviours as actions or behaviours 
individuals demonstrate that promote health and safety in the workplace (e.g. safety 
compliance, safety participation, safety initiative, safety-specific organizational citizenship 
behaviours, safety-specific creativity, etc.). Similarly, I conceptualize safety outcomes as 
tangible events or results such as workplace injuries, accidents, fatalities, safety-related 
events, etc. By clarifying the definitions and conceptualizations of safety behaviours and 
safety outcomes, this study enhances our understanding of how to promote workplace 
safety.  It also extends the extant safety literature by responding to the clarion call (See 
Christian & colleagues, 2009) to distinguish between safety behaviours and safety outcomes. 
Thus, the delineation of the two constructs is a critical step to facilitate not only the 
organization of accumulated knowledge, but also the development of theory in the safety 
domain (Christian & colleagues, 2009).  
 
As earlier noted, the final linkage between safety performance as behaviour and safety 
outcomes (e.g. Neal & colleagues, 2000; Griffin & Neal, 2000; Sigmard & Marchand, 1995) 
constitutes another issue that is often overlooked in safety literature. Rarely have the two 
been examined in the same study. In this study, I have examined the effects of the safety 
behaviours of safety compliance and safety initiative on safety outcomes of safety-related 
events and workplace injuries. The finding reveals safety compliance to be significantly 
related to both safety-specific events and workplace injuries. The finding also reveals safety 
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initiative to be significantly related to workplace injuries. HPWS for safety practices promote 
employee goal attainment in terms of safety and well-being. When employees perceive this 
kind organizational gesture, SET demands that they reciprocate the organization’s 
inducement or favourable treatment by engaging in safety-related activities that heighten 
their safety behaviours, and this, in turn, impact on their safety outcomes in terms of safety-
related events and workplace injuries. Thus, this finding fosters our understanding of how the 
implementation of HPWS for safety practices constitutes an organization’s strategy for 
managing the employee-organization relationship through enhancing a high-quality 
relationship. 
 
There are also a number of findings that were not consistent with my expectations. First, 
safety initiative was unrelated to safety-related events. This could have affected the 
relationship between experienced HPWS for safety and safety-related events through a 
mediational chain of safety knowledge and safety initiative. It is also possible that it could 
have affected the effects of experienced HPWS for safety on both safety-related events and 
workplace injuries via the mediational chain of safety motivation and safety initiative. The 
reason for this unexpected result could be that, while the organizations emphasize more 
employee compliance with safety rules and procedures, the emphasis on employees’ 
discretionary behaviour such as safety initiative is inadequate to exert expected influence on 
workplace incidents such as safety-related events and workplace safety. Another plausible 
explanation for these findings could be because the study adopted a cross-sectional design 
approach to the study. This is consistent with Neal and Griffin (2006) who note that change in 
the overall level of safety behaviours in a group should take time to produce changes in 
safety outcomes for that group, suggesting that the effect is likely to be lagged. It has been 
argued that a link between safety behaviours and safety outcomes is more appropriate when 
it is observed at the unit level rather than the individual level of analysis (Neal & Griffin, 
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2006). It is also plausible that other forms of discretionary behaviour such as safety OCB or 
safety-related creativity may be more closely associated with safety outcomes. Although 
safety compliance was found to be related to both safety-related events and workplace 
injuries, I am of the opinion that adopting a longitudinal design may improve the relationships 
between these safety behaviours (i.e. safety compliance and safety initiative) and safety 
outcomes of safety-related events and workplace injuries. In addition, I encourage future 
studies to explore the relationship between both safety compliance and safety initiative and 
safety outcomes at the unit level of analysis and to try out the relationship between other 
forms of discretionary behaviour (e.g. safety OCB) and safety outcomes. Second, the results 
show that the unit safety climate moderated the effects of safety knowledge on safety 
compliance and not safety initiative. Probst (2004) suggests that an organization’s climate 
provides employees with cues with regard to what behaviour and outcomes will be reinforced 
or punished within the organization. Thus, it is plausible that in this circumstance, the 
organizations convey signals demonstrating the relative importance of organization’s safety 
rules and procedures (safety compliance) as against or compared to discretionary behaviour 
(e.g. safety initiative). In other words, the supportive environment is more in favour of 
compliance with organization’s rules and procedures rather than safety initiative. In 
response, employees might interpret these messages to mean that they should focus more 
on safety compliance if they wish to retain their employment. Thus, the findings of the 
present study could indicate that the extent to which safety behaviours (i.e. safety 
compliance and safety initiative) were affected was directly related to the extent to which 
employees perceived these behaviours to be differentially emphasized within the 
organization. However, future research should employ some other discretionary behaviour 
such as safety OCB or safety-related creativity in place of safety initiative. Third, contrary to 
my prediction, the relationship between safety motivation and safety initiative was weaker 
than the relationship between safety motivation and safety compliance. Fourth, the results 
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indicate that safety compliance and safety initiative did not mediate the relationship between 
the interaction of safety knowledge/safety motivation and unit-level safety climate on safety 
outcomes of safety-related events and workplace injuries. The reason for this unexpected 
result could be attributed to the fact that the study adopted the cross-sectional research 
design. The cross-sectional research design indicates, for example, that employee safety 
behaviours were measured after the performance period leading to the prediction of past 
safety outcomes (Wright & colleagues, 2005). The explanation is that organizations can 
decide to create a supportive environment (Nahrgand, Morgeson, & Hofmann, 2011) or a 
shared perception of safety climate among employees by, for example, (i) investing in 
induction programmes that emphasize safety practices and on-the-job safety-related training 
programmes that help facilitate employees’ safety knowledge, (ii) sharing information with 
regards to new development in safety practices with employees and thus, enhancing their 
safety-related knowledge, and (iii) organizing health and safety awareness through specific 
health and safety campaign programmes that can enhance employees’ safety knowledge. 
However, the fact remains that before employees apply the safety knowledge gained and be 
motivated to perform safely (in terms of safety-related events and workplace injuries), they 
need more time to engage safety behaviours such as safety compliance and safety initiative. 
Therefore, future research that employs longitudinal design may be better suited to ascertain 
the causal status of the relationships reported in this thesis. 
 
6.5. Practical Implications 
This study has important managerial implications for fostering workplace safety. This section 
outlines the five most prominent practical implications stemming from the findings of this 
research. 
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First, it is apparent that HPWS for safety is significantly related to unit safety climate, 
implying that organizations should consider creating a supportive environment (Nahrgand & 
colleagues, 2011) or a shared perception of safety climate among employees using 
appropriate HPWS for safety practices. Organizations can create this supportive environment 
when they (i) invest in induction programmes that emphasize safety practices and on-the-job 
safety-related training programmes that help facilitate employees’ safety knowledge, (ii) 
share information with regards to new development in safety practices with employees and 
thus, enhancing their safety-related knowledge, (iii) organize health and safety awareness 
through specific health and safety campaign programmes that can enhance employees’ 
safety knowledge, (iv) provide employee with a favourable working environment through the 
provision of extensive safety-related training and development, (v) deliberately consider the 
investment of managerial time in appraising the performance and training needs of 
employees, and (vi) creating a favourable social exchange with the employees (Liao & 
colleagues, 2009)). Based on SET, employees are likely to perceive that their exchange 
relationship with the organization is characterized by supportive environment based on 
investments in their safety and well-being. In return, employees are likely to be obliged to the 
organization by developing positive behaviours towards the achievement of organizational 
goals. Thus, these approaches can make unique contributions to fostering desirable safety 
behaviours, and ultimately, influencing safety outcomes and hence financial costs and 
corporate reputation of the organization. Thus, the findings of this study show that 
establishing a supportive environment will benefit organizations across the industry. 
 
Second, the finding indicates the cross-level influence of the unit-level safety climate on the 
effects of individual safety knowledge on safety compliance. It suggests that if improvements 
in safety climate are to have any meaningful impact on safety behaviours, they must first 
produce changes in safety knowledge. The finding also suggests that safety climate can 
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have independent effects on safety knowledge and that safety knowledge is an important 
determinant of safety behaviour (Neal & colleagues, 2000). This information can be used to 
guide the development of measurement systems to evaluate the effectiveness of safety 
management practices in an organization. So incorporating assessment of safety knowledge 
into monitoring systems will provide a more complete assessment “not only of the 
effectiveness of safety practices, but also of their operation” (Neal & colleagues, 2000, p. 
107).  
 
Third, the present study found employees’ experiences of the use of HRM and safety 
practices (i.e. HPWS for safety) to associate positively with employees’ safety behaviours. 
This demonstrates that, most of the time, safety outcomes are potential indicators of 
managerial practices (Zacharatos & colleagues, 2005; Ruth, 2004) rather than indicators of 
individual employees and engineering or ergonomically unsafe environment (Lauver, 2007; 
Zacharatos & colleagues, 2005). These findings are consistent with Kaminski (2001) who 
suggests that many of the management practices that are often applied to improve 
organizational performance (such as pay-based performance, teams, etc.) may have equal 
or greater effects on workplace injuries. Thus, the role of management in workplace safety is 
highlighted. Put together, these findings suggest strong implications for intervention designed 
to enhance workplace safety.  It provides evidence that organizations seeking to improve 
workplace safety should adopt HPWS practices that have been shown in the literature to be 
associated with employee as well as organizational safety performance in terms of safety 
behaviours and safety outcomes. 
 
Fourth, the study also provides important insights into how safety knowledge and unit safety 
climate interact to influence safety behaviour (i.e. safety compliance). The findings indicate 
that workplace climates characterized by high employee safety and well-being facilitate 
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employee safety behaviours (i.e. safety compliance) through a positive interaction with safety 
knowledge. These findings provide for organizations an example of how applying SET and 
SIP within multilevel framework can give a more detailed view of the mechanisms underlying 
safety behaviours. Importantly, these findings can be adopted by organizations to leverage 
their employees’ characteristic by bringing in those aspects of the work environment that 
facilitate employee safety and well-being in order to enhance their safety behaviours in the 
workplace.  
    
Lastly, International Labour Organization (2007) acknowledges the global enormity of 
occupational injuries, deaths, and illnesses and posits the need to develop policies and 
practices that continuously promote preventive health and safety culture. Therefore, research 
that aims to improve safety promotion represents a vital shift in the approach to workplace 
safety. The findings of this study suggest that the use of HPWS for safety practices such as 
safety training, reward contingent on safety performance, safety information sharing, internal 
opportunity for promotion, safety involvement and participation, self-managed teams, safety-
related performance appraisals, safety audit, safety campaign, and safety equipment 
maintenance may represent management accountability for safety in the workplace. 
 
6.6. Limitations and Strengths/Methodological Contributions of the 
 Study, and Avenue for Future Research 
6.6.1. Limitations of the Study 
Despite the aforementioned theoretical and practical implications of the findings of this study, 
there are a number of limitations. In the current study, data were derived from employees’ 
self-reports with regard to their experiences of safety-related events and workplace injuries in 
the workplace. These types of data are said to be subject to accident underreporting, 
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cognitive biases, and recall errors due to limitations in human memory and cognitive 
processing (Probst, 2015). Individual level underreporting occurs when the individual does 
not report an experienced accident to his or her employer (Probst, 2015). Second, it is 
possible that this method could have heightened the possibility of mono-method bias 
(Zacharatos & colleagues, 2005). However, the use of self-reported data is very necessary in 
some studies especially in studies like the one under consideration where data on all the 
variables except the use of HPWS for safety were self-reported. The alternative could have 
been to collect data on safety outcomes (safety-related events and workplace injuries) from 
company records. Apart from the fact that such records are grossly unreliable due to 
underreporting (Probst, 2015; Zacharatos & colleagues, 2005), they are not easily 
accessible. Underreporting at the organizational level occurs when an organization’s official 
recordable injury rates reported to occupational safety and health administration (OSHA) is 
an “undercount of the true number of work-related illnesses and injuries that the company is 
aware of” (Probst, 2015, p.1905). Therefore, there are no organizational records that can 
serve as a true report of experienced accidents. While mono-method bias is of concern in 
this study, Crampton and Wagner (1994) observe in their study that mono-method bias does 
not take place as often as we think. In addition, Wall, Michie, Paterson, Wood, Shehan, 
Clegg, and West (2004) found self-reported measures or data to compare favourably with 
other measures in terms of their convergent, discriminant, and construct validity. Because 
self-reports of safety attitudes, safety behaviours, and perceptions are commonly used in 
safety research (e.g. Neal & Griffin, 2006; Zacharatos & colleagues, 2005) and are in some 
cases preferable to using data available from management (Thompson, Hilton, & Witt, 1998), 
it is believed that the findings of this study are still valid. 
 
Second, the respondent sample was collected from only seven companies. Out of these 
seven oil and gas companies, six of them are under the control of NNPC while the seventh is 
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under the control of the Ministry of Petroleum Resources. Thus, the two organizations are 
Federal government parastatals. In other words, they are public companies and no private 
company among them. Obtaining data from the public companies with the exclusion of the 
private companies limits the generalizability of the findings to all the companies within the oil 
and gas industry. Therefore, generalization of the findings to a broader Nigerian context 
should be approached with caution. To enhance external validity, therefore, future research 
should obtain data from both private and public companies in the oil and gas industry. 
 
Third, the cross-sectional research design limits the extent to which cause-effect relations 
can be inferred from the findings reported in this thesis. The cross-sectional research design 
indicates that HPWS practices are measured after the performance period leading to the 
prediction of past performance (Wright & colleagues, 2005). Future research that employs 
longitudinal design may be better suited to ascertain the causal status of the relationships 
reported in this thesis. 
 
Fourth, the findings of this study cannot be interpreted to indicate that HPWS for safety 
practices lead to improvement in workplace safety (safety outcomes) through safety initiative 
despite the postulated hypotheses in this direction. As earlier suggested, it is plausible that 
other forms of discretionary behaviour such as safety OCB may be more closely associated 
with safety outcomes. It is also likely that adopting a longitudinal design may improve the 
relationships between these safety behaviours (i.e. safety compliance and safety initiative) 
and safety outcomes of safety-related events and workplace injuries. 
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6.6.2. Strengths/Methodological Contributions of the Study 
These limitations are counterbalanced by the methodological strengths of this thesis. Thus, 
in addition to the study’s theoretical extensions and implications, it also contributes to the 
literature methodologically in terms of its study design. 
6.6.2.1. Multi-rater Design 
Although the importance of HRM practices has been acknowledged by scholars in fostering 
workplace safety (e.g. Zacharatos & colleagues, 2005; Kivimaki, Kalimo, & Salminen, 1995; 
Griffiths, 1985), prior studies  show that research in this area is characterized by measure of 
HRM practices at the organizational level of analysis (See Boselie & colleagues, 2005) 
where single-source respondents, whose perceptions are essentially prone to ‘noise’ and 
bias (Whitener, 2001; Gerhart, Wright, McMahan, & Snell, 2000b; Purcell, 1999; Ichniowski, 
Kochan, Levine, Olson, & Strauss, 1996), are asked about the HR practices that account for 
the whole organization. For example, in their first study, Zacharatos and colleagues (2005) 
utilized a single organizational representative to provide data with regard to the existence or 
use of high commitment management practices in their respective companies. 
 
Osterman (1994) and West, Borill, Dawson, Scully, Carter, Anelay, Patterson, and Waring 
(2002) have, however, expressed scepticism about the level of typical HR manager’s 
awareness and impartiality as to his or her organization’s people management processes. 
Gerhart and colleagues (2000a, p. 807) contend that “the reliability of single raters is typically 
quite weak.” Therefore, even if the single respondent is adjudged knowledgeable, Edgar and 
Geare (2009) suggest that that system is problematic. According to Wright, Gardner, 
Moynihan, Park, Gerhart, and Delery (2001, p.876), the problem even becomes worse when 
we realize that it is “difficult for the senior VP of HR to accurately describe the practices that 
exist across the whole corporation” in large diversified organizations. Similarly, Bowen and 
Ostroff (2004) are concerned about the questionable reliability status of single-rater design 
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and suggest that, rather than relying on an HR executive, “a better alternative is to assess 
these characteristics of the HRM system from the employees themselves” (p.216). Thus, in 
order to control for unreliability, Gerhart and colleagues (2000b) recommend at least four 
raters per level of analysis for HRM indicators to average the raters’ scores per independent 
HPWS into more reliable variables. 
 
The present study contributes to literature by adopting a multi-source design. The study was 
approached through two levels of analysis: the unit as well as the individual employee levels 
of analysis. Data on experienced HPWS for safety were obtained from a minimum of three 
(3) and maximum of six (6) frontline employees in each unit amounting to useable 569 
responses while sixty-four line managers provided data on the use of HPWS for safety 
representing 168 units. This is consistent with Gerhart and colleagues (2000b) who observe 
that unit (or establishment) level surveys may be more reliable than organizational (or 
corporate) level surveys because the managers are likely to be more familiar with the HR 
practices that are in use in their unit as a result of the smaller size (See Batt, 2002). This 
design also provides more confidence to rule out the possibility of questionable reliability 
(Bowen & Ostroff, 2004). In addition, obtaining data from multiple sources help to reduce 
common method bias and assisted my examination of the associations of the use of HPWS 
for safety with both unit safety climate and experienced HPWS for safety and, consequently 
safety outcomes through safety knowledge/safety motivation, and safety behaviours of safety 
compliance and safety initiative. 
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6.6.2.2. Research Uncovered New HPWS for safety Domains/Practices 
This study developed and validated a theoretically driven, grounded, and integrative measure 
of HPWS for safety. As a part of the inductive approach to the study, a sample of the 
potential respondents were asked to describe some aspects of their organization’s safety-
related HRM practices that were not deductively identified in the literature (Kinicki, Jacobson, 
Peterson, & Prussia, 2013; Hinkin, 1998, 1995). This was done in order to know the extent to 
which those deductively identified in the extant literature were relevant to HRM practices 
relating to safety in the Nigerian context (See Sun & colleagues, 2007). This qualitative 
approach aimed to achieve two basic purposes: the first was to find out if the HRM practices 
used in Nigeria’s oil and gas industry to promote safety are in consonant with each of the 
practices identified in the extant literature (e.g. safety training, safety rewards, internal 
opportunity for promotion, safety involvement and participation, performance appraisals, self-
managed team, safety information sharing, clear job description, hiring for safety, and 
employment security). The second was to explore and identify safety-related HRM practices 
unique to the oil and gas industry in Nigeria. In the process, I generated the initial pool of 
items through interviews with a sample of potential respondents who were subject matter (i.e. 
HRM and Health and safety) experts. Importantly, in addition to the previously demonstrated 
domains, this approach uncovered three other domains such as “safety audit”, “safety 
campaign”, and “safety equipment maintenance.” 
 
6.6.2.3. Multilevel Model of Intermediate Linkages 
This research proposed and tested hypotheses drawn from a multilevel model of 
intermediate linkages in the performance implications of HPWS for safety. I sample across a 
range of workplaces, using line managers’ ratings of HPWS for safety practices at the unit 
level to predict employees’ experienced HPWS for safety, which predicted safety outcomes 
 
 
  
 
245 
 
via safety knowledge, safety motivation, and safety behaviours. The findings extend our 
understanding of the mechanism through which HPWS for safety may influence employee 
safety knowledge/safety motivation and safety behaviours and, in turn, safety outcomes. 
Safety knowledge and safety motivation were found to mediate the relationship between 
HPWS for safety and safety behaviours of safety compliance and safety initiative. 
 
6.6.3. Suggestions for Future Research 
Several issues demand further investigations. First, although the new HPWS for safety scale 
has been theoretically developed and validated based on AMO, there is need for future 
research to provide more evidence for the scale’s validity. In addition, given the ongoing 
debates in SHRM literature on “the best” vs business strategic goal specific HRM systems 
(Chuang, Jackson, & Jiang, 2013; Delery & Doty, 1996), future research should test the 
incremental validity of the new HPWS for safety scale. This is particularly necessary in the 
light of the dominance of the behavioural approach to safety. Furthermore, there is no 
significant difference when I compared the correlations between the new HPWS for safety 
scale and safety behaviours of safety compliance, safety participation, and safety initiative 
with the correlations of an abridged version of Zacharatos and colleagues’ (2005) general 
HPWS measure with safety compliance, safety participation, and safety initiative, using 
Fisher’s z test. Future research may endeavour to replicate this comparison but using 
complete version of Zacharatos and colleagues’ (2005) or any other general HPWS 
measure. Future research could also compare the correlations of the safety-specific HPWS 
measure and safety outcomes as defined in this study with the general HPWS measure and 
the same safety outcomes. 
 
Second, from a SHRM perspective, prior research has primarily emphasized the influence of 
systems of HRM practices on organizational climate (e.g. Chuang & Liao, 2010; Zacharatos 
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& colleagues, 2005). In spite of the importance of HRM practices, climate researchers (e.g. 
Bowen & Schneider, 2014) contend that, although focusing on HRM practices is good, it may 
not be sufficient to fully understand how to promote organizational climate. Bowen and 
Schneider (2014, p. 12) observe that “a focus only on HRM practices is limiting because so 
many other practices and issues influence employee experiences and their likely 
perceptions”. Thus, it becomes necessary to identify other antecedents to explicate how they 
interact with HRM practices to influence organizational climate. One factor that may influence 
organizational climate but has not been fully utilized jointly with HRM practices is safety-
specific transformational leadership. There is the need for future research to combine safety-
specific transformational leadership and HPWS for safety to understand unit safety climate. 
This is necessary because Bowen and Ostroff (2004) suggest that leaders serve as 
interpretive filters of HRM practices and thus help convey messages of HRM practices to 
employees about expected behaviours. In this circumstance, HRM practices and leadership 
may work in a synergistic way to enhance the influence of one another (Jiang & colleagues, 
2015) on unit safety climate. 
 
Third, although safety and productivity are both important dimensions of overall performance 
on many jobs, unfortunately, the safety literature suggests that managers are more often 
concerned about production as an organization’s bottom-line to the neglect of employees’ 
health and safety (Wallace, Chen, & Kanfer, 2005; Zohar, 2000; Janssens, Brett, & Smith, 
1995). They see the provision of health and safety as a cost to be incurred (Goldenhar, 
Ruder, Ewers, Earnest, Haag, & Petersen, 1999). This situation will not be remedied until 
further research consistently shows that workplace incidents such as injuries and fatalities 
represent financial costs to organizations (Zacharatos, 2001). This is a necessary direction 
for future research because once this gap in the literature is filled, the findings of this study 
will be more meaningful in the sense that there will be more evidence to conclude that HPWS 
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positively affects workplace safety in terms of safety behaviours and safety outcomes which, 
in turn, positively affect organization’s financial performance. It is only when this is empirically 
demonstrated that management can be expected to consider the adoption of HPWS for 
safety practices for the management of workplace safety. 
 
Fourth, the present study adopted social exchange theory (SET) and social information 
processing perspective (SIP) as the theoretical perspectives to explore the relationships 
depicted in its conceptual model (See figure 2.1). Social exchange theory, for example has 
become a strong theme (Snape & Redman, 2010) in the SHRM and safety literature. Thus, 
in the extant literature, HRM practices-outcome linkages have been under-theorized (Guest, 
1997). These linkages have been addressed using SET, but this framework has been 
criticized in research (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005; Coyle-Shapiro & Conway, 2004). 
Consistent with the call for researchers to diversify their attention from SET in analyzing the 
antecedents of employee behaviours (Zellars & Tepper, 2003), this study provides 
complementary perspective by examining SIP theoretical framework. Future research should 
employ other theoretical perspectives such as job characteristic theory explanation of HRM 
practices-outcomes relationships, which lies outside the tradition of SET explanation. 
 
Fifth, as earlier noted, the sampling frame for this study (Study 4) focuses upon data 
obtained from only seven public-sector organisations and none from private-sector of the oil 
and gas industry in Nigeria. This sampling frame provides a unique context that limits the 
generalizability of the study’s findings. For example, it may be that, because the government 
manages all the public-sector organizations by laws of the parliament, the employees in the 
public oil and gas companies have low perceptions of HPWS for safety practices, which 
serve to shape their safety knowledge, safety motivation, and safety behaviours. 
Consequently, the extent to which these findings are generalizable to the oil and gas industry 
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in Nigeria is somewhat limited. Future research that includes data from both public and 
private sectors of the oil and gas industry would be helpful in ascertaining the external 
validity of these findings. 
 
Sixth, this study focuses on the examination of the effects of HPWS for safety on employee 
safety outcomes. Thus, as earlier noted, the use of cross-sectional research design suggests 
that the findings are correlational rather than causal. Thus, future research that employs 
longitudinal research design will be better suited to demonstrate the causal basis of the 
relationships reported in this thesis. In doing so, more light can be shed on the question over 
whether employee experienced HPWS for safety changes over time, with subsequent effects 
on safety knowledge, safety motivation, safety behaviours, and, safety outcomes. Although 
several studies in this area have begun to examine longitudinal effects of HRM practices on 
performance (e.g. Ployhart, Weekley, & Ramsey, 2009; Bird, Clegg, Patterson, Robinson, 
Stride, Wall, & Wood, 2008), given that most of these studies focus on productivity, there is 
need for a focus on workplace safety. 
 
Seventh, the HRM practices experienced by employees are largely those delivered or 
enacted by line managers with the direct responsibility. Purcell and Hutchinson (2007) 
observe that there is a gap between what is formally required in HRM policy and what is 
actually delivered by line managers. The manner in which line managers undertake their 
HRM duties is linked to a wider range of leadership behaviours, which aim to influence 
employee attitudes and behaviours. Employees are likely to be influenced by both HRM 
practices they experience and their managers’ leadership behaviours. Future research 
should focus on the examination of the extent to which line managers’ enactment of HRM 
practices and the HRM practices as perceived by the employees converge. Purcell and 
Hutchinson (2007) suggest that the outcome effects on employee attitudes and behaviours 
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might be greater when both are positive. If this proposition is confirmed, it will have an 
implication for practitioners in the way they seek to ensure successful implementation of 
HRM practices and enhance line managers’ leadership behaviours.  
 
6.7. Conclusion 
Research in workplace safety has focused on either the physical approach that emphasizes 
ergonomic design of the environment and work-related equipment, an environmental 
approach that emphasizes potential hazards such as noise, toxins, and temperature, or a 
behavioural approach that emphasizes changing employee behaviours that are deemed to 
be responsible for workplace incidents such as accidents, injuries, fatalities, and safety-
related events. Motivated by two factors: (i) the costs of pain, sufferings, and grief that 
employees undergo in times of accidents or injuries and the high financial costs of accidents 
and damage to corporate reputation, and (ii) the fact that management attitudes toward 
workplace safety are directly related to employee attitudes toward workplace safety 
(Margolis, 1973), this study focused on how and why organizational practices and 
management behaviours interrelate with employee  behaviours to promote employee safety 
behaviour and, in turn, safety outcomes. 
 
It has been noted that safety problems stem from not only the poor attitudes of management 
towards workplace safety (Coyle, Sleeman, & Adams, 1995) but also from employees’ 
unsafe behaviours including recklessness, violation of safety rules and regulations and 
nonchalant attitudes to hazards (Laurence, 2005; Zohar & Luria, 2003; Hobbs & Williamson, 
2002). Building on the above, research (e.g. Clarke, 2013; Clarke, 2006; Neal & Griffin, 2006, 
2000; Zohar & Luria, 2005; Wallace & Chen, 2005; Probst, 2004; Probst & Brubakar, 2001; 
Griffin & Neal, 2000) has examined the workplace safety particularly the predominance of 
behavioural approach. However, despite this behavioural approach research, there is a 
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paucity of research that has examined HR practices and the few have focused on single 
practices (e.g. Lauver, 2007; Harvey, Bolam, Gregory, & Erdos, 2001). However, extant 
research has shown that HRM practices are more likely to yield positive effects for the 
organization when they are introduced as part of a coherent system, rather than as single 
“best practices” (Kling, 1995). 
 
Furthermore, although productivity and safety have been recognized as the twin objectives of 
performance (Wallace & Chen, 2006) on many jobs, prior research in SHRM that has linked 
HPWS to performance outcomes (e.g. Aryee & colleagues, 2012; Combs & colleagues, 
2006; Wright, Gardner, Moynihan, & Allen, 2005; Boselie & colleagues, 2005; Bartel, 2004; 
Batt, 2002; Arthur, 1994), has focused primarily on productivity to the neglect of workplace 
safety. Zacharatos and colleagues (2005) noted this gap and consequently extended prior 
research on HPWS-performance relationships to include occupational safety. I built on this 
research to: (i) develop and validate an HPWS for safety scale, and (ii) proposed and tested 
a model of processes through which unit level HPWS for safety influence individual level 
safety outcomes. 
 
This thesis reports the findings of four studies. Three of these studies focused on the 
development and validation of an HPWS for safety scale while the fourth study used the 
validated scale to examine the processes through which HR practices influence workplace 
safety. First, and underpinned by social information processing perspective (SIP), I examined 
how the use of HPWS for safety influences unit-level safety climate and experienced HPWS 
for safety. Second, and underpinned by social exchange theory (SET), I examined individual 
level processes through which experienced HPWS for safety influences safety outcomes. 
Third, and informed by SIP, I examined how unit-level safety climate moderates the effects of 
safety knowledge/safety motivation) on safety behaviours (i.e. safety compliance and safety 
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initiative) on one hand, and on safety outcomes of safety-related events and workplace 
injuries via safety behaviours, on the other.  
 
Data were analyzed using multilevel structural equation modelling (MSEM) with Mplus 
version 7.3. The findings revealed that (i) experienced HPWS for safety directly relates to 
safety behaviours and also indirectly through safety attitudes, (ii) experienced HPWS for 
safety relates to both safety-specific events and workplace injuries through safety knowledge 
and safety compliance, (iii) experienced HPWS for safety relates to workplace injuries 
through safety knowledge and safety initiative, (iv) experienced HPWS for safety relates to 
both safety-related events and workplace injuries via safety motivation and safety 
compliance, (v) the use of HPWS for safety significantly related to unit safety climate, (vi)  the 
relationship between safety knowledge and safety compliance is stronger than the 
relationship between safety knowledge and safety initiative, (vii) the use of HPWS for safety 
significantly  related to experienced HPWS for safety while unit-level safety climate 
moderated the safety knowledge-safety compliance relationship such that in a high safety 
climate, safety behaviour is valued, expected and rewarded in the unit and, as a result, 
employees would be more likely to comply with the unit’s safety rules and procedures. In 
contrast, in a low safety climate, safety performance would attract less emphasis and as a 
result, the effects of safety knowledge on employees’ safety behaviours would diminish. 
Lastly, the findings provide support for the psychometric properties of the scale. 
 
By indicating that safety knowledge/safety motivation and safety behaviours mediated the 
relationships between HPWS for safety and safety outcomes, this study provides empirical 
evidence in support of the notion that employees’ perceptions and interpretation of HRM 
practices, rather than actual HRM practices themselves, that directly influence their attitudes 
and behaviours (Wright and colleagues, 2005; Gerhart & colleagues, 2000) which, in turn, 
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influence outcomes. By developing and validating a theoretically driven, internally coherent 
and integrative measure of a system of HR and safety practices (i.e. HPWS for safety), this 
study enhances theoretical approach in three ways: (i) speaks to Delaney and Huselid’s 
(1996) concern that the SHRM literature “is distinguished by the fact that virtually no two 
studies measure HRM practices in the same way” (p. 967), (ii) addresses the absence of a 
theoretically informed measure of high-performance human resource practices (Delery, 
1998) in safety context, and (iii) achieves the need for a strategically-focused HPWS which is 
related to but goes beyond the motivation for Delaney and Huselid’s call. Together, the 
findings of this study provide evidence of the important role the management/organization 
rather than individual elements play in workplace safety and this forms the paramount 
contribution of this study.     
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    APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Interview Questionnaire 
 
AN INTERVIEW WITH HUMAN RESOURCE AND OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND 
SAFETY PROFESSIONALS IN ORGANIZATIONS OF INTEREST IN OIL AND GAS 
INDUSTRY IN NIGERIA 
This project aims to examine how organizations use human resource practices to promote 
health and safety in the oil and gas industry in Nigeria. Therefore, the objective of this 
interview is to ascertain HR practices that your organization uses to promote health and 
safety. The information gathered from this interview will contribute to the development of a 
measure of HR practices for safety performance. 
SECTION A 
What is your job title? ............................................................................................. 
How long have you been working in your current position? 
 ..........years  ............months. 
How long have you been working with your current organization? 
..............years .............months 
Please explain briefly how workplace safety is reflected in your organization’s vision and 
mission statements (please, back-up with relevant organizational documents) 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
SECTION B 
 
 
  
 
290 
 
Below is a list of human resource management practices for promoting workplace safety. 
Kindly and carefully look through them and respond to the questions or statements with 
regard to each of them:  
Workplace safety as an organizational objective    
Does your organization emphasize workplace safety as an objective in the same way as it 
emphasizes the bottom-line (profits)? If yes, how is this accomplished?   
....................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................ 
Do you have a separate health and safety unit and if so how different are its functions 
relative to the HRM department?  
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………… 
How do these two departments work to promote workplace safety? Can you please give 
specific examples?   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………… 
Hiring for safety 
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Does your organization emphasize long-term employee safety potentials in its hiring 
practices? Can you please give examples of how this is accomplished? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………….................. 
Are the health and safety values and beliefs of the individual potential employee discussed 
when hiring an employee?  
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………….. 
Does your organization emphasize traits and abilities that promote workplace safety? How is 
this accomplished? 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………... 
Do you have specific safety practices or criteria when hiring employees? Specifically, is one’s 
ability to work safely a consideration when hiring new employees? How is this done? In what 
ways do your hiring practices focus on safety? 
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……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………… 
Extensive Safety Training 
Does your organization provide extensive safety training programmes for employees? What 
are some of these programmes or practices?  
....................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................... 
Does your organization invest time and money in safety-related training? Please, provide 
examples and evidence.  
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………….. 
Does your organization normally provide induction for new employees? If yes, to what extent 
are health and safety emphasized in this training?  
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
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……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………. 
What specific safety training practices/programmes do you have? How often do employees 
undergo such practices?  
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………… 
Compensation contingent on safe performance 
How do you compare the average pay level (including incentives) of your employees 
(especially front-line employees) with that of similar organizations (competitors) in the 
industry? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………… 
To what extent are employees’ salaries and rewards determined by their safety 
performance? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………… 
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Does your organization give monetary and non-monetary rewards for exemplary safety 
performance? If yes, please, give some examples of such specific safety-contingent 
monetary and non-monetary rewards 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………….. 
How much importance does your organization attach to fairness or equity in the distribution 
of safety-related compensation/rewards? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………. 
Do you have specific practices to encourage or motivate employees to work safely? Are 
these practices focused on individuals or work groups?  
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………… 
What other specific safety-contingent compensations or practices do you have and how do 
you actually carry them out in practice? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
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……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………… 
Employment security 
How much emphasis does your organization attach to employment security for its 
employees?  
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………… 
With reference to safety performance, please describe the extent to which your organization 
would try to find an employee another position if he/she were to lose his/her job. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………….. 
All being well, can employees expect to work for your organization for their entire career? If 
not, can safety-related concerns be a cause for termination or retention?  
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………… 
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Please explain the extent to which safety performance is important in employee retention in 
your organization.  
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………… 
Internal opportunities for promotion 
Using safety-related qualifications and performance as criteria, do qualified employees have 
good opportunity for internal promotion in your organization? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………. 
To what extent do internal candidates, who are beneficiaries of the organization’s investment 
in safety-related orientations and training, have priority in terms of job openings? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………….. 
To what extent do employees who have acquired safety-related skills have clear career 
paths in your organization? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
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……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………. 
Does your organization consider safety performance when making internal promotion 
decisions? In other words, do you have practices that encourage employees to engage in 
safe work-related behaviours? Can you please elaborate?   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………… 
Employee safety involvement/safety participation 
To what extent do supervisors keep open safety communications with employees in your 
organization? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………. 
To what extent do you ask your employees for their opinions in advance if a decision made 
might affect their safety at work?  
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………. 
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Do you have practices that give employees discretion to resolve safety-related issues in the 
workplace? Can you please, give examples of such practices?  
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………… 
What are some practices through which your organization supports employees with 
necessary equipment and resources to provide high quality safety performance? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………….. 
Do you have practices that enable employees to make suggestions or recommendations 
regarding safe work practices? Please elaborate on these practices.  
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………… 
Performance appraisals 
How often does your organization measure employee safety performance in terms of 
objective quantifiable results? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
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……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………….. 
What are some practices that your organization uses to assess the safety performance of 
employees?  
....................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................ 
Do employee appraisals emphasize long term and group-based safety achievements? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………  
To what extent do safety performance appraisals provide employee feedback for personal 
development? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………….. 
To what extent are safety performance appraisals based on multiple sources (e.g. self, co-
workers, supervisors, etc.)? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
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……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………….. 
To what extent do supervisors get together with employees to set their personal safety 
goals? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………..                                        
How important is ability to work safely relative to ability to meeting production targets in 
appraising the performance of employees? What makes one an ideal employee in your 
organization-meeting production targets or meeting safety targets? Please explain with some 
examples 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………… 
 
Self-managed team and collaboration 
To what extent are team suggestions on safety issues implemented within your organization? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
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……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………. 
Please explain the extent to which your organization supports safety-related team 
development (e.g. encouraging self-management and collaboration on safety-related issues). 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………… 
Safety information sharing 
To what extent does your organization share with employees information about how well the 
organization is performing in safety-related issues? Can you please, give specific examples 
of how this is done? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………..              
To what extent does your organization share information on its safety performance with 
employees?  
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………….. 
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What specific practices do you have for ensuring employees are kept informed about safety-
related issues? Please explain or elaborate. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………  
Job and work design 
Do the jobs employees do have an up-to-date safety-related descriptions? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………. 
Are safety requirements or rules clearly defined? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………. 
To what extent do employees perform simple and repetitive tasks as part of their safety-
related work? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
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……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………. 
To what extent does the job description for a position accurately describe all of the safety 
rules and procedures?  
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………. 
How is the work employees do designed or structured to promote safety? Are there any 
specific practices that are used? 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………… 
 
 Are there other practices that your organization has developed or uses to promote health 
and safety? Please state them.  
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………. 
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Are there organizations in the oil and gas industry that are considered leaders in the 
promotion of health and safety? What do you think is unique about these organizations? 
What can other organizations learn from them in terms of promoting health and safety?  
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………… 
Thank you for sparing me your time  
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Appendix B: Letter to Organizations Seeking for Access 
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Appendix C: Letter from Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) 
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Appendix D: Letter from Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation 
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Appendix E: Summary Report of Interview Schedule 
My first point of contact was Lagos. I stopped in Lagos because most of the oil and gas 
companies in Nigeria have their head offices in Lagos. I used the first four weeks to distribute 
my letters to about twenty-eight (28) companies out of the thirty-five (35) letters I prepared. 
The major problems were that: (i) some of the companies had relocated and to find their new 
locations became very difficult; (ii) some of them have ceased to exist while some are just 
doing some skeletal work trying to come back to life; and (iii) it was very difficult to gain 
access to the companies’ premises because of tight security as result of the turbulent 
political and religious terrain in Nigeria. However, I was able to deliver the mails either to their 
mail rooms or to the security and most of the mails were acknowledged immediately. 
 
Along the line I was able to discover the Department of Petroleum Resources, the 
Government Company responsible for regulating the health, safety and the environmental 
activities of all the oil and gas companies operating in Nigeria. I was able to gain access and 
I applied requesting for their participation in my research and an introduction letter to all of 
the private oil and gas companies in Nigeria. The approval to participate was given within 
three days but to give letter of introduction was a little bit controversial. Meanwhile, the 
Human Resource Manager of Conoil had given me access to interview himself, Health, 
Safety, and Environment manager, and another safety expert without the official approval of 
the company. This was possible because the Managing Director (MD) was indisposed. I was 
able to interview two people in Conoil within that week and the appointment with third the 
person failed. Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) also gave me audience to 
interview two people, the Human Resource Manager and the Director of Medical Services 
but the HSE manager was a little bit controversial so I let him go. All put together, I was able 
to interview four people within the first five weeks of my stay in Lagos. I then decided to go to 
Abuja since I had already made contact with Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
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(NNPC) through my brother’s connection. However, I sent letters of reminder to all the 
companies I had earlier visited. 
My journey to Abuja was very fruitful. I interviewed the Head of Safety Unit in Petroleum 
Technology Development Fund (PTDF) in the first day of my visit to that company. And 
within the next few days I was able to interview the second person the Human Resource 
Manager (HRM) in PTDF. The Group General Manager (GGM) of NNPC gave me a letter of 
introduction to all NNPC subsidiaries in the country (see appendix 1). There are nine (9) of 
them including: 
 Kaduna Refinery and Petrochemical Company Limited (KRPC); 
 Warri Refinery and Petrochemical Company Limited (WRPC); 
 Port Harcourt Refinery and Petrochemical Company (PHRC) 
 Nigerian Petroleum Development Company (NPDC) Ltd, Benin City; 
 Nigeria Gas Company Limited (NGC) Ltd, Warri; 
 Petroleum Product Marketing Company Limited (PPMC) Ltd, Abuja; 
 National Petroleum Investment Services (NAPIMS), Lagos; 
 Research and Development (R&D), Port Harcourt; 
 Integrated Data Services Limited (IDSL), Benin City. 
 
I interviewed the Manager, Manpower and Welfare Management, Manager, Health, Safety 
and Environment, and Deputy Manager, Fire and Safety in Petroleum Product Marketing 
Company Limited Abuja. I then moved to Benin City after my interaction with PPMC. I 
interviewed the Human Resource Manager (HRM) and the Manager, HSE in Nigerian 
Petroleum Development Company, Benin City. Then in Warri, I interviewed the Manager, 
HSE, the Superintendent, Fire and Safety, and another Safety Officer in Nigeria Gas 
Company Limited, Warri. I also interviewed the Heads of Departments of Human Resource 
Management (HRM) and Health, Safety, and Environment in Petroleum Training Institute 
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(PTI), Warri. The Institute had also given a letter of consent to participate in my research and 
in fact, the students of the Institute will be used to pilot-test the employee version of HPWS 
for safety scale since they train junior and intermediate employees of oil and gas industry in 
Nigeria. 
 
I returned to Lagos and within few days I was able to interview the Manager, HSE in Conoil 
and Human Resource Manager, South Atlantic Petroleum (SAPETRO) and also obtained 
letters from DPR introducing me to sixteen (16) major private oil and gas companies in 
Nigeria (see appendix 2) and a letter of access (see appendix 3) to their zonal offices: Port 
Harcourt, Warri, Kaduna, Abuja, Lagos and Owerri, who will in turn, introduce me to their 
twenty-one (21) locations in the country. 
In summary, I interviewed eighteen (18) professionals drawn from eight (8) different oil and 
gas companies as follows:  
Conoil........................................................................................................................3 
Department of Petroleum Resource.........................................................................2 
Petroleum Technology Development Fund...............................................................2 
Petroleum Product Marketing Company......................................................................3 
Nigeria Gas Company....................................................................................................3 
Petroleum Training Institute.........................................................................................2 
Nigerian Petroleum Development Company................................................................2 
South Atlantic Petroleum..............................................................................................1 
Total                                                                                                          =18 
 
Workplace safety is broadly reflected in the companies’ vision and mission statements as 
shown in the documents given to me by some of them. Their responses as well as the HSE 
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policy statements indicate that the NNPC or Ministry of Petroleum Resources issued the 
policy guidelines on HSE which was adapted by each of the companies.   
 
 
  
 
313 
 
SERIAL 
NUMBER 
PRACTICES STATEMENT/QUESTION YES NO COMMENTS/SUMMARY 
OF RESPONSES 
 WORKPLACE SAFETY AS 
ORGANIZATIONAL 
OBJECTIVE 
    
1  Does your organization 
emphasize workplace 
safety as an objective in the 
same way as it emphasizes 
the bottom-line? 
18  The emphasis is on 
safety as the core value 
because without the 
safety of the employees, 
equipment, and the 
environment the profit 
will be adversely 
affected.  
2  Do you have a separate 
health and safety unit and if 
so how different are its 
functions relative to the 
HRM department? 
17 1 The law governing the oil 
and gas industry in 
Nigeria makes it 
compulsory for all the 
organizations to have 
Occupational Health, 
Safety, and Environment 
department (HSE). 
However, the Petroleum 
Training and 
Development Fund 
(PTDF) has safety unit 
as part of HR department 
because its objectives 
are different from those 
of other oil and gas 
companies. 
3  How do HR department 
and HSE department work 
to promote workplace 
safety? 
  The HSE department 
identifies the training 
needs of the technical as 
well as other staff and 
the HR department 
organizes for the training 
using experts either from 
outside the organization 
or within the 
organization. The HSE 
department provides the 
safety equipment and the 
HR department 
distributes them to all the 
departments.   
 HIRING FOR SAFETY     
4  Does your organization 
emphasize long-term 
employee safety potentials 
in its hiring practices? 
14 4 Only those companies 
that are highly technical 
in their operations 
consider safety 
potentials when they are 
hiring their employees. 
Others only consider 
safety potentials when 
they employ HSE staff. 
5  Are the health and safety 
values and beliefs of the 
individual potential 
employee discussed when 
hiring an employee? 
18  The emphasis on safety 
values and beliefs 
however varies 
depending on the 
department to which the 
individual is being 
considered. Safety 
values and beliefs are 
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more highly emphasized 
when employing staff to 
HSE department.   
6  Does your organization 
emphasize traits and 
abilities that promote 
workplace safety? 
18  Just as in item 5 above, 
issues on safety are 
more emphasized when 
employing people to 
HSE department than 
other departments. 
However, some of the 
companies utilize 
psychological tests to 
identify some of the traits 
and abilities they need. 
7  Do you have specific safety 
practices or criteria when 
hiring employees? 
Specifically, is one’s ability 
to work safely a 
consideration when hiring 
new employees?  
17 1 One’s ability to work 
safely is specifically 
considered when 
employing HSE staff and 
this they do by applying 
psychological tests to 
identify their safety 
values, beliefs, traits and 
abilities that promote 
safety, and other related 
safety requirements. 
Others are just asked 
questions relating to 
safety at work. 
 EXTENSIVE SAFETY 
TRAINING 
    
8  Does your organization 
provide extensive safety 
training programmes for 
employees?  
18  Although all the 
employees receive 
safety-related training, 
only the HSE staff 
receive extensive 
training programmes. 
Both general and specific 
training programmes 
include Firefighting, first 
aid application, auxiliary 
fire training programme, 
fire drills, survival 
swimming training, 
environmental 
awareness, equipment 
awareness and 
management, defensive 
safety, quarterly health 
talks (e.g. fit to work 
programme, etc.), off-
shore training, induction 
programme (for new 
employees),   
9  Does your organization 
invest time and money in 
safety-related training? 
18  The interview responses 
suggest that the 
organizations invest time 
and money in safety-
related training. 
However, the amount of 
money and time they 
invest each year varies 
from organization to 
organization and from 
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department to 
department. The type of 
training also varies from 
department to 
department. The safety 
professionals like other 
departments are trained 
both within the country 
and abroad. The other 
staff are trained on 
safety-related matters 
within the country in form 
of seminars, workshops, 
and safety week 
programme. The HSE 
staff receive initial 
professional (safety-
related) training between 
six and one year at the 
point of entry and after 
that, at least once a year. 
Some respondents could 
not give the range of the 
amount they spend on 
individual employee with 
regard to training while 
some gave an average 
of one million naira 
(#1,000,000 or about 
£4,000) per employee in 
HSE department 
(training includes both 
home and abroad). Little 
amount is expended on 
other staff with regard to 
safety-related training 
since their safety-related 
training is only within the 
organization. 
10  Does your organization 
normally provide induction 
for new employees? 
18  The responses show that 
the organizations 
emphasized more on 
safety-related issues 
during induction. The 
new employees are 
introduced to all various 
units, the equipment, 
facilities, and the 
implications of their use. 
11  What specific safety 
training practices/program 
do you have? 
  Both general and specific 
training programmes 
include Firefighting, first 
aid application, 
environmental 
awareness, equipment 
awareness and 
management, defensive 
safety, quarterly health 
talks (e.g. fit to work 
programme, etc.), off-
shore training, induction 
programme (for new 
employees), auxiliary fire 
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training program, fire 
drills, and survival 
swimming training. The 
general safety-related 
training programmes are 
for all the staff and they 
are on regular basis. The 
duration of the 
professional (specific 
safety training for HSE 
staff only) training ranges 
from six months to one 
year at the point of entry 
and at least once in a 
year there after. This 
however depends on 
each organization. 
 COMPENSATIONS 
CONTINGENT ON SAFE 
PERFORMANCE 
    
12  How do you compare the 
average pay level 
(including incentives) of 
your employees (especially 
front line employees) with 
that of similar organizations 
in the industry? 
  All the employees 
(except management 
staff) of the oil and gas 
companies in Nigeria 
belong to one trade 
union-Petroleum and 
Gas Association of 
Nigeria (PENGASSON). 
Although, the employees 
negotiate salary through 
the trade union, the 
government owned 
companies pay a little 
less than what the 
private companies pay. 
The allowances and 
incentives also vary from 
company to company 
though very competitive. 
13  To what extent are 
employees’ salaries and 
rewards determined by 
their safety performance? 
  The entry point pay of 
employees is determined 
by qualifications and   
cognate experience in all 
the companies and not 
safety performance. 
However, incentives and 
rewards/awards vary 
from department to 
department and from 
organization to 
organization. 
14  Does your organization 
give monetary and non-
monetary reward for 
exemplary safety 
performance? 
18  Although, all of them 
agreed that they give 
letter of commendation 
for exemplary safety 
performance, some do 
actually give more than 
that. For example, the 
drivers of some highly 
technical-oriented 
companies are given 
safety performance or 
accident free bonus in 
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addition to the letter of 
commendation. Some 
companies also identify 
the staff of the year 
based on safety-related 
issues and reward them 
in one way or the other. 
15  How much importance 
does your organization 
attach to fairness or equity 
in the distribution of safety-
related 
compensation/rewards?  
  All the responses 
indicate that there is 
fairness and equity in the 
distribution of 
compensation/rewards. 
For example, the staff of 
the month or staff of the 
year is nominated by the 
staff and to be ratified by 
the head of department 
for management 
approval. Moreover, the 
records of each 
employee are usually 
referred to before such 
nominations for rewards 
are ratified. 
16  Do you have specific 
practices to encourage or 
motivate employees to 
work safely? Are these 
practices focused on 
individuals or work groups? 
18  The management’s 
acknowledgement of 
safety-related efforts by 
the individuals and 
groups is meant to 
motivate them. This is 
because the letter of 
commendation and other 
reward systems can add 
value to their appraisal 
and consequently 
facilitate their upward 
movement. 
17  What other specific safety-
contingent compensations 
or practices do you have 
and how do you actually 
carry them out in practice? 
  As in 16 above. 
 EMPLOYMENT SECURITY     
18  How much emphasis does 
your organization attach to 
employment security for its 
employees 
  All the responses show 
that their companies 
place a great deal of 
emphasis on 
employment security 
20  With reference to safety 
performance, describe the 
extent to which your 
organization would try to 
find an employee another 
position if he/she were to 
lose his/her job. 
  This type of situation has 
never been experienced 
by any of the 
interviewees and 
therefore could not make 
any statement. However, 
one of them remarked 
that a staff of his 
company resigned to go 
to a similar organization 
but the company gave 
him what the other 
company offered him in 
order to retain him 
because of his 
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performance (not 
necessarily safety 
performance).  
21  All being well, can 
employees expect to work 
for your organization for 
their entire career? 
18  However, all of them are 
of the opinion that safety-
related concerns (as 
much as other concerns) 
can be a cause for 
employee termination or 
retention. 
22  Please, explain the extent 
to which safety 
performance is important in 
employee retention in your 
organization 
   In two (2) companies, an 
employee in HSE 
department must have a 
particular minimum score 
(70% for one of them) for 
general safety 
performance before 
he/she is considered for 
promotion. Others except 
three (3) have 10% or 
15% rating for safety-
related performance in 
the employee appraisal 
form and an employee 
must have this score 
before he/she is 
considered for 
promotion. One of the 
companies has 
considered including a 
particular score for safety 
performance in 
employees’ appraisal 
form but this would be 
effected in January, 2014  
 INTERNAL 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR 
PROMOTION 
    
23  Using safety-related 
qualifications and 
performance as criteria, do 
qualified employees have 
good opportunity for 
internal promotion in your 
organization? 
 18 Although all of them 
suggest that safety-
related qualifications and 
performance can serve 
as an opportunity for 
internal promotion, this is 
particularly true for the 
HSE department 
employees. However, all 
the employees are 
expected to do their work 
safely as gross safety 
infraction by any 
employee can lead to 
termination of 
appointment 
24  To what extent do internal 
candidates, who are 
beneficiaries of the 
organization’s investment in 
safety-related orientations 
and training have priority in 
terms of job opening?  
  All the interviewees 
suggest that, generally, 
their companies give 
priority to internal 
candidates in terms of 
job openings irrespective 
of the department except 
where the company is 
hiring for a particular 
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experience and the 
experience is not found 
within the organization.  
25  To what extent do 
employees who have 
acquired safety-related 
skills have clear career 
paths in your organization? 
  All the responses 
suggest that all the 
employees (including the 
HSE staff) have clear 
career paths in their 
companies. This is 
demonstrated by the fact 
that most of their 
employees work until 
they retire from service 
or transfer to other 
companies. 
26  Does your organization 
consider safety 
performance when making 
internal promotion? 
18  As stated in item 23 
above, safety 
performance is highly 
considered when making 
internal promotion for the 
HSE employees only but 
gross safety infraction 
can have adverse effect 
on the promotion of all 
the employees in the 
company. 
 EMPLOYEE SAFETY 
INVOLVEMENT/SAFETY 
PARTICIPATION 
    
27  To what extent do 
supervisors keep open 
safety communications with 
employees in your 
organization? 
  All the interviewees 
suggest that supervisors, 
to a very large extent, 
keep open safety 
communications with all 
their subordinates.  
28  To what extent do you ask 
your employees for their 
opinion in advance if a 
decision made might affect 
their safety at work 
  In all the companies, 
employees have a 
powerful union that 
represents them in any 
meeting where issues 
including safety-related 
matters that might affect 
the employees at work 
are discussed and 
decisions taken on them 
before they are 
implemented.  
29  Do you have practices that 
give employees discretion 
to resolve safety-related 
issues in the workplace? 
18  The responses indicate 
that employees are given 
opportunity to handle 
some safety-related 
issues to some extent. 
Thus they have safety 
initiative as a common 
practice among the 
employees. For example, 
all the employees are 
trained to understand 
accident prevention 
strategies and what the 
safety signs in the 
organization represent, 
the use of safety 
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equipment, what total 
loss control signifies, and 
so on. The employees 
are therefore expected to 
use their initiative to 
operate at their various 
levels. This must 
however, conform with 
the company’s rules and 
regulations.    
30  What are some practices 
through which your 
organization supports 
employees with necessary 
equipment and resources 
to provide high quality 
safety performance? 
  The use of safety 
equipment depends on 
the type of work an 
employee does and the 
nature of the 
organization. Generally, 
the HSE employees 
must have and wear their 
safety equipment while 
other employees in less 
hazardous companies, 
though provided with 
protective equipment, 
wear them when they 
want to visit the areas 
with hazards.  
Some of the practices to 
ensure that the 
employees have the 
necessary equipment 
and resources are: 
disposition, meaning the 
practical evaluation of 
pre- and post-event 
issues to ascertain if lack 
of equipment or 
resources played a role; 
visibility, meaning going 
round by a team to 
ensure safety; and 
training 
31  Do you have practices that 
enable employees to make 
suggestions or 
recommendations 
regarding safe work 
practices? 
18  They have some 
practices that enable 
employees to make 
suggestions and 
recommendations on 
general matters including 
safety-related issues. For 
example, all the 
organizations have such 
provision like suggestion 
box, while many others 
have ‘focal points’ in 
HSE where all the 
departments are 
represented. Latest 
information on safety-
related issues is shared 
with the representatives 
for onward transmission 
to their departments for 
sampling of opinions. 
Routine safety updates 
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and messages are 
disseminated from the 
focal points through 
emails.   
 PERFORMANCE 
APPRAISALS 
    
32  How often does your 
organization measure 
employee safety 
performance in terms of 
objective quantifiable 
results? 
  At the beginning of each 
year the supervisor and 
his subordinates get 
together to set objectives 
for the year and these 
objectives are pursued at 
the individual as well as 
team levels though there 
is monitoring and weekly 
or monthly or quarterly 
review of achievements. 
Responses indicate that 
before a particular 
safety-related job is 
performed the individual 
concerned will fill a form 
and at the completion of 
the job, a certificate is 
issued indicating that the 
job is done. This is 
however different from 
normal routine job. This 
performance of their job 
is documented and the 
annual appraisal is 
based, among others, on 
these documentations of 
the employees.  
33  What are some practices 
that your organization uses 
to assess the safety 
performance of 
employees? 
  The HSE employees are 
said to be safety 
professionals and are 
therefore assessed 
basically on their safety-
related performance as 
shown in the record.  
34  Do employee appraisals 
emphasize long-term and 
group-based safety 
achievements? 
17 1 Responses from 
seventeen (17) of the 
professionals interviewed 
suggest that long-term 
and group-based safety 
achievements are 
emphasized in HSE 
employees’ appraisals 
but not for other 
employees. 
35  To what extent do safety 
performance appraisals 
provide employees 
feedback for personal 
development? 
   All the professionals 
interviewed suggest that 
their superior officials 
regularly report on the 
individual employee 
(irrespective of your 
department) 
performance and the 
outcome of this report is 
made known to the 
individual employee 
concerned. This report 
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helps the employee to 
know his standing and to 
adjust accordingly. 
 
36  To what extent are safety 
performance appraisals 
based on multiple sources 
(e.g self, co-workers, 
supervisors, etc)? 
  All the eighteen (18) 
interviewees suggest 
that, generally, 
supervisors appraise 
their subordinates and 
the outcome is given to 
the employee concerned 
for his information and 
comment (if any) before 
the report is sent to the 
management. The co-
workers do not appraise 
the employees in any 
company 
37  To what extent do 
supervisors get together 
with employees to set their 
personal safety goals? 
  The supervisors get 
together with their 
employees to set 
objectives (including 
safety objectives) at the 
beginning of each year in 
most of the companies 
and get together again 
on regular basis to 
review the progress and 
achievements.  
 SELF–MANAGED TEAM 
AND COLLABORATION 
How important is ability to 
work safely relative to 
ability to meeting 
production targets in 
appraising the performance 
of the employees? What 
makes one an ideal 
employee in your 
organization-meeting 
production targets or 
meeting safety targets? 
  It is a consensus 
statement by all the 
interviewees that safety 
is priority and that safety 
determines productivity. 
The safety of the 
employees, equipment, 
and the environment 
goes a long way in 
promoting companies 
productivity. So meeting 
safety targets makes one 
an ideal employee. 
39  To what extent are 
suggestions on safety 
issues implemented with 
your organization? 
  The companies believe 
more on team work 
because they assumed 
that the team work is the 
bedrock for every 
organization. Therefore, 
team’s suggestion and 
recommendations on 
safety-related matters 
are more acceptable to 
the companies than 
those of the individual 
employees. 
40  Please explain the extent to 
which your organization 
supports safety-related 
team development (e.g 
encourages self-
management and 
collaboration on safety-
related issues)? 
  Team development is 
highly supported by their 
companies because they 
are more achievement-
oriented than the 
individual. So seminars, 
workshops, monthly and 
quarterly drills focus on 
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team development. 
 SAFETY INFORMATION 
SHARING 
    
41  To what extent does your 
organization share with 
employees information 
about how well the 
organization is performing 
in safety-related issues?   
  Responses indicate that 
safety-related 
information about the 
organization is regularly 
shared with the 
employees through web, 
tool box talks, safety 
talks, awareness lecture, 
journals, safety tips, 
notice board, 
sensitization talks, safety 
briefs, routine safety 
messages dissemination, 
focal points, and so on.  
42  To what extent does your 
organization share 
information on its safety 
performance with 
employees? 
  As in 41 above. 
43  What specific practices do 
you have for ensuring 
employees are kept 
informed about safety-
related issues? 
  As in 41 above. 
 JOB AND WORK DESIGN     
44  Do the jobs employees do 
have an up to date safety-
related descriptions?  
18  Every job description is 
clearly defined in line 
with safety rules and 
procedures and jobs are 
designed to promote 
safety. 
45  Are safety requirements or 
rules clearly defined? 
18  Safety rules and 
requirements are clearly 
defined. 
46  To what extent do 
employees perform simple 
and repetitive tasks as part 
of their safety-related work? 
  Most of the work is done 
as a team. 
47  To what extent does the job 
description for a position 
accurately describe all of 
the safety rules and 
procedures? 
  The company provides 
safety-related document 
with regard to each job 
and safety requirements 
or rules and job 
description for position 
are clearly stated in the 
document.  
48  How is the work employees 
do designed or structured 
to promote safety? 
  Safety is said to be 
paramount in oil and gas 
companies and everyone 
is trained to be safety 
conscious. So the work 
employees do especially 
in the technical-oriented 
departments is designed 
to meet safety 
requirements, rules and 
procedures. In order to 
achieve this, employees 
are exposed to refresher, 
exigency, and incidental 
 
 
  
 
324 
 
 
 
 
 
The following practices were found to be in vogue in many of the companies: 
 
Internal Technical Safety Audit of Plants and Facilities 
The companies have in place a practice where the NNPC safety policy guideline is followed 
by carrying out internal technical safety audit of all their plants and facilities as well as  third 
party facilities. This is done by the HSE staff. During this exercise, the unsafe acts, operators’ 
constraints and the conditions of the plants and facilities are noted. The observation of non-
courses. There is also a 
regular job safety 
analysis. 
49  Are there other practices 
that your organization has 
developed or uses to 
promote health and safety? 
  Some other practices 
include total lost control 
community, internal 
technical safety audit of 
plants and facilities, 
safety campaign, fire 
equipment maintenance, 
accident prevention, 
management 
discretionary 
payment/reward, and 
safety initiative. The 
management 
discretionary 
payment/reward in this 
case can be explained in 
terms of the 
compensation contingent 
on safety performance.    
50  Are there organizations in 
the oil and gas industry that 
are considered leaders in 
the promotion of health and 
safety? What do you think 
is unique about these 
organizations? What can 
other organization learn 
from them in terms of 
promoting health and 
safety? 
  Some of the interviewees 
suggest that some oil 
and gas companies are 
actually leading in terms 
of promotion of health 
and safety. They believe 
that they are unique 
because of their high 
level of technology, level 
of awareness and their 
level of investment on 
safety. They also 
consider their leadership 
commitment to safety 
policy as unique. 
 
 
  
 
325 
 
compliance (if any) is made known to the location manager for his information. The 
committee then writes its report on each of the locations to the management through the 
HSE manager. 
Safety Campaign 
The safety campaign activities are in compliance with the NNPC safety policy guideline. It is 
the responsibility of the manager, HSE, the Superintendent, Fire and Safety, and the Safety 
Officers to ensure that banners, flyers, billboard, T-Shirts, Caps, Refreshment and items of 
stationary are adequately provided for this purpose. During the campaign, the officers 
concerned move from location to location to address staff on the objective of safety 
campaign, entertain questions on all aspects of safety and ensure that satisfactory 
responses are provided for the questions. During this exercise every unsafe acts and 
conditions are also observed. The committee submits its report at the end of the exercise to 
the manager HSE through the Superintendent, Fire and Safety. 
 
Fire Equipment Maintenance   
In compliance with NNPC safety policy guideline, most of the companies have detailed 
guideline for Fire Equipment Maintenance. It is the responsibility of the HSE manager, 
Superintendent, Fire and Safety and Fire Officers to ensure that fire extinguishers, caution 
tapes, barricades, gas detectors/explosimeters, work permit, working tools, and first-aid kits 
are provided and in the right positions within the locations. It is also their responsibility to see 
that these equipment are adequately maintained in line with the laid down procedure of the 
company. There is therefore constant inspection of the fire equipment in order to ensure 
adequate maintenance. 
 Accident Prevention 
The NNPC safety policy guideline also provides for activities to ensure accident prevention in 
each company. Thus it is the responsibility of the Manager HSE, Superintendent Fire and 
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Safety, and Safety Officers to ensure that safety sign posts, safety manuals, safety 
awareness signs, safety flyers, speed breakers, barricades and warning signs are 
adequately provided for employees and in the appropriate positions. It is also their duty to 
educate staff at each location on the importance of the safety signs and to ensure 
compliance by staff at locations. They are also to issue safety violation to defaulters and 
induct them on the effect of non-compliance. The report on accident is prepared by them on 
monthly, quarterly and yearly basis and sent to the manager HSE through the 
Superintendent Fire and Safety. 
Total Loss Control Community 
The total loss control community represents a situation where the company strives to achieve 
a complete condition or state of no loss of personnel, equipment and environment. Thus 
before any job is done the members of the team concerned will be invited for a practical 
informal discussion requiring every member to frankly talk why the task at hand will not be 
hundred per sent (100%) achieved. Following this frank talk, adequate provisions will be 
made to solve every potential problem and this will lead to 100% success in the task 
accomplishment with any loss. 
Safety Initiative   
Safety is said to be the responsibility of everybody from the top (i.e. the CEO) down the 
hierarchy to the peon or the general factotum. Therefore, all hands must be on deck in order 
to have, if not a complete accident-free workplace, a very close to accident-free workplace. 
This can only be achieved when the employees’ safety-related opinions are allowed. In other 
words, employees are openly allowed to give safety suggestions, advice and 
recommendations that will promote the current safety practices of the organization.  
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Appendix F: List of 41 Items Retained for Further Analysis 
 
 Safety Training 
1. This company provides safety-related training programmes for all employees 
2.  This company invests considerable amount of time and money in safety-related 
training 
3. This company provides regular safety-related training programmes for its employees 
4. Safety-related issues are well emphasized during the induction programmes for new 
employees 
Rewards Contingent on Safety Performance 
5. The company gives non-monetary rewards for exemplary safety performance 
6. There is fairness and equity in the distribution of rewards contingent on safe 
performance in this company 
7. The management recognizes the safety-related efforts by individual employees in the 
company by giving a letter of commendation, among others 
Internal Opportunity for Promotion 
8. This company gives priority to safety-related experience of internal candidates in 
terms of job openings 
9. Safety-related efforts enhance employees’ opportunity for upward movement in this 
company 
10. The letter of commendation given to an employee for exemplary safety-related efforts 
in this company enhances his/her opportunity for promotion 
11. Employees who have acquired safety-related skills have clear career paths in this 
company     
Safety Involvement and Participation 
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12. Employees in this company are represented in meetings when issues, including 
safety-related matters, affecting them are discussed before they are implemented 
13. Employees are allowed to use their discretion to handle some specific safety-related 
issues 
14. My company provides suggestion boxes and other avenues through which 
employees make suggestions and recommendations on general matters including 
safety issues 
15. This company acts upon the suggestions provided by employees (e.g. through 
suggestion boxes) 
Performance Appraisals 
16. Supervisors set performance objectives or goals (including safety goals) with their 
subordinates   
17. Performance appraisals provide employees feedback on their understanding of safety 
issues 
18. The immediate superior officers appraise their subordinates on their knowledge of 
safety-related issues but with the knowledge of the individual employee concerned  
Self-Managed Team 
19. Teams are responsible for regulation the safety performance of their members 
20. A member of the team ensures members are up to date in safety-related issues  
21. Teams are held responsible for the safety performance of their member 
22. Teams are encouraged to suggest improvement on safety-related practices 
Safety Information Sharing 
23. This company shares safety-related information with employees on regular basis 
24. Employees are given safety-related information to understand and perform their job 
safely 
25. Company-level safety performance information is shared with employees 
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26. The company shares information regarding new development in safety practice with 
employees 
Clear Job Description 
27. Every job description is clearly defined in line with safety rules and procedures 
28. Jobs are designed to enable employees to work safely 
29. The job description for each position is clearly defined in the document given to 
employees 
Safety Audit 
30. This company carries out a safety audit of its plant and facilities on a regular basis 
31. This company carries out a safety audit of the plants and facilities provided by 
contractors 
32. This company acts on issues raised as a result of the safety audit 
33. The company has procedure for ensuring compliance with statutory safety regulations 
Safety Campaign 
34. My company has a periodic safety campaign 
35. My company has safety awareness week 
36. Employees are encouraged to discuss safety-related issues during the safety 
awareness week 
37. Safety briefings are provided during the safety awareness week 
Safety Equipment Maintenance 
38. My company provides fire safety equipment in the right position within the locations 
39. My company ensures that its fire safety equipment are regularly maintained 
40. The fire safety equipment are inspected on regular basis  
41. My company provides safety sign posts, safety manuals, safety awareness signs, 
safety flyers, speed breakers, barricades and warning.   
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Appendix G: Sample of Cover Letter of Line Manager’s Questionnaire 
 
 Dear Sir/Madam 
Request for Participation in a PhD Research 
I am Paulson Okhawere, a doctoral researcher from Aston Business School, Aston 
University, Birmingham, United Kingdom. Despite the high financial and human costs of 
unsafe work behaviours, there is very little research on how companies in Nigeria’s oil and 
gas industry can promote safe work behaviours. Accordingly, I am currently conducting a 
study to investigate the extent to which companies in this industry have adopted safe work 
practices. I am therefore writing to invite you to participate in this study by completing the 
attached questionnaire. If successful, this study will generate actionable knowledge that oil 
and gas companies in Nigeria can use to promote workplace safety.  
Please read each question carefully. There are no RIGHT or WRONG answers so I urge you 
to answer each question according to how you personally feel about it. That is, as an 
accurate description of your company’s hazardous environment and safety practices adopted 
in your company. For the survey to be meaningful, please answer all questions.  
 In accordance with the ethics of behavioural science research, your responses would be 
completely CONFIDENTIAL and will only be used for the purposes of this study.   
Thank you very much for your understanding. 
Yours sincerely 
 
Paulson Okhawere 
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Appendix H: Sample of Cover Letter of Frontline Employee’s 
Questionnaire 
 
Dear Sir/Madam 
Request for Participation in a PhD Research 
I am Paulson Okhawere, a doctoral researcher from Aston Business School, Aston 
University, Birmingham, United Kingdom. Despite the high financial and human costs of 
unsafe work behaviours, there is very little research on how companies in Nigeria’s oil and 
gas industry can promote safe work behaviours. Accordingly, I am currently conducting a 
study to investigate the extent to which companies in this industry have adopted safe work 
practices. I am therefore writing to invite you to participate in this study by completing the 
attached questionnaire. If successful, this study will generate actionable knowledge that oil 
and gas companies in Nigeria can use to promote workplace safety.  
Please read each question carefully. There are no RIGHT or WRONG answers so I urge you 
to answer each question according to how you personally feel about it. That is, as an 
accurate description of safety practices adopted in your company. For the survey to be 
meaningful, please answer all questions.  
 In accordance with the ethics of behavioural science research, your responses would be 
completely CONFIDENTIAL and will only be used for the purposes of this study.   
Thank you very much for your understanding. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
Paulson Okhawere 
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Appendix I: Scales used for data collection in Study 4 
              Code: ........ 
 
 
 
Section A: Personal Information 
Sex:  
       Male 
       Female 
 Age at last birthday:          Under 30 years;          30-39 years;  40-49 years;  50-60 
years 
Employment Status:  
       Full-time  
       Part-time 
       Contract 
Level of education:  
       Below First Degree (e.g. OND, NCE, WASC, NECO, etc.) 
       First Degree or its equivalence (e.g. BSc, BA, HND, B.TECH, etc.) 
       Postgraduate Degree (e.g. MSc, MA, MBA, M.TECH, PG etc.) 
Your experience on the job: Under 3 years;  3-6 years;            7-10 years;           
Over 10 years 
How long have you worked in the oil and gas industry?         Under 3 years;            3 – 6         
years;            7 – 10 years;           Over 10 years 
How long have you worked under your present supervisor?        Under 3 years;      3 – 6 
years;          7– 10 years;         Over 10 years  
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HIGH PERFORMANCE WORK SYSTEM FOR SAFETY  
Below are practices that a company may adopt to promote health and safety at work. 
For each practice, please indicate the extent of your agreement or disagreement (by 
ticking the appropriate box) as a description of the extent to which you experience it 
in your present organization 
1 = Strongly Disagree (SD), 2 = Disagree (D), 3 = Undecided (UND), 4 = Agree (A), 5 = 
Strongly Agree (SA) 
S.No. Statement SD D UND A SA 
1 This company provides safety-related training programmes for all 
employees 
1 2 3 4 5 
2 This company invests considerable amount of time and money in 
safety-related training 
1 2 3 4 5 
3 This company provides regular safety-related training programmes 
for its employees 
1 2 3 4 5 
4 Safety-related issues are well emphasized during the apprenticeship 
(or induction) programmes for new employees 
1 2 3 4 5 
5 There is fairness and equity in the distribution of rewards contingent 
on safe performance in this company 
1 2 3 4 5 
6 The management recognizes the safety-related efforts by individual 
employees in the company by issuing outstanding employees letters 
of commendation, among others 
1 2 3 4 5 
7 This company gives priority to safety-related experience of internal 
candidates in terms of job openings 
1 2 3 4 5 
8 Safety-related efforts enhance employees’ opportunity for upward 
movement in this company 
1 2 3 4 5 
9 Employees who have acquired safety-related skills have clear 
career paths in this company     
1 2 3 4 5 
10 Employees in this company are represented in meetings when 
issues, including safety-related matters, affecting them are 
discussed before they are implemented 
1 2 3 4 5 
11 This company acts upon the suggestions provided by employees 
(e.g. through suggestion boxes) 
1 2 3 4 5 
12 In this company, supervisors set performance objectives or goals 
(including safety goals) with their subordinates 
1 2 3 4 5 
13 Performance appraisals provide employees feedback on their 
understanding of safety issues 
1 2 3 4 5 
14 Immediate superior officers appraise their subordinates on their 
safety performance 
1 2 3 4 5 
15 Teams are held responsible for the safety performance of their 
members 
1 2 3 4 5 
16 Teams are  encouraged to make suggestions regarding 
improvements in safety-related practices 
1 2 3 4 5 
17 This company shares safety-related information with employees  1 2 3 4 5 
18 This company shares information regarding new developments in 
safety practices with employees 
1 2 3 4 5 
19 Job descriptions are clearly defined in line with safety rules and 
procedures 
1 2 3 4 5 
20 Jobs are clearly designed to highlight safety requirements 1 2 3 4 5 
21 This company carries out a safety audit of its plant and facilities on a 
regular basis 
1 2 3 4 5 
22 This company carries out a safety audit of the plants and facilities 
provided by contractors 
1 2 3 4 5 
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S.No. Statement SD D UND A SA 
23 This company acts on issues raised as a result of the safety audit 1 2 3 4 5 
24 This company gives priority to periodic safety campaigns 1 2 3 4 5 
25 Employees are encouraged to discuss safety-related issues during 
the safety awareness week   
1 2 3 4 5 
26 Safety briefings are provided during the safety awareness 
campaigns 
1 2 3 4 5 
27 This company provides adequate safety equipment in strategic or 
appropriate locations on its premises 
1 2 3 4 5 
28 This company ensures that its safety equipment are regularly 
maintained 
1 2 3 4 5 
29 Safety equipment are inspected on a regular basis 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
 
SAFETY CLIMATE  
The following statements indicate the priority an organization (or manager) may place 
on workplace safety. Please indicate the extent to which each of the following 
statements describes your immediate supervisor by ticking the appropriate box 
1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Undecided, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly Agree 
 
Serial 
Number 
Statements Strongly  
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Undecided 
(3) 
Agree 
(4) 
Strongly 
Agree (5) 
1 My supervisor makes sure we receive 
all the equipment needed to do the job 
safely 
1 2 3 4 5 
2 My supervisor frequently checks to 
see if we are all obeying the safety 
rules 
1 2 3 4 5 
3 My supervisor discusses how to 
improve safety with us 
1 2 3 4 5 
4 My supervisor uses explanations (not 
just compliance) to get us to act safely 
1 2 3 4 5 
5 My supervisor emphasizes safety 
procedures when we are working 
under pressure 
1 2 3 4 5 
6 My supervisor frequently tells us about 
the hazards in our work 
1 2 3 4 5 
7 My supervisor refuses to ignore safety 
rules when work falls behind schedule 
1 2 3 4 5 
8 My supervisor is strict about working 
safely when we are tired or stressed 
1 2 3 4 5 
9 My supervisor reminds workers who 
need reminders to work safely 
1 2 3 4 5 
10 My supervisor makes sure we follow 
all the safety rules (not just the most 
important ones) 
1 2 3 4 5 
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11 My supervisor insists that we obey 
safety rules when fixing equipment or 
machines 
1 2 3 4 5 
12 My supervisor says  “good words” to 
workers who pay special attention to 
safety 
1 2 3 4 5 
13 My supervisor is strict about safety at 
the end of the shift, when we want to 
go home 
1 2 3 4 5 
14 My supervisor spends time helping us 
learn to see problems before they 
arise 
1 2 3 4 5 
15 My supervisor frequently talks about 
safety issues throughout the work 
week  
1 2 3 4 5 
16 My supervisor insists we wear our 
protective equipment even if it is 
uncomfortable 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
SAFETY KNOWLEDGE  
The following statements describe an employee’s safety-related knowledge. For each 
statement, please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree. 
1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Undecided, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly Agree 
 
Serial 
Number 
Statements 
 
Strongly  
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Undecided 
(3) 
Agree 
(4) 
Strongly 
Agree 
(5) 
1 I know how to performance my job in a 
safe manner 
1 2 3 4 5 
2 I know how to use safety equipment and 
standard work procedures 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
3 I know how to maintain or improve 
workplace health and safety 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
4 I know how to reduce the risks of accidents 
and incidents in the workplace 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
 
SAFETY MOTIVATION 
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The following statements describe an employee’s safety motivation at work. For each 
statement, please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree.  
1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Undecided, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly Agree    
Serial 
Number 
Statements Strongly  
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Undecided 
(3) 
Agree 
(4) 
Strongly 
 Agree 
(5) 
1 I believe that workplace health and 
safety are important issues  
1 2 3 4 5 
2 I feel that it is worthwhile to put in effort 
to maintain or improve my personal 
safety 
1 2 3 4 5 
3 I feel that it is important to maintain 
safety at all time 
1 2 3 4 5 
4 I believe that it is important to reduce the 
risk of accidents and incidents in the 
workplace 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
SAFETY COMPLIANCE 
The following statements represent an employee’s safety compliance in the 
workplace. Please, indicate the extent to which each of these statements describes 
you 
1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Undecided, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly Agree 
Serial 
Number 
Statements 
 
Strongly  
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Undecided 
(3) 
Agree 
(4) 
Strongly 
Agree 
(5) 
1 I carry out my work in a safe manner 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
2 I use all the necessary safety equipment 
to do my job 
1 2 3 4 5 
3 I use the correct safety procedures for 
carrying out my job 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
4 I ensure the highest levels of safety when 
I carry my job 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
 
SAFETY INITIATIVE 
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The following statements describe an employee’s safety initiative in the workplace. 
Please, indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of these 
statements. 
1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Undecided, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly Agree 
Serial  
Number 
Statements Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Undecided 
(3) 
Agree  
(4) 
Strongly  
Agree 
(5) 
1 I am involved in improving safety policy and 
practices 
1 2 3 4 5 
2 If I think it will make work safer, I initiate 
steps to improve work procedures 
1 2 3 4 5 
3 If I see something unsafe, I go out of my 
way to address it 
1 2 3 4 5 
4 I voluntarily carry out tasks or activities that 
help to improve workplace safety 
1 2 3 4 5 
5 I often make suggestions to improve how 
safety is handled around here 
1 2 3 4 5 
6 I often try new approaches to improving 
workplace safety 
1 2 3 4 5 
7 I often try to solve problems in ways that 
reduce safety risks 
1 2 3 4 5 
8 I keep abreast of changes to do with safety 1 2 3 4 5 
 
SAFETY-SPECIFIC TRANSFORMATIONAL LEADERSHIP 
The following statements represent an organization’s management style with regards 
to safety.  Please indicate the extent to which the following statements describe your 
immediate supervisor by ticking the appropriate box 
1 = Not at all, 2 = Once a While, 3 = Sometimes, 4 = Fairly Often, 5 = Frequently or 
Always 
 
Serial 
Number 
Statements Not at 
all (1) 
Once 
in a  
While 
(2) 
Sometimes 
(3) 
Fairly  
Often 
(4) 
Frequently  
Or Always 
(5) 
 
1 My supervisor expresses satisfaction when I 
perform my job safely 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
2 My supervisor makes sure that we receive 
appropriate rewards for achieving safety 
targets on the job 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
3 My supervisor provides continuous 
encouragement to do our job safety 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
4 My supervisor shows determination to 
maintain a safe work environment 
1 2 3 4 5 
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5 My supervisor suggests new ways of doing 
our jobs more safely 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
6 My supervisor encourages me to express my 
ideas and opinions about safety at work 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
7 My supervisor talks about his/her values and 
beliefs of the importance of safety 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
8 My supervisor behaves in a way that 
displays a commitment to a safe workplace 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
9 My supervisor spends time showing me the 
safest way to do things at work 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
10 My supervisor would listen to my concern 
about safety on the job 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
BOTTOM-LINE ORIENTATION 
Below are statements that describe orientation to the bottom-line (usually 
profit/productivity) or whatever is worth paying attention to while neglecting 
everything else. For each statement, please indicate the extent of your agreement or 
disagreement as a description of your work unit’s orientation to the bottom-line 
1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Undecided, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly Agree 
 
Serial 
Number 
Statements Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Undecided 
(3) 
Agree 
(4) 
Strongly  
Agree 
(5) 
1 In my work unit, we are 
solely concerned with 
meeting the bottom-line 
1 2 3 4 5 
2 Colleagues in my work 
unit only care about the 
business 
1 2 3 4 5 
3 In my work unit, we 
treat the bottom-line as 
more important than 
anything else 
1 2 3 4 5 
4 Colleagues in my work 
unit care more about 
profits than employee 
well-being 
1 2 3 4 5 
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SAFETY-RELATED EVENTS 
Please indicate the frequency with which each of the following events has occurred to 
you over the past one (1) year  
1 = Never, 2 = Rarely, 3 = Sometimes, 4 = Often, 5 = Frequently         
Serial 
Number 
Statements Never 
 (1) 
Rarely 
(2) 
Sometimes 
(3) 
Often 
(4) 
Frequently 
(5) 
 
1 I was exposed to some dangerous chemicals 
(e.g. hydro-sulphuric acid,  
Hydro-fluoric acid, etc. ) 
1 2 3 4 5 
2 I was exposed to some dangerous gases 
(e.g. carbon monoxide, ammonia gas, 
hydrogen sulphide, etc.) 
     
3 I tripped over something on the floor (e.g. 
empty cans, metal scraps, liquids, work 
tools/instruments, etc.) 
1 2 3 4 5 
4 A sharp object (e.g. rotating parts of 
machines such as compressors, fin fans, 
etc.) cut my hand while working 
1 2 3 4 5 
5 My clothes got caught in something (e.g. 
rotating parts of pumps, compressors, fin 
fans, etc.) while working  
1 2 3 4 5 
6 I slipped on liquid substances (e.g. liquid 
gas) or other objects on the floor 
1 2 3 4 5 
7 I came in contact with dangerous equipment 
(e.g. high pressure and high temperature 
steam lines, etc.) that almost caused an 
injury 
1 2 3 4 5 
8 A heavy object (e.g. a sledge hammer, 
spanner, screw, etc.) dropped on my body 
part (e.g., foot). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
WORKPLACE INJURIES 
Please indicate how often, over the past SIX (6) months, you required First Aid 
treatment for each of the types of injuries listed below  
1 = Never, 2 = Rarely, 3 = Sometimes, 4 = Often, 5 = Frequently 
Serial 
Number 
Statements Never 
 (1) 
Rarely 
 (2) 
Sometimes 
(3) 
Often 
 (4) 
Frequently 
(5) 
 
1 Fracture 1 2 3 4 5 
2 Dislocation, sprain, strain 1 2 3 4 5 
3 Bruising, crushing 1 2 3 4 5 
4 Scratch, abrasion, (superficial wound) 1 2 3 4 5 
5 Cut, laceration, puncture (open wound) 1 2 3 4 5 
6 Burn, scald 1 2 3 4 5 
7 Eye injury 1 2 3 4 5 
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8 Concussion, head injury 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
9 Gassing 1 2 3 4 5 
10 Hernia 1 2 3 4 5 
11 Different types of shocks 1 2 3 4 5 
12 Multiple injuries 1 2 3 4 5 
13 Others (please specify) 1 2 3 4 5 
END 
Please go over the questionnaire and ensure every item has been completed. Thank 
you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire. 
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Appendix J: Summary of the Psychometric Properties of HPWS for 
Safety Scale 
 
Type of  
Validity 
Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Study 4 
Face  
Validity 
Conducted 
interview with 
managers and 
professionals to 
generate 14 
domains and 64 
items  
 
   
     
Content 
 Validity 
Engaged 11 
doctoral 
researchers drawn 
from Aston 
Business School as 
judges to classify or 
sort the 64 items to 
the 14 theoretical 
domains 
underpinning the 
construct. 14 
domains and 41 
items were 
retained. 
EFA conducted 
indicated that 29 items 
loaded on three factors, 
explaining 55.88% of 
the total variance. This 
is consistent with the 
theoretical foundation 
(AMO) upon which the 
construct was built.  
 
 EFA conducted 
indicated that the 
27 items (having 
removed two items 
on clear job 
description) loaded 
on five-factor 
components. A 
closer look at the 
screeplot (See 
Figure 5.1) 
suggested a clear 
break after the 
third component. 
So Catell’s (1966) 
test was used to 
retain three-factor 
component for 
further 
investigation.  
     
 My supervisory 
team observed that 
three of the 
proposed domains 
appeared to 
measure outcomes 
rather than 
practices. The 3 
domains: accident 
prevention, total 
loss control 
community, and 
safety initiative 
were dropped. 11 
domains and 41 
items were retained 
for further analysis.   
Consistent with some 
researchers’ (e. g. 
Aryee, et al. 2012; 
Zacharatos & 
colleagues, 2005; 
Kanfer, 1985; Comrey, 
1978) subscale 
summation approach, 
the average of the 
scores of items of each 
subscale was calculated 
and used for conducting 
EFA. Table 3.9 shows a 
one-factor solution, 
accounting for 66.22% 
of the total variance 
explained. This now 
constitutes a system of 
HPWS for safety scale,  
 Watkin’s (2000) 
Monte Carlo PCA 
for parallel 
analysis indicates 
three-factor 
components with 
eigenvalues 
exceeding the 
corresponding 
criterion values for 
a randomly 
generated data 
matrix of the same 
size (27 x 569) 
(See Tables 5.1 & 
5.2). This supports 
the decision to 
retain three-factor 
solution. Three-
factor solution was 
then forced (see 
Table 5.3). 
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    Note: The three-
factor solution 
here is similar to 
that obtained in 
Study 2 except 
that safety 
information 
sharing loaded on 
opportunity-
enhancing 
component instead 
of motivation-
enhancing 
component. 
     
 Interrater Reliability 
Assessment was 
done to determine 
the level of 
similarity among the 
judges’ ratings. The 
interrater reliability 
coefficients ranged 
from 0.33 to 0.99 
with an average of 
0.77, indicating a 
high level of 
similarity among the 
judges’ ratings. The 
11 domains and 41 
items were used to 
form a HPWS for 
safety scale for pilot 
testing. 
The internal consistency 
reliability coefficients 
(Cronbach, 1951) of the 
Subscales range from 
0.73 to 0.92 and the 
alpha for the whole 
scale was 0.97 (See 
footnote of Table 3.12), 
all greater than 0.70 
suggested by Nunnally 
(1978) (See Table 
3.10). 
 Table 5.5 indicates 
that positive and 
significant 
correlations exist 
among the 
variables in each 
factor. 
     
  To determine whether 
the HPWS for safety 
scale accounts for the 
majority of the variance 
of each subscale, the 
squared multiple 
correlation for the 
subscale was calculated 
to see whether it is 
greater than 0.50 
(Fornell & Larcker, 
1981).  Table 3.11 
shows that the squared 
multiple correlations of 
the subscales range 
from 0.59 to 0.75, > 
0.50, demonstrating 
very high construct 
reliability. 
Fornell and Larcker’s 
(1981) construct 
reliability coefficient of 
the whole scale was 
0.95 > 0.70 suggested 
by Netemeyer, Burton, 
& Lichtenstein (2003) 
 The Cronbach’s 
(1951) alpha 
coefficients of the 
three components 
range from 0.87 to 
0.91 as compared 
to 0.88 to 0.95 in 
Study 2. 
The Cronbach’s 
(1951) alpha 
coefficients range 
from 0.70 to o.88 
except safety 
involvement and 
participation 
(0.60). 
The Cronbach’s 
(1951) alpha 
coefficient of the 
whole scale was 
0.92. 
 
     
  Because the study   
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assumes that each item 
or indicator is 
associated with only 
one factor constituting 
the HPWS for safety 
scale, MacKenzie, 
Podsakoff, and 
Podsakoff (2011) 
recommend that the 
construct reliability of 
each item or indicator 
should be assessed by 
examining the squared 
multiple correlations for 
the item or indicator. 
Table 3.12 shows that 
each item had a 
squared multiple 
correlation value 
(ranging from 0.51 to 
0.83) greater than 0.50 
(Fornell & Larcker, 
1981).  
     
  Table 3.12 also shows 
that all the items were 
positively correlated, 
meaning that the items 
or indicators are 
measuring the same 
underlying construct or 
characteristics.  
  
     
Convergent  
Validity 
  The new scale correlated 
positively and 
significantly with 
theoretically or 
conceptually similar 
constructs: HPWS scale 
(Zacharatos and 
colleagues, 2005) (r = 
0.72, p < 0.01), and 
safety-specific 
transformational 
leadership scale (r = 
0.52, p < 0.01). 
 The CFA results 
confirm the three-
factor and one-
factor solutions 
obtained in the 
EFAs in Study 2 
and Study 4 
     
   The average variance 
explained (AVE: Fornell 
& Larcker, 1981) is 0.56 
> 0.50 
The average 
variance explained 
(AVE: Fornell & 
Larcker, 1981) 
was 0.62 > 0.50 
    Each of the 10 
subscales is 
significantly 
related to the 
system of HPWS 
for safety scale 
(Bollen & Lennox, 
1991; Bollen, 
1989) (See Table 
5.8) 
Discriminant    The new scale Tables 5.9 and 
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Validity demonstrated a non-
significant but positive 
correlation with a 
theoretically dissimilar 
construct: social 
desirability (r = 0.05) 
(See Table 3.15). 
5.10 present the 
results of the 
confirmatory factor 
analyses of the 
distinctiveness of 
the unit-level and 
individual-level 
variables 
respectively. 
The hypothesized 
four-factor model 
at the unit-level fit 
the data well and 
better than all the 
alternative models. 
 
In the same 
manner, the 
hypothesized 
seven- factor 
model at the 
individual-level of 
analysis fit the 
data well and 
better than all the 
alternative models.  
     
   Z-test statistics was used 
to compare the 
correlations between the 
new scale and 
theoretically or 
conceptually similar and 
dissimilar constructs 
(Kinicki, Jacobson, 
Peterson, & Prussia, 
2013). The result shows 
that the new scale’s 
correlation with HPWS 
scale (r = 0.72) is 
significantly different (Z-
obs = 9.84 > 1.96, p < 
0.01) from the new 
scale’s correlation with 
social desirability (r = 
0.05). 
 The result also shows 
that the new scale’s 
correlation with safety-
specific transformational 
leadership scale (r = 
0.52) is significantly 
different (Z-obs = 6.03 > 
1.96, p < 0.01) from the 
new scale’s correlation 
with social desirability 
scale (r = 0.05).   
 
     
   The study examined 
whether the HPWS for 
safety scale is less than 
perfectly correlated with 
the conceptually similar 
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constructs (Anderson & 
Gerbing, 1988). Table 
3.15 shows that the 
HPWS for safety scale is 
less than perfectly 
correlated with HPWS 
scale by Zacharatos and 
colleagues (2005) (r = 
0.72 < 1) and safety-
specific transformational 
leadership scale (r = 
0.52 < 1) being the 
constructs that were 
considered to be 
conceptually similar to 
the new scale.  
     
   The AVE of HPWS for 
safety scale (0.56) is 
greater than its shared 
variances with HPWS 
(0.52,), safety-specific 
transformational 
leadership (0.27), safety 
compliance (0.22), safety 
participation (0.22), 
safety initiative (0.19), 
and organization-based 
self-esteem (0.06). 
These results support 
discriminant validity of 
the scale (Farrel & Rudd, 
2009; Fornell & Larcker, 
1981). 
 
     
Criterion-
Related 
Validity 
  The HPWS for safety 
scale is significantly 
related to safety 
compliance (r = 0.47, p < 
0.01), safety participation 
(r = 0.47, p < 0.01), 
safety initiative (r = 0.44, 
p < 0.01), and 
organization-based self-
esteem (r = 0.25, p < 
0.01) which were 
hypothesized to be 
within its nomological 
construct (See Table 
3.15 ). 
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